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Chapter 1
Introduction
The last decade we have witnessed advances in information and communication tech-
nologies. These ICTs play a central role in the world economy (OECD 2004): the rise
of the Internet has facilitated the dissemination of information, while at the same time
technological progress enhances the acquisition of information, for example in health care.
Nevertheless, information processing is still bounded by human nature, and the ease by
which one economic agent can nowadays contact another may overload the latter. Other
limitations are that not everything of value can be digitalized, exchange via Internet is
indirect and disclosure of personal information may enable discrimination. The impact of
these technologies on society is therefore equivocal. Indeed, OECD (2004) identifies the
following as major policy issues of ICTs: lack of trust in the online environment, privacy
concerns and combating spam.
This book consists of five essays that each discusses some of the above issues and
analyzes the impact of an information or communication technology on the functioning
of markets. The thesis consists of two parts. Part I discusses how and to what extent
the Internet can be used for retailing. Access to the Internet by households has been
rising almost everywhere, and ranged in 2001 between 40% and 60% of households in
Northern Europe and North America (OECD 2002). The Internet offers new ways for
supply and demand to meet and trade. A distinctive feature of retailing electronically is
that transactions no longer require the physical coordination of buyers and sellers: market
participants find each other at their screens. There are many aspects of market interaction
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which are affected by this online nature of trade (see also Borenstein and Saloner 2001).
On the supply side, we may think of all kinds of cost reductions, resulting from new ways
of organizing production and sales processes. On the demand side, the major impact of
the Internet is on consumers’ ability to acquire information about product characteristics
and prices. Moreover, due to the global nature of the Internet, there is a potentially
dramatic increase in market size: a firm selling online may reach customers worldwide,
round the clock. Yet, there are also drawbacks associated to online trading. In this part
of the book the trade-offs that are involved are investigated thoroughly in order to explain
the importance of online retailing.
Part II concerns information acquisition. In many markets, information is not being
held symetrically: the buyer for example does not now the characteristics of a good
as well as the seller does. Since the seminal paper by Akerlof (1970) many authors
have shown how taking such an informational structure of a market into account can
lead to dramatic predictions, like the foreclosure of trade. My approach instead is to
analyze how the uninformed party can improve upon his disadvantage, by employing some
technology to uncover what is unknown. This information acquisition is commonplace;
a buyer of a car tries the car, an employer interviews a job candidate and an insurer
asks numerous questions to an insuree. Also organizations such as assessment centers and
certification agencies specialize in this task and are widespread. The essays study this use
of information in the insurance market and when receiving large numbers of applications
for a prize or contract. The technology based solution is explicitly set aside from earlier
studied solutions that are incentive based, such as signaling and screening.
Each essay is self-contained and discusses the relevant literature in detail. I now discuss
both parts in more detail.
Part I: Retailing on the Internet
Borenstein and Saloner (2001) and Bakos (2001) sketch far-reaching transformative
powers to online retailing and motivate the need for economic analysis. While electronic
commerce is now indeed an established retail channel, its share of total sales does not
exceed 2% in 2000, which contrasts with the high level of Internet use (OECD 2002).
The expectation that the Internet would prevail in a ‘New Economy’, that was held by
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many observers a decade a go, has clearly not materialized. Yet Bakos (2001) quotes
a projection for the year 2005 that 7.8% of sales will be online. On a more skeptical
tone, Ellison and Ellison (2005) suggest that the online environment does not eliminate
all frictions as predicted, thus not creating the rather utopian “frictionless commerce”.
The question of the importance of Internet retailing is thus an open one. In this part
of the thesis the frictions in commerce are analyzed in detail and additionally, we suggest
that online trading may create new frictions, such as the inability to evaluate intangible
product attributes and the indirect nature of payment and delivery. OECD (2002) and
Hummerston (2001) report that these barriers are indeed empirically significant. We
incorporate these barriers in theoretical analysis, thereby contributing to understanding
the gap between Internet access and sales, and between the promising prospect of e-
commerce and the reality of its low share.
Another intriguing discrepancy on the research agenda is between the prices set by
different online retailers for one and the same product (Ellison and Ellison 2005 and
Borenstein and Saloner 2001). In many e-commerce environments, a consumer checking
prices is exposed to offerings by rival firms on the same webpage, and the price dispersion
is therefore surprising at first sight. Some explanations have been given in an overview
by Ellison and Ellison (2005). We contribute to understanding observed price differences
by characterizing firms’ online entry and pricing strategies. For firms, online retailing
requires an investment and their presence online may be far from profitable when it
only cannibalizes on their own customer base. Various industry structures emerge in our
analysis and we attribute some of the anomalies in price dispersion to these structures
and to market conditions.
This part of the thesis thus extensively models the incentives to use the Internet, for
consumers and firms. The results provide insights about the organization of the industry,
the market share of e-commerce and the prices that are charged.
In Chapter 2, a model is devised in which there are two firms, both selling offline as
well as online. We consider the question to what extent consumers will substitute the
conventional retail channel for the Internet. On the Internet, product attributes that can
be communicated digitally can easily be checked and compared, such as prices. However,
intangible attributes such as fit cannot be evaluated. The trade-off a consumer faces is
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thus between price information that can be found online, and product information that
can be found offline. On the supply side, a firms’ optimal pricing strategy depends on the
number of prices a consumer compares. The pricing policy for a firm that sells mostly
through his conventional shop is less competitive than one that sells mainly through
Internet, where potential consumers are informed about the rivals’ offer. This interaction
is analyzed in a game and relates the share of Internet sales to the degree of confidence
in the online environment. Surprisingly, prices are dispersed, and the consumer that is
lured to the electronic shop by the expectation to find low prices often discovers that the
price is not low enough for compensating the lack of confidence and does not purchase at
all.
Chapter 3 contributes to the understanding of e-commerce by analyzing the stage
where firms decide whether to sell online or not. Initially, there are two offline firms, and
various entry decisions are analyzed, including one in which a third player enters with
an online channel only. The latter possibility provides scope for entry deterrence. Firms
are differentiated with respect to both physical location and their products, but on the
Internet only the latter kind plays a role. When entering online, the incumbent firms
have the advantage of bringing their product reputation with them. Additionally, in this
model consumers may find the Internet either more or less convenient than conventional
shopping. Equilibrium market structure and prices for either case are being analyzed,
allowing us to explain for example the low viability of pure online players and why prices
can be higher online than offline.
Part II: Using information acquisition technology
The second part of the book is related to the literature on asymmetric information.
From a methodological viewpoint, this literature enriches the prevailing perfect compe-
tition model (Maki, 2001). The fact that the Nobel Prize 2001 was awarded to George
Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz shows that information economics now fully
belongs to the core of economic science. Most existing work has discussed the conse-
quences of a given situation of asymmetric information for the market outcome. My
essays rather analyze how the uninformed party can improve upon his disadvantage by
employing some technology and I discern such an approach from earlier studied solutions
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that are incentive based and often costly to implement, such as signaling and screening.
In an overview article on signaling and screening, Riley (2001) supports this approach:
"there is a strong incentive for the market to seek alternative means of information
transmission [for signaling or screening devices]. It is likely that in environments where
this is the case, there will be evidence of direct testing, early monitoring, etc. -all provided
to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, asymmetric information." (p. 474)
and emphasizes "the need for further discussion of equilibrium in which screening/signaling
costs are not perfectly negatively correlated with quality." (p. 475).
In Chapters 4 and 5, adverse selection in insurance is taken as the starting point.
Insurers try to overcome their disadvantage by acquiring information about the appli-
cants’ health. Some practices, such as genetic screening, are highly controversial as such
disclosure of personal information inflicts upon privacy, yet health-related biotechnology
is developing at unprecedented speed (OECD 2005). In Chapter 4, I look at the situation
where insurers screen applicants before signing a contract. With this knowledge, they can
offer different terms to high and low risks. This constitutes a loss for the high risks and a
gain for the low risks, since adverse selection is softened. To contribute to the debate on
the desirability of such discrimination, I show when aggregate surplus increases and when
this is not the case. Interestingly, this depends on the risk attitude of insurees, when for
example risk aversion is low, the discrimination mechanism I study saves the market from
being eradicated by adverse selection.
For many contracts, insurees are required to provide information to the insurer them-
selves. Insurance law provides for contestability, that is, after a claim has been filed the
insurer may dispute a claim by showing that the insuree provided false information. This
is the subject of Chapter 5: information use by the insurer after the contract has been
signed. Smoking behaviour in the application for life insurance is the leading example.
Again, there are counterforcing welfare effects: the highest risks are being discouraged
to purchase non-smokers insurance, softening adverse selection, but the non-smokers face
the risky dispute and the smokers pay a higher premium. I devise a model that allows
me to compute the aggregate welfare effects and it turns out that the distinction between
non-smokers contracts and smokers contracts (as we observe in the U.S., among other
countries) generates less welfare than a one-contract economy.
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Chapter 6 is the final essay, where in addition to information acquisition, I analyze the
consequences of the ease with which individuals and firms can contact one another. The
difficulties of processing on one hand and the ease of sending on the other, together create
problems such as spam, that accounts for as much as 60% of all e-mail (OECD 2004).
More generally, the challenge of allocating attention to the desired sources encompasses
recognizing the ever-changing unwanted sender, while at the same time avoiding desired
senders being blocked.
I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or
not. Abilities are private information and in an attempt to select the best candidate,
the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. Imperfection is incor-
porated by letting the accuracy of the ranking of candidates decrease in the number of
applicants being processed. A committee therefore sometimes suffers from overload and
an optimal strategy appears to be to randomly ignore some applicants. The choice of
application cost, size of the prize and use of information technology are being studied.
To this end, I model the incentives to apply extensively and it appears that the number
of individuals that has access to the contest is an important variable. The emergence of
online job search (as well as searches for grants etc.) suggests that the use of Internet
increases this number substantially. However, since this competition is taken into account
by each individual, I show in this chapter that the actual number of applying candidates
might decrease in market size. The question being addressed is whether an increase in the
market size (due to e.g. the Internet), urges a capacity-constrained committee to raise
the utility cost of applying or invest in its ranking technology. One of the dangers turns
out to be the possibility that no one applies. The optimal strategy that I characterize
strikes a balance between this danger and overload, which is a challenge faced by any
communication technology.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the thesis and concludes.
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Chapter 2
Electronic Commerce and Retail
Channel Substitution
2.1 Introduction
The importance of the Internet as a marketplace has substantially grown the past few
years, even though expectations have tempered after March 2000. A distinctive feature of
doing business electronically is that transactions no longer require the physical coordina-
tion of buyers and sellers: market participants find each other at their screens. There are
many aspects of market interaction which are affected by this online nature of trade. On
the supply side, we may think of all kinds of cost reductions, resulting from new ways of
organizing production and sales processes. On the demand side, the major impact of the
Internet is on consumers’ ability to acquire information about product characteristics and
prices. Moreover, due to the global nature of the Internet, there is a potentially dramatic
increase in market size: a firm selling online may reach customers worldwide, round the
clock. Finally, as far as information goods are concerned, the distribution process can be
made entirely electronically.
While electronic commerce has an enormous potential, it is good to realize that even
for books and CDs it is still of minor importance compared to other retail channels.1 It is
0This chapter is a version of an article co-authored by Maarten Janssen.
1According to a study by the Boston Consulting Group (2000) in the United States and Europe,
e-commerce accounts for less than 5 percent of total sales in the books and CDs categories.
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important, however, to consider the question to what extent consumers will substitute the
Internet for the conventional retail channel. This paper provides a theoretical framework
that sheds some light on the relative importance of different factors that determine the
market share of electronic sales. In doing so, we also investigate the way in which the
Internet may promote competition in markets.
The basic point of our paper is to account for the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the online retail channel compared to conventional stores. On the Internet, it is easy
to find firms and compare their prices, but the online nature of the transaction leads to
uncertainties. For example, it is more difficult to assess how well a particular product
fits the specific needs of the costumer. Other uncertainties and inconveniences are related
to the payment method and the delivery.2 We refer to the uncertainty associated with
an online purchase as ‘online uncertainty’. In a conventional store, physical inspection of
goods is much easier, but in order to compare firms’ offers one has to make more than
one costly visit. We will refer to this disadvantage of a visit in the offline channel as
‘best-price uncertainty’. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to contribute to the
understanding of the functioning of electronic markets by analyzing the trade-off between
(i) online uncertainty on the Internet and (ii) best-price uncertainty in the conventional
store.
The view that some consumers may derive a lower value from an online purchase, as
compared to a conventional purchase, can be expressed as follows:
”Why do users decide not to shop?
The reasons why more online users decide not to shop online despite the
fact that they have considered it, than those who actually do, may be several:
... E-commerce web sites must also carry part of the responsibility, as many
are not good at making the shopping experience easy and trustworthy for
the online users. Lack of privacy statements, difficult navigation, poor prod-
uct declarations, slow delivery of goods, limited price discounts, uncertainty
2A survey by Hummerston (2001) indicates that the most important reason for not purchasing online
is related to payment security and the second most important reason is given by ‘You don’t know what
you get.’ and ‘Easier/more fun to buy goods/services in a store.’
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around security, and unclear redemption policies are examples of issues faced
by the users.” Andersen (2000).
We present a duopoly model where firms sell in both the conventional and the elec-
tronic retail channel. Firms sell homogeneous products and the price at which a firm
sells the product is the same in both retail channels. There are two types of consumers.
Experienced consumers do not incur purchase uncertainties online. As a result they al-
ways search on the Internet for the lowest price of the product. Inexperienced consumers,
in contrast, incur an online uncertainty. For example, they do not know which version
of a product they like best, prior to physical inspection. They therefore face a trade-off
between best-price uncertainty, if they purchase in the store, and online uncertainty, if
they purchase online. We shall refer to the percentage of experienced consumers in the
economy as market maturity. The pricing decisions by firms and the shopping decisions
by buyers are modelled as a simultaneous move game.
By means of this model, we arrive at the following insights. First, searching consumers
do not always buy. We find that inexperienced consumers who search the Internet may
not purchase, if the online uncertainty is not compensated by a low price. As was pointed
out above by the survey of Andersen (2000), this so-called drop-out seems relevant for
electronic markets.
Second, the share of the market captured by the electronic channel crucially depends on
the importance of the online uncertainty and the maturity of the market. The more non-
digital product attributes matter, such as in the clothing industry, the more important is
physical inspection, hence the online uncertainty is large in that case. As a result, more
buyers frequent the conventional store and channel substitution is small. Market maturity
has the following surprising impact: if some inexperienced consumers use the Internet,
the total market share of this channel decreases in market maturity. The reason for this
result is that when a market matures, the gain from comparing prices decreases.
Third, we show that the equilibrium exhibits price dispersion. The reason for this
result is as follows. Firms have monopoly power over those consumers who visit the
physical store and observe only one price. This gives firms incentives to charge high
prices. However, firms also aim at attracting the consumers who browse their Internet
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homepages searching for the best price. These consumers give firms incentives to charge
lower prices. The interplay of these two forces results in price dispersion: some firms
aim at selling to a few consumers in the conventional store at higher prices, others aim
at selling to more consumers at lower prices. In equilibrium, the two different strategies
result in the same profit.
Fourth, the equilibrium price distribution is such that marginal cost pricing never
occurs. Interestingly, the expected price increases in the number of price comparing con-
sumers, if some inexperienced consumers also use the Internet. Finally, if no inexperienced
consumer uses the Internet, the price distribution is not depending on online uncertainty,
while if this channel does receive some inexperienced consumers, the expected price is
increasing in online uncertainty.
Our theoretical framework is built around three crucial assumptions. Firstly, both
firms are present on both retail channels. The relevance of these so-called multichannel
retailers has widely been recognized. In Europe, multichannel retailers accounted for
two-thirds of the online retail sales in 1999 (Boston Consulting Group 2000). A ‘clicks-
and-mortar’ approach seems to be good business practice, as multichannel retailers have
a brand advantage over their ‘pure-play’ counterparts. Internet retailers start recognizing
the importance of a physical presence for customer satisfaction. The two other other
important features of our model are that, for a particular product, a firm sets the same
price on the Internet as in the physical store, and that consumers search only once. Section
5 discusses these assumptions extensively.
There is an emerging theoretical and empirical literature on the implications of the
Internet for the competitiveness of markets. On the empirical side, a number of studies
compare average prices and price dispersion in electronic marketplaces against those in
conventional markets. Some studies find that prices in electronic markets are lower than
corresponding prices in conventional markets (see, e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith (1999)),
while others report that prices in electronic markets are approximately equal to (see, e.g.,
Clay et al. (2000)) or even higher than prices in conventional stores (see, e.g., Lee (1997)
and Bailey (1998)). Some of these studies also find that price dispersion is not lower
on-line than in traditional outlets.
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On the theoretical side, there are papers by Bakos (1997) and Janssen and Moraga
(2000), among others, studying the implications of a reduction in search cost due to the
emergence of Internet on the competitiveness of markets. Bakos presents a model of
circular product differentiation where consumers search for prices and product features.
In his model, consumers can get to know all product characteristics if they engage in costly
search. In our model, in contrast, consumers cannot get around some of the uncertainties
associated with buying on the Internet. Commenting on Bakos’ paper, Harrington, Jr.
(2001) questions the validity of some of Bakos’ results.
Janssen and Moraga present a consumer search model showing that a reduction in
consumer search cost does not unambiguously imply increased competition.
There are a few papers addressing the issue of channel substitution. Zettelmeyer
(2000) focuses on the incentives firms have to increase the ease with which consumers can
evaluate their products. Consumer search cost is in this way a strategic variable of firms.
He shows that firms may provide selected groups of consumers with different information
(level of search cost), thereby providing monopoly power to the firms and reducing market
competition. The focus of our model is different. The source of monopoly power in our
model lies in the fact that some consumers visit one conventional store only and, hence,
do not compare prices. In other words, a major difference is that in our model consumers
have to search to learn prices, whereas prices are known in Zettelmeyer’s world.
Lal and Sarvary (1999) pose a different question: When is the Internet likely to decrease
price competition? They study a model in which a consumer needs to evaluate the
product, like clothing, physically to learn about its non-digital attributes. Firms are also
present on two retail channels. Since digital attributes can be communicated over the
web, the Internet changes the effective search cost structure: without the Internet, the
cost of evaluating an unfamiliar brand of clothing is the cost of visiting an additional
store. With the Internet however, consumers do not have to visit the store at all to buy
their familiar brand, and thus, the cost of trying another brand is to undertake the entire
shopping trip. In this way, the Internet may increase the effective cost of search and
customer loyalty, which decreases price competition.
Finally, Mazón and Pereira (2000) analyse whether firms have incentives to open
electronic retail channels and the different price equilibria these incentives generate. They
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show that, depending on variables as possible retail cost reductions, established firms may
or may not compete with new virtual shops.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium properties. Section 4 discusses the model’s predictions when
parameters values change. A discussion about the robustness of the model and conclusions
are contained in Section 5 and proofs are contained in an Appendix.
2.2 The Model
On the supply side there are two vertically integrated firms, each offering a homogeneous
good in a conventional physical store and on the Internet. Firms produce the good at
constant returns to scale at zero production cost.
On the demand side of the market, there is a mass of consumers, normalised to one.
The consumer has a maximum willingness to pay for the good equal to v and purchases
at most one unit. There are two types of consumers. The first type incurs an online
uncertainty such that when she buys online, the value of her purchase is equal to λv,
where λ ≤ 1. We will refer to this type as the inexperienced consumer. The second type
does not incur this uncertainty. We will call this second type the experienced consumer.
The uncertainty can be seen as resulting from the inability to physically inspect a good
online and hence, to select the most preferred version of a good. In this interpretation,
the novel feature is that some consumers do not know what they want to have prior to
inspection, that is, they are uncertain about their preferences, while some do know their
preferences.3
There are 1−µ inexperienced consumers and µ experienced consumers, with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1.
Both types have a restricted time endowment such that consumers can either visit the
Internet, where they can observe all prices, or they can visit one store.4
3As mentioned above, another model that comes close to this feature is Zettelmeyer (2000). Above
we discussed the major differences.
4Here we recognize that, although often suggested otherwise, searching on the Internet does take time.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that it takes the same amount of time to visit
two sites electronically or one shop physically. Section 2.5 contains more discussion on this point.
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In our model, firms and consumers play a simultaneous move game. An individual firm
i sets its price pi, taking price behavior of the rival, firm j, as well as consumers’ search
behavior as given. Consumers form expectations about their individual valuations and
the prices in the market and decide which channel to search. Experienced consumers do
not incur online uncertainty and they will therefore just look for the best price. Inexperi-
enced consumers however face a trade-off and may either search the store or the Internet.
Specifically, we will say that a fraction α searches the store and a fraction (1− α) searches
the Internet, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If this consumer searches the Internet, she either buys at
the lowest price, or if this lowest price is too high, she exits without making a purchase. If
she searches the conventional store, she observes only the price charged by the particular
firm she visits.
The pay-offs to the players of this game can be expressed as follows. For the firms:
Πi
¡
pi, pj
¢
=



h
α(1−µ)
2
+ µ+ (1− α) (1− µ)
i
pi if pi < pj and pi ≤ λvh
α(1−µ)
2
+ µ
i
pi if pi < pj and λv < pi ≤ vh
α(1−µ)
2
i
pi if pj < pi ≤ v
.
(2.1)
This can be understood as follows. Firm i obtains a per consumer profit of pi. In the store,
the firm sells to the inexperienced consumers who (i) search the store, which happens
with probability α and (ii) who find the store of i, which happens with probability one
half. This results in a demand of α (1− µ) /2. On the Internet, the firm attracts all µ
experienced consumers when it asks a lower price than the rival, since they observe all
prices and buy from the cheapest firm. Additionally, the (1− α) (1− µ) inexperienced
consumers who search the Internet, also go for the lowest price, but purchase only if the
lowest price does not exceed their maximum willingness to pay of λv.
The expected value a consumer derives is straightforward to determine. For the inex-
perienced consumer:
v − E (pi) if she searches the store of firm i,
Pr [min [p1, p2] ≤ λv]×
{λv −E (min [p1, p2] | min [p1, p2] ≤ λv)} if she searches the Internet .
(2.2)
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The surplus for the experienced consumer can be described as follows:
v −E (min [pi, pj]) if he searches the Internet,
v −E (pi) if he searches the store of firm i.
Since we will illustrate below that the model exhibits price dispersion, we have E (p) >
E (min [p]). It is then easy to see that the experienced consumer will choose to visit the
Internet, since he can obtain the same value v in both channels.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we will analyze possible equilibrium configurations and their properties.
An equilibrium is a pricing strategy, one for each firm, and a set of decisions where to
shop, one for each consumer, such that no one has an incentive to change his behavior. A
first observation is that there is no pure strategy equilibrium. To see why, suppose firm
i adopts the strategy to set pi∗, its rival will have an incentive to set its price just below
pi∗, such that it can capture all experienced consumers. If we continue this reasoning
we end up with Bertrand prices, pi∗ = pj∗ = 0. However, these prices do not constitute
an equilibrium either: firm i will raise price so as to collect some revenues from the
inexperienced consumers in its store.5
Thus, firms play mixed strategies and randomly pick a price from a set of prices, with
each price generating the same expected pay-off. We will denote the mixed strategy of
firms by F (p): the probability that a firm charges a price smaller than p.
The following result shows that there are no equilibria in which all inexperienced
consumers prefer the Internet, i.e. α = 0. Therefore, full retail channel substitution does
not occur. Additionally, we have shown above that experienced consumers never use the
physical store. The lemma proves.
Lemma 2.1 An equilibrium where (i) α = 0 or (ii) experienced consumers use the phys-
ical store does not exist.
5A similar argument establishes that there are no mass points in the mixed strategy of firms.
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Proof. (i) Suppose α = 0, then all consumers of both types would use the Internet and
therefore, observe all prices. This would lead firms to charge Bertrand prices, i.e. both
prices equal to marginal cost, normalized to zero pi = pj = 0. If this were so, inexperienced
consumers would prefer the store, since there they can avoid online inconveniences, and
hence, make a better purchase. Thus, α = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
(ii) Experienced consumers obtain valuation v in both channels, but pay a strictly
lower price on the Internet than in the store, since E (min [pi, pj]) < E (p).6
We now proceed by investigating the pricing behavior of firms for the case that α > 0.
We will distinguish two situations: α = 1, i.e., all inexperienced consumers visit the store
and hence, no channel substitution occurs, and 0 < α < 1, i.e., inexperienced consumers
randomize between visiting the store and visiting the Internet. This second case can
be interpreted as a situation of partial channel substitution, with some inexperienced
consumers visiting the store, while others visit the Internet.
2.3.1 No channel substitution
In this case all inexperienced consumers use the conventional channel, i.e. α = 1, and
all experienced consumers use the Internet. By substituting α = 1 in (2.1) we can write
expected profits as:
Πi
¡
pi, F (p)
¢
=
·
(1− µ)
2
+ µ
¡
1− F
¡
pi
¢¢¸
pi,
where (1− F (pi)) represents the probability that i is the cheapest firm.
Firms are indifferent between all prices in a certain support. It is easily seen that
the upperbound of the price support equals v. Charging prices higher than v cannot be
optimal as no consumer will buy. Also, by charging a price equal to the upperbound,
a firm will only make profits from consumers who visit the shop. But, if the highest
price a firm would ever charge is strictly smaller than v, then the firm could raise profits
6The combination of pure strategies in which firms charge the monopoly price v and both types of
consumers use the store can be disregarded. As it is well known in the search literature, this equilibrium
has the informed (here: experienced) consumer playing a weakly dominated strategy.
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on these consumers by charging higher prices. Hence, the highest price a firm will ever
charge equals v and the profit the firm makes in this case is (1−µ)
2
v. Since the firm must
be indifferent between setting any price in the support of F , the following equality must
hold:
Πi (·) =
·
(1− µ)
2
+ µ
¡
1− F
¡
pi
¢¢¸
pi =
(1− µ)
2
v.
By rewriting this equality, we can find the mixed strategy price distribution7
F (p) =
1 + µ
2µ
− 1− µ
2µ
v
p
. (2.3)
Now we want to investigate whether the proposed pricing behavior by firms and search
behavior by consumers indeed constitutes an equilibrium. To this end, we now verify when
the inexperienced consumer indeed will find it optimal to use the conventional channel. If
she visits the physical shop, she will obtain her maximum willingness to pay, equal to v,
but she is not able to make a price comparison between firms. In contrast, if she decides
to browse the Internet, she will obtain only λv and buy at the best price if this price is low
enough. Therefore, to let the physical store be the optimal channel for the inexperienced
consumer, the following has to hold:
v −E (p) ≥ Pr
£
min
£
p1, p2
¤
≤ λv
¤×©
λv −E
¡
min
£
p1, p2
¤ | min £p1, p2¤ ≤ λv¢ª , (2.4)
which easily follows from (2.2). Since v drops out of the above expression and the pa-
rameter µ enters via the expected price and minimum price, the conventional channel is
indeed optimal for the inexperienced consumer for values of λ and µ satisfying inequality
(2.4), see the Appendix for a detailed derivation. In that case there exist equilibria that
exhibit no channel substitution, in the sense that all inexperienced consumers will shop
at the conventional store.
When the online uncertainty is high, λ is low. Now the following Proposition states
that for λ low enough, the trade-off between online uncertainty and best-price uncertainty
7There must be some p for which F
¡
p
¢
= 0, from (2.3) we obtain that the lowerbound of the support
is p = (1−µ)v1+µ .
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is made in favor of the store. Put differently, for low λ, we have that physical aspects are
more important than price comparisons, no matter what the value of µ is. Additionally,
for low λ, the probability of a purchase on the Net is lower, since the best price is less
likely to be low enough. Thus, for λ low enough (2.4) may be satisfied.
The result also states that (2.4) will be satisfied for µ low or high enough. This can be
understood as follows. The difference between the prices the duopolists set, approaches
zero for µ close to zero or close to one. Intuitively this makes sense, for when everybody is
experienced (µ = 1) and buys on the Internet, competition is strong and Bertrand prices
result. Similarly, when everybody is inexperienced (µ = 0), monopoly prices may result
and there is no price difference to be expected either. If the price difference is small,
inexperienced consumers have no reason to search the Internet. Thus for µ small or large
enough, we may have an equilibrium where inexperienced consumers buy in the store.
The proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 2.2 (no channel substitution) An equilibrium of the game described above
in which inexperienced consumers do not use the Internet and all experienced consumers
do use the Internet exists when inequality (2.4) is met. Firms randomly select prices from
the set
h
(1−µ)v
1+µ , v
i
according to the cumulative distribution function F (p) given by (2.3).
Furthermore, there exists λ such that:
(i) if λ ≤ λ the no channel substitution equilibrium exists for all µ;
(ii) if λ > λ there exist µ (λ) and µ (λ) with µ(λ) < µ (λ) such that the no channel
substitution equilibrium exists for all µ < µ (λ) and all µ > µ (λ). Moreover, limλ→1
µ(λ) = 0 and limλ→1 µ (λ) = 1.
2.3.2 Partial channel substitution
When inequality (2.4) is not satisfied, inexperienced consumers do not prefer the store,
implying some buyers substitute the online for the offline retail channel. In this case,
α ∈ (0, 1) and the profits per firm are as in (2.1). Observe that if an inexperienced
consumer chooses the Internet, her maximum willingness to pay is λv and this leads to
a discontinuity of demand at λv. The derivation of firm’s behavior must account for this
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discontinuity. Since we have shown that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, we
will investigate how a mixed strategy can be described. Firstly, observe that for a givenbα, firms will never be indifferent between a price slightly above λv and a price of λv,
since they prefer a price of λv in order to attract also the mass of (1− bα) (1− µ) > 0
inexperienced consumers. Therefore, in equilibrium, prices in a right neighbourhood of
λv will never be charged. Hence, the price support can be of one of the following forms:
1. the lowerbound of the price support is larger than or equal to λv;
2. the upperbound of the price support is smaller than or equal to λv;
3. the support is nonconvex and contains a ‘hole’: prices not greater than λv are
charged and prices strictly higher than λv are charged, leaving open an interval of
prices that will not be set in equilibrium.
The first case implies that α = 1 as illustrated in Section 2.3.1: since the probability
that the best price is low enough is zero, no inexperienced consumer will search the
Internet. The analysis is provided above. The second case cannot be an equilibrium since
in this case, charging a price equal to v dominates charging the upperbound.
Therefore, for an equilibrium with α < 1, the price support must be as described in
the third case. In equilibrium, prices in a certain range are charged with zero probability.
For convenience, we denote by x ≡ α (1− µ) the share of all consumers going to the
shop. Hence, x is the mass of consumers on which firms exercise market power. In the
Appendix, we show that
Lemma 2.3 In equilibrium, prices in the interval
µ
λv, (1−x)v
1−x+µ(1−λ)λ
¶
are set with zero
probability.
Let us denote the upperbound of this interval by p0 ≡ (1−x)v
1−x+µ(1−λ)λ
. Now we want to
describe the cumulative distribution function for prices above p0, denoted F u (p), and for
prices below λv, denoted F l (p). For p ≥ p0, the following must hold:
³x
2
+ µ [1− F u (p)]
´
p =
x
2
v,
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since, as was argued in Section 2.3.1, the maximum price a firm will charge is p = v and
at any price in the support of F , expected profits must equal profits at p = v. It follows
that:
F u (p) =
2µ+ x
2µ
− x
2µ
v
p
.
For prices p ≤ λv, we must have that
³x
2
+ [1− x]
£
1− F l (p)
¤´
p =
x
2
v
and we obtain:
F l (p) =
2− x
2− 2x −
x
2− 2x
v
p
.
Summarizing, we can describe the strategy of the firm as follows:8
F (p) =



2−x
2−2x −
x
2−2x
v
p if p ≤ p ≤ λv
1− x(1−λ)
2λ(1−x) if λv ≤ p ≤ p0
2µ+x
2µ −
x
2µ
v
p if p
0 < p ≤ v
. (2.5)
Note that when α = 1, the ‘hole’ disappears and the case of no channel substitution
analyzed above emerges.
To find an equilibrium, we must now turn to the demand side to describe how α is
determined. Since α ∈ (0, 1) the consumer must be indifferent between the two retail
channels. The following equality must therefore be satisfied:
v − E (p) = Pr
£
min
£
p1, p2
¤
≤ λv
¤× (2.6)©
λv − E
¡
min
£
p1, p2
¤ | min £p1, p2¤ ≤ λv¢ª .
The above expression therefore implicitly determines α. The left-hand side of this expres-
sion represents the expected surplus of visiting the physical shop and the right-hand side
represents the expected surplus of visiting the Internet. We let π ≡ Pr [min [p1, p2] ≤ λv]
denote the probability of purchase for an online inexperienced consumer. 9
8To find the lowerbound of the support, we solve 2−x2−2x −
x
2−2x
v
p
= 0, resulting in p = xv2−x .
9Consumers might be tempted to continue searching and visit the store after the search on the Internet.
We discuss this possibility in Section 3.5.
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To obtain the expression above explicitly, we derive the expected price and the condi-
tional expected minimum price. In the Appendix the reader can check that
Lemma 2.4 The expected price is given by
E (p) =
xv
2 (1− x) ln
·
λ (2− x)
x
¸
+
xv
2µ
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)µ
λ (1− x)
¸
,
and the conditional expected minimum price is given by10
E
¡
min
£
pi, pj
¤ | min £pi, pj¤ ≤ λv¢ = 1
π
x2v
2 (1− x)2
·
−1
λ
+
2− x
x
− ln
·
(2− x)λ
x
¸¸
,
for 0 ≤ x ≤ x ≡ 2λ
λ+ 1
.
Now that we have determined the expected price and the relevant minimum price, we
consider again the equation that determines α. Rewriting the equilibrium condition given
by (2.6), we define Γ (x;λ, µ) by
Γ (x;λ, µ) = π
©
λv − E
¡
min
£
p1, p2
¤ | min £p1, p2¤ ≤ λv¢ª+E (p)− v.
The value of Γ (x;λ, µ) represents the surplus that can be obtained by visiting the Internet,
in excess of the surplus in the store. Therefore, Γ (x;λ, µ) > 0 implies that consumers
prefer the Internet and Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 implies that they prefer the physical store. By
employing Lemma 2.4 we can write this function explicitly as:
Γ (x;λ, µ) =
x
(1− x)2
µ
x
4
µ
4− λ+ 1
λ
¶
− 1
¶
+
x
2 (1− x)2
ln
λ (2− x)
x
+
+
x
2µ
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)µ
λ (1− x)
¸
− 1 + λ = 0, for 0 ≤ x ≤ x.
For any given λ and µ, this equality determines the equilibrium value of α ∈ (0, 1) if
it exists. In the Appendix we prove the following useful properties:
10Note that the conditional expected minimum price is defined up to a certain upperbound on x. This
restriction on the domain of x arises because for high enough x, the lowerbound of the price support
exceeds λv. Below we will discuss this in a more intuitive way.
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Figure 2-1: The equilibrium condition Γ (x; .93, .5) for 0 < x < x. Γ (·) > 0 implies
consumers have an incentive to search the Internet. As x ≡ α (1− µ), the function is in
this case defined only for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5.
Fact 1 Γ (0;λ, µ) < 0 for all λ < 1 and all µ; Γ (0; 1, µ) = 0 for all µ.
Fact 2 Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 for all µ > 0 and all λ < 1; Γ (x;λ, 0) = 0 for all λ.
Fact 3 ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂x |x=0> 0.
Fact 4 There exist at most two values of x ∈ [0, x] such that Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0.
Fact 5 ∂
2Γ(x;λ,µ)
∂x2 |x=0< 0.
By using these facts, we may plot Γ (x;λ, µ) as a function of x as in Figure (2-1).11
The first three facts and the shape of this curve can be understood as follows. Recall
that Γ (x;λ, µ) > 0 implies that consumers prefer the Internet and Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 implies
that they prefer the physical store. An alternative interpretation is that the curve shows
how beneficial it is to compare prices. Furthermore, x represents the segment of the
market over which firms exercise market power. Now when x = 0, firms only sell to
price comparing buyers and are induced to price competitively. There is no benefit to
comparing prices and inexperienced consumers prefer to avoid online inconveniences and
11In the Figure we have ∂
2Γ(·)
∂x2
< 0 but this is not in general the case.
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go to the physical shop. This is reflected in Fact 1. As x increases, we see that Γ (x;λ, µ)
first increases. This is because it becomes more beneficial to compare prices, when firms
gain market power and price dispersion emerges. Hence, it becomes more beneficial to
search the Internet. Fact 3 states this formally. For x sufficiently large, we see that
Γ (x;λ, µ) starts to decrease. This can be explained by the fact that when firms have a lot
of market power, they price closer to the monopoly price, and then the price dispersion
decreases in x. Additionally, as firms price closer to the monopoly price, it becomes less
likely that the best price is low enough. Hence, comparing prices on the Internet becomes
less rational. Finally, as x exceeds x, π becomes zero. The surplus of buying on the
Internet becomes zero as the consumer expects that even the lowest of the two prices she
will observe will be too high. This is given by Fact 2.
For an equilibrium in which both retail channels receive some inexperienced consumers,
it must be that Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0. Since x ∈ (0, 1−µ] we may infer that for small µ, the curve
is first increasing and then decreasing. Hence, there may be two intersection points of
the line with the horizontal axis. It may be questioned whether both these points reflect
stable equilibria.
To address the issue of stability, recall that Γ (x;λ, µ) represents the surplus that can
be obtained in excess of the surplus attainable in the store. Consider now the two points of
intersection A and B in Figure (2-1). To the right of point B, consumers expect to derive
more value from searching the store than from searching the Internet. They will therefore
prefer the store so that α (and x) has a tendency to rise. Between points A and B, the
consumer derives more value from searching the Internet than from searching the store.
This is because the expected price difference is high. Consumers will prefer to search the
store less intensely, i.e., α (and x) decreases. A similar argument establishes that to the
left of point A, α has a tendency to increase. Point A is therefore a stable equilibrium
and point B an unstable one. We have thus esthablished that a stable equilibrium with
α < 1 must be such that the curve Γ (x;λ, µ) is increasing, as in point A. The following
proposition summarises the case of partial channel substitution.
Proposition 2.5 (partial channel substitution) A stable equilibrium of the game with
α < 1 has a share α of inexperienced consumers searching the conventional store and a
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share 1 − α searching the Internet, where α ∈ (0, 1) is the solution to Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0.
Inexperienced consumers searching the Internet buy whenever min [pi, pj] ≤ λv, that is,
with probability π. Firms randomly select prices from the set
£
xv
2−x , v
¤
according to the
cumulative distribution function given in (2.5).
2.3.3 Characterization of Equilibria
After having introduced the following three facts, we are ready to provide a complete
characterization of stable equilibria in our model:
Fact 6 ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂λ > 0.
Fact 7 Γ (x; 1/2, µ) < 0.
Fact 8 For any 0 < µ < 1,Γ (x; 1, µ) > 0 for 0 < x < 1 and Γ (1; 1, µ) = Γ (0; 1, µ) = 0
These facts tell us that as λ increases, the incentives to search the Internet increase.
This is easily understood if one considers the fact that λ describes the confidence in
the online purchase environment. Furthermore, when λ ≤ 1/2 there is no incentive to
visit the Internet, since the importance of a tangible purchase environment outweighs the
importance of price comparison in that case, regardless of µ or x. When λ = 1 there is
no incentive to visit the store since the advantage of physical interaction is absent in that
case.
The following statement is proved in the Appendix:
Theorem 2.6 There exists µ¯ such that
(A) for all µ > µ¯, there exist a eλ (µ) such that the unique equilibrium is characterized
by α = 1 for all λ ≤ eλ (µ) and the unique equilibrium is characterized by α ∈ (0, 1) for all
λ > eλ (µ).
(B) for all µ ≤ µ¯, there exist eλ (µ) and eeλ (µ) , with eλ (µ) ≤ eeλ (µ), such that
(i) the unique equilibrium is characterized by α = 1 for λ ≤ eλ (µ),
(ii) for eλ (µ) < λ < eeλ (µ), there are two stable equilibria, one in which α = 1 and one
in which α ∈ (0, 1) and
(iii) for λ > eeλ (µ), the unique stable equilibrium is such that α ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 2-2: Characterization of equilibria.
The Theorem is illustrated in Figure 2-2 for λ ≥ 1/2, which shows simulation results
obtained by using Microsoft Excel. Basically, there are three regions of parameters: one
in which no channel substitution occurs, one in which partial channel substitution occurs
and one region of multiple equilibria in which either partial or no substitution occurs.
We know by Fact 7 that for all λ < 1/2 the unique equilibrium is such that channel
substitution does not occur.
The two possibilities A and B introduced in the Theorem are illustrated in Figures
(2-3) and (2-4), respectively. Figure (2-3) exhibits a mature market where µ = .93 > µ¯.
In this case, the segment of the market on which firms exercise market power, x ≡
α (1− µ) , is necessarily small. Therefore Γ (x;λ, µ) is only increasing; x cannot become
large enough to allow monopolistic pricing to diminish price dispersion in the market. In
this case the equilibrium is unique; depending on λ either no channel substitution occurs
or partial channel substitution occurs. In the picture, an equilibrium with partial channel
substitution is found where the curve intersects the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2-3: Γ (x; 0.9, .93) for x ∈ [0, 1− µ]. Determination of equilibrium for a mature
market.
On the other hand, for an immature market (µ = 0.3), x may become large and
then the shape is as in Figure (2-4). Depending on the degree of online uncertainty λ,
there may be one or two equilibria: if λ is low enough, Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 for all α and then
the only equilibrium is α = 1, hence no channel substitution occurs. For higher λ, we
obtain one equilibrium with α ∈ (0, 1) where Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0 and one with α = 1 where
Γ (1− µ;λ, µ) < 0. Finally, for λ high enough, the unique equilibrium has α ∈ (0, 1).
The properties of the equilibria will be discussed in detail below. At this point we
already would like to mention the following observations to which the Theorem points.
Firstly, for all degrees of market maturity, if the online inconvenience is sufficiently high
(low λ), and hence physical aspects are important, inexperienced consumers will not
substitute the online for the offline channel. Secondly, for relatively immature markets,
another reason for channel substitution not to occur is the following. In an immature
market, the decisions of inexperienced consumers are important for pricing behavior.
If all consumers coordinate on using the physical store, this shopping behavior induces
monopolistic pricing, and hence, consumers infer that they cannot make a purchase on
the electronic retail channel (since π = 0) and an equilibrium of no channel substitution
may prevail.
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Figure 2-4: Γ (x;λ, 0.3) in x ∈ [0, 1− µ] for different levels of λ. Illustration of equilibrium
for an immature market.
2.4 Comparisons across Markets
We will now discuss our analysis of the issues raised in the Introduction. Specifically,
we will analyze the market sizes of the two channels, the total market size and the ex-
pected price resulting from market interaction. We will argue that if we specify online
inconvenience as the inability to inspect a product, the parameter λ describes a product
market.
2.4.1 Retail Channel substitution
In this subsection we address the question how market circumstances affect the extent
to which consumers will substitute the online for the offline retail channel. In doing so,
we gain insight in the functioning of electronic markets. Furthermore, we will explain
empirical differences in online penetration across markets.
To determine the relative importance of the electronic retail channel we have to look
at the decisions by the (1− µ) inexperienced consumers, since the experienced consumers
are already conquered by the electronic channel. A share α of them frequents the store,
therefore the relative size of the conventional and the electronic channel is x and (1− x),
respectively. As we have shown in Section 2.3, the variable x is determined by two factors.
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The valuation parameter λ, reflecting the confidence in an online purchase environment,
and the maturity of the market, µ. We will discuss the impact of both determinants in
turn, in each case distinguishing between partial and no channel substitution.
Online uncertainty: λ.
The greater the uncertainty or inconvenience online, the more consumers are tempted
to use the conventional store. Indeed, we have already demonstrated in Theorem 2.6 that
all inexperienced consumers will use the store for λ sufficiently low, that is, λ ≤ eλ (µ). For
these levels of λ there occurs no channel substitution and then the market share of the
online channel is simply given by 1 − x ≡ µ. For λ > eλ (µ) partial channel substitution
may prevail, with a fraction of inexperienced consumers using the online channel. We
expect that as λ increases, this fraction increases. To investigate this hypothesis, we can
use Fact 6 introduced above and the fact that in a stable equilibrium, ∂Γ(·)∂x > 0 combined
with the Implicit Function Theorem to obtain the result ∂x∂λ < 0 if α < 1.
12 Thus if channel
substitution is partial and λ decreases, α increases. This result supports our hypothesis:
as λ decreases less buyers frequent the online retail channel.
If we interpret the online inconvenience as resulting from the inability to physically
inspect a product before purchase, we can relate the value of λ to the degree of non-digital
product variety: the higher the non-digital variety, the more important it is to inspect
non-digital product attributes, hence, the lower λ.
In this framework, we can infer from our analysis that product markets which are
characterised by a high degree of non-digital product variety, are likely to have relatively
small electronic retail channels. Vice versa, we expect more intensive use of the electronic
channel for products that show little non-digital variety. We illustrate this result in Figure
2-5, where the sales in the conventional channel are depicted.
Our characterization is supported empirically. The electronic channel makes up a small
share of retailing in product categories as clothing, food, flowers, cards, home/gardening
supplies and gifts (0.1% or less in the US and Europe), while online penetration is biggest
for categories such as computer hardware/software and books (in the US respectively
12The Implicit Function Theorem implies in the case under consideration that dx
dλ
= −∂Γ(·)/∂λ
∂Γ(·)/∂x < 0.
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Figure 2-5: Sales in conventional channel (x) and expected price, µ=0.3.
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9.2% and 5.1%, in Europe these figures are 3.5% and 1.6% resp.).13 We may note that
these figures show an enormous gap in the extent of online penetration for the different
product categories. These observations are in line with our predictions, specifically, one
of our results is that there occurs a substantial jump in market shares, when consumers
switch to partial channel substitution, see Figure 2-5. Furthermore, since in the United
States electronic commerce is more widely developed, it is convincing to observe that even
there the online penetration for the highly differentiated categories is very low compared
to the less differentiated categories.
The maturity of the market: µ.
The maturity of the market influences the expected price difference and therefore the
best-price uncertainty for offline shoppers. We demonstrate in the Appendix that
Fact 9 ∂x∂µ > 0 if α < 1.
Clearly, there are two effects of µ at work. Recall that x ≡ α (1− µ) so that the direct
effect of an increase in µ is to decrease x. However, there is also an indirect effect through
the impact on α. This indirect effect is positive as an increase in µ increases α. This can
be understood by taking into account that the more experienced consumers there are in
the market, more price comparisons are being made, and the less interested inexperienced
consumers are in making price comparisons themselves. Surprisingly, the latter indirect
effect dominates the former! Therefore, when a market matures, inexperienced consumers
infer that the increased magnitude of experienced consumers reduces the price dispersion
in the market. Hence, they frequent the Internet less often. This effect dominates the
fact that there are less inexperienced consumers in total and x increases. This process
continues untill α becomes one, when only the first effect remains. In Figure 2-6 we
illustrate this effect.
The figure shows that even though we can show that the impact of µ on x is positive
when α < 1, the impact is quite small. The figure also shows that when µ is small, there
exist two equilibria. The important lesson here is that the presence of relatively many
experienced consumers does not imply that expected prices are relatively low.
13The observations concern the year 1999, Boston Consulting Group 2000.
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Figure 2-6: Sales in conventional channel (x) and expected price, λ=0.9.
2.4.2 Size of the market
In the Introduction it was pointed out that some consumers who consider to buy online
actually do not make a purchase. This phenomenon of drop-out must therefore be included
in a realistic model of electronic commerce. Above we illustrated that the online consumers
do not necessarily make a purchase. In Section 2.3.2 we showed that the (1− α) (1− µ)
inexperienced consumers who search the Internet only make the purchase if min [pi, pj] ≤
λv. Therefore, the total number of transactions in the market is given by
S (x;λ, µ) ≡ 1− (1− π) (1− α) (1− µ) .
Below we will investigate the role the two market characteristics of our model play in
determining market size S.
Online uncertainty: λ.
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We first focus on the role of the parameter λ. A few observations can be made. First,
when λ is small enough, all inexperienced consumers visit the store (α = 1) and there is
no drop-out, i.e. S (·) = 1. Second, when λ = 1 everybody visits the Internet (α = 0),
so that in equilibrium prices drop to zero and there is, again, no drop-out. In between,
when 0 < α < 1, there will always be some drop-out as firms also randomize over prices
larger than λv. Hence, there is a non-monotonic relation between S and λ. The reason
for this non-monotonicity can be explained by looking at the expression for S (x;λ, µ) and
realizing that there are two forces at work. When λ increases, the number of inexperienced
consumers visiting the Internet increases, increasing the number of consumers that are
prone to the drop-out phenomenon. However, when more consumers visit the Internet,
the more competitive the firms’ pricing behavior, thereby decreasing the chance that
individual consumers drop out.
Our model thus predicts that the size of the market depends on the importance of
physical interaction: for λ large, physical interaction plays an insignificant role in the
consumer purchase. As a consequence, many consumers use the Internet, leading to
competitive prices. In turn, competitive pricing ensures that almost all inexperienced
consumers indeed make the purchase, so that the entire demand side is active in the
market. As λ decreases, some consumers will prefer to search the conventional store
in order to avoid online inconveniences. These consumers do not compare prices and
therefore induce firms to price more monopolistically. In this way the consumers in the
store impose a negative externality on the consumers searching the Internet: consumers
comparing prices on the Net will more often drop-out. Because of this reason, the size
of the market starts to decline. As λ becomes small enough, all inexperienced consumers
prefer to search the store, and therefore all consumers make the purchase: the marketsize
returns to its higher, initial level.
The impact of Market Maturity µ.
It is easily checked that ∂S(x;λ,µ)∂µ = (1− π)
∂x
∂µ + (1− α) (1− µ)
∂π
∂µ + (1− π). When
α = 1 we have that ∂x∂µ = −1 and hence,
∂S(·)
∂µ = 0. For the case of α < 1 we will
consider each term. Firstly, experienced consumers always buy, and hence, there are more
transactions in the market if there are more consumers of this type. This is reflected by
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the third term. Secondly, the second term shows us that the inexperienced online shoppers
will more often make a purchase, since ∂π∂µ > 0, and thirdly, the first term tells us that
more inexperienced consumers will use the store, that is, the channel where they will
make the purchase for sure. Therefore, the three terms are positive and the number of
transactions increases in market maturity when channel substitution is partial.
2.4.3 Prices
We finally investigate the impact of market circumstances on price setting behavior. Since
our model exhibits price dispersion, we will look at the expected price. In Lemma 2.4 we
have shown that the expected price equals:
E (p) =
xv
2 (1− x) ln
·
λ (2− x)
x
¸
+
xv
2µ
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)µ
λ (1− x)
¸
.
As before, we will investigate the impact of market determinants λ and µ.
Online uncertainty: λ
In the appendix, we establish the following property:
Fact 10 dE(p)dλ < 0 if α < 1 and
dE(p)
dλ = 0 if α = 1
Fact 10 tells us that the expected price is nondecreasing in the importance of tangible
interaction. This result can be understood by considering that if α < 1, dE(p)dλ =
∂E(p)
∂x
∂x
∂λ +
∂E(p)
∂λ < 0. The first term tells us that as λ increases, less consumers use the store
and therefore, firms price more competitively, hence, this term is negative. The second
term, ∂E(p)∂λ , is also negative, illustrating that an increase in λ causes π to increase, thereby
making it more beneficial to have the best price in the market as it attracts more purchases.
See also Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-7.
Market maturity µ
For an equilibrium of no channel substitution, we can easily infer from (2.3) that
∂F (p)
∂µ > 0, hence the expected price decreases in market maturity in such an equilibrium.
If channel substitution is partial, we obtain that dE(p)dµ =
∂E(p)
∂x
∂x
∂µ +
∂E(p)
∂µ and from Fact 9
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Figure 2-7: Expected price for different values of λ and µ.
and the proof of Fact 10 we know that the first, indirect, effect is positive. We can also
show that the direct effect is negative. However, by simulation we can obtain that the
direct effect is offset by the positive indirect one (see Figure 2-7). This overall effect is
small, but positive, which is a quite remarkable result: an increase in the proportion of
price comparing shoppers leads to an increase in expected price! The intuition is the same
as for Fact 9: an increase in µ causes more inexperienced consumers to use the store, such
that the total number of consumers in the store, x, rises. For higher x firms are induced
to set higher prices.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have set up a model of electronic commerce, describing how consumers
choose between offline and online retail channels. Our analysis shows how the degree of
retail channel substitution is determined, by considering the consumer’s trade off between
price comparisons and a tangible, immediate transaction.
We took the need to physically compare different versions of a product as the leading
example of an online inconvenience. In this interpretation, we demonstrated that for a
particular product market, the sales in each channel depend on the importance of physical
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inspection and on the number of consumers already familiar with the product. Our main
results are as follows. Firstly, we expect online penetration to be low for the product
categories that are characterised by the presence of non-digital product variety. More
specifically, for product variety high enough, the consumers that need to learn product
attributes do not use the online channel at all and for lower levels of product variety,
the share of online sales is decreasing in product variety. Secondly, we found that online
consumers do not always buy because of the reason that their uncertainty about the
product match is not always compensated by a low enough observed price. Thirdly,
we investigated the pricing behavior of firms and we found that firms price above the
competitive level because they have market power over the consumers in their store.
Additionally, the tension between having monopoly power in the store and competition
on the Internet yields price dispersion in the market. The expected price in the market
is increasing in the importance of the online uncertainty if some inexperienced use the
online channel and constant if no inexperienced consumer uses the online channel.
As was mentioned in the Introduction, other reasons than physical inspection may give
rise to the perception of online uncertainty. Examples are the payment method or the
slow delivery of goods. In these cases, the parameter λ could describe the infrastructural
and institutional state of affairs of Internet transactions or cultural determined attitudes
towards electronic commerce. In this wider interpretation our results can be described as
follows: If the perceived inconvenience is large enough, electronic commerce will only be
used by the users in the economy who do not incur it. If some inexperienced consumers
do shop online, the market share of the Internet is decreasing in the inconvenience.
All the above results are in line with observations that have been made on Internet
purchases. We also found two quite unexpected results, namely that the market share of
the electronic channel is decreasing and the expected price is increasing in the propor-
tion of price comparing experienced consumers in the market. Finally, the fact that the
expected price may rise in the online uncertainty is somewhat surprising at first sight:
one would expect that firms would try to compensate the consumer for uncertainties, by
lower prices. However, a firm rather prefers the consumer to feel uncertain indeed, and
to shop where she is not exposed to the rival’s offers.
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In the remainder of this section we discuss the importance of two main features of our
model: firms set the same price on both retail channels and consumers search only once.
Concerning the pricing policy, there are different ways to defend this assumption.
Firstly, one may think that a firm will be punished by consumers if they find out that
a firm discriminates between the two channels.14 Secondly, one could also argue that
the presence of administrative menu cost of having two prices prohibits firms to price
discriminate between retail channels. Finally, suppose that firms choose two different
prices, one for each channel. Then the equilibrium is such that firms charge p = 0 on
the Internet, p = (1− λ) v in the store and all inexperienced consumers would search the
store. For a set of values of λ and µ, firms obtain lower expected profits, however, than
in the case we studied. One may therefore expect to find a Prisoner’s Dilemma type of
problem: both firms are better off if both pursue equal pricing than if both differentiate,
but they individually have an incentive to differentiate. The reason for this is that equal
pricing limits price competition on the electronic channel, which is in the interest of both
firms. In a repeated setting, there exist then ‘cooperative’ type of equilibria where firms
concentrate on the strategies we have considered in the main body of the paper.
The framework that we have studied has the consumer searching only once. However,
it seems likely that consumers are tempted to use both channels for their purchase. They
might for instance first select the firm with the best price by browsing the Internet,
and subsequently visit the store of that firm to inspect the product line and make the
purchase. Similarly, a consumer that has evaluated products in a particular store might
decide to buy the preferred product version online, at the best price. In the remainder we
discuss how our model could be extended to allow for more than one search, again taking
product match uncertainty as an example of an online inconvenience. We will argue that
our qualitative results will hold in such an extension.
Multiple search can be accounted for by allowing consumers to search sequentially,
introducing different search costs cs and cI for the store and the Internet, where 0 < cI ≤
cs. Consumers first decide which channel to search. After having observed what there is
14One could oppose to this argument by saying that consumers understand that the two channels
differ in their transaction costs, both on the demand and supply side, and would therefore accept a price
differential. However, we do not consider transaction costs on the demand side and we think consumers
do not have that much consideration towards the efficiency of the firm.
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to be observed (prices (p1, p2) of different stores on the Internet, all product characteristics
and one price in the store), consumers may decide to enter a second stage by engaging
in an additional search. Therefore, if search costs are not prohibitive, the inexperienced
consumer may find it optimal to eliminate both best-price uncertainty as well as product
match uncertainty, by performing more than one search. If this were the case, however,
all consumers would make price comparisons and Bertrand prices would result. Clearly,
when (1−λ)v > (cs−cI), this cannot be an equilibrium, as argued in Lemma 2.1: since the
expected price difference is zero, consumers prefer to visit the store and buy the product
that best matches their preferences (even it may be somewhat more costly in terms of
search time) so that they will have no reason to search the Internet.
To give a sketch of possible equilibrium configurations, consider the following four
strategies of the inexperienced consumer: (i) ”go to the Internet and buy from the cheapest
site”, (ii) ”go to one of the stores and buy the product that you like best”, (iii) ”go to the
Internet first and afterwards go to the store that has the lowest price and buy the product
you like best in the store” and, finally, (iv) ”go to one of the stores and buy the product
that you like best if the price is below a certain upperbound, otherwise continue searching
on the Net and buy from the lowest priced site”. If the consumer can make a purchase
on the Internet, then strategy (i) and (iii) have a clear dominance relation to each other,
namely, if cs > (1−λ)v, then strategy (i) dominates strategy (iii). If the reverse inequality
holds, then strategy (iii) dominates strategy (i). This easily follows from the fact that
the cost and expected benefits of an additional search in the conventional channel are
cs and (1− λ)v, respectively. On the other hand, a version of strategy (iv), namely ”go
to one of the stores and buy the product that you like best if the price is smaller than
E (p) + cI , otherwise continue searching on the Net and buy from the lowest priced site”
clearly dominates strategy (ii) and other strategies in class (iv). This is easily seen from
the fact that the expected price the other firm charges equals E (p) and one first has to
incur the search cost cI .
Given these observations on the optimal search strategy of the consumers, it follows
that inexperienced consumers will either randomize over strategy (i) and the ‘E (p) + cI ’
version of (iv), namely if cs > (1− λ) v, or randomize over this last strategy and strategy
(iii). It is also clear that some inexperienced consumers will not choose strategy (i) or
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(iii) for a reason similar to the one argued in Lemma 2.1. Moreover, in equilibrium the
upper bound of the price distribution equals min [E (p) + cI , v] as a firm who charges
the maximal price will only attract costumers who visit the conventional store and if he
would charge a price above E (p) + cI he will also loose these costumers. Hence, given
this reaction by the firm to the threat to continue searching on the Net, in equilibrium
no consumer will first visit the store to inquire which product fits his tastes best and
then go and look for the lowest price on the Internet. So, even if we allow for sequential
search, firms have some market power (bounded above by the search cost) and some
inexperienced consumers will not use the sequential search possibility, but simply buy at
the conventional store. Most qualitative results of the paper will therefore most likely
continue to hold, although the analysis will become more complicated.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Facts
The equilibrium condition for α ∈ (0, 1) and 0 ≤ x ≤ x is given by:
Γ (x;λ, µ) =
x
(1− x)2
µ
x
4
µ
4− λ+ 1
λ
¶
− 1
¶
+
x
2 (1− x)2
ln
λ (2− x)
x
+
+
x
2µ
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)µ
λ (1− x)
¸
− 1 + λ = 0.
Fact 1: Γ (0;λ, µ) < 0 for all λ < 1 and all µ; Γ (0; 1, µ) = 0 for all µ.
Proof of Fact 1: It is easy to see that Γ (0;λ, µ) = −1 + λ, the result then follows.
Fact 2: Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 for all µ > 0 and all λ < 1; Γ (x;λ, 0) = 0 for all λ.
Proof of Fact 2: It is easy to see that
Γ (x;λ, µ) = −1+ λµ(λ+1) ln
h
1 + µ(1+λ)λ
i
. Now substituting z = µ(λ+1)λ , we have to show
that
−1 + ln (1 + z)
z
≤ 0.
For the case µ > 0 we have that z > 0. As ln(1+z)z < 1 for all z > 0, Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 for
µ > 0. For the case µ = 0 it is enough to observe that limz→0
ln(1+z)
z = 1.
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Fact 3: ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂x |x=0> 0.
Proof of Fact 3: This is easily verified by first substituting µ = 1 and taking the
derivative:
∂Γ (x;λ, 1)
∂x
=
x
2λ (1− x)3
¡
2λ+ 2− (1− λ)2
¢
− 1 + x
(1− x)3
+
+
1 + x
2 (1− x)3
ln
λ (2− x)
x
− 1
(2− x) (1− x)2
+
+
1
2
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)
λ (1− x)
¸
+
x
2
·
(1− λ)
λ (1− x)2 + (1− λ) (1− x)
¸
.
Evaluating this expression at x = 0 gives +∞. If we then take into account that Γ
2(x;λ,µ)
∂x∂µ <
0, shown in observation (ii), step 2 of Fact 4, it easily follows that the claim holds for all
µ.
Fact 4: There exist at most two values of x ∈ [0, x] such that Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0.
Proof of Fact 4: We proceed in 2 steps; first we concentrate on µ = 0. The second
step is to establish that the claim holds also for µ > 0.
1 For µ = 0 the equilibrium condition is
Γ (x;λ, 0) =
x2
¡
4λ+ 1− λ2
¢
4λ (1− x)2
− x
(1− x)2
− 1 + λ+
+
x
2 (1− x)2
ln
λ (2− x)
x
+
(1− λ) x
2λ (1− x) = 0.
We have that
∂Γ (x;λ, 0)
∂x
=
x
¡
4λ+ 1− λ2
¢
2λ (1− x)3
− 1 + x
(1− x)3
+
+
1 + x
2 (1− x)3
ln
λ (2− x)
x
− 1
(2− x) (1− x)2
+
(1− λ)
2λ (1− x)2
,
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and
∂2Γ (x;λ, 0)
∂x2
=
(1 + 2x)
¡
4λ+ 1− λ2
¢
2λ (1− x)4
− 4 + 2x
(1− x)4
+
+
2 + x
(1− x)4
ln
λ (2− x)
x
+
5− 3x
(2− x)2 (1− x)3
− 1 + x
x (2− x) (1− x)3
+
(1− λ)
λ (1− x)3
.
Furthermore, ∂
2Γ(x;λ,0)
∂x2 > 0 iff g (x, λ) ≡
2+x
1−x
(1−λ2)
2λ − 2+
2+x
(1−x) ln
λ(2−x)
x −
2(1−x)2
x(2−x)2 > 0.
Now the following observations (i) to (iii) establish that there exists exactly one bx
such that ∂
2Γ(x;λ,0)
∂x2 |x=ex= 0. This fact, in combination with Facts 1 and 2 ensures that
the curve Γ (x;λ, 0) intersects the horizontal axis at most twice on the relevant intervalh
0, 2(1+λ)
3+λ
i
. (Note that, moreover, if there are two intersection points, ∂2Γ (·) /∂x2 < 0
whenever ∂Γ (·) /∂x > 0 as otherwise Γ (·) will be only increasing).
(i) g (0, λ) < 0.
We obtain limx→0 g (x, λ) =
(1−λ2)
λ − 2 + limx→0{ 2+x(1−x) ln λ(2−x)x − 2(1−x)
2
x(2−x)2}. Now it is
enough to observe that the second term decreases faster to −∞ than the first increases
to +∞.
(ii) g (x, λ) > 0.
We have that: g (x, λ) =
8λ2+4λ+4−(1−λ)(1−λ2)
4λ > 0.
(iii) There exists at most one bbx such that ∂g(x,λ)∂x |x=eex= 0.
We proceed as follows. We construct a function that has the sign of ∂g(x,λ)∂x and then
we show that this function is monotone. We have:
∂g(x,λ)
∂x =
3(1−λ2)
2λ(1−x)2 +
3
(1−x)2 ln
λ(2−x)
x +
2(1−x)(2−x+x2)
x2(2−x)3 −
2(2+x)
(1−x)x(2−x) ,so that
∂g(x,λ)
∂x > 0 iff
h (x, λ) ≡ 3(1−λ
2)
2λ + 3 ln
λ(2−x)
x +
2(1−x)3(2−x+x2)
x2(2−x)3 −
2(2+x)(1−x)
x(2−x) > 0.
Now we will show that ∂h(x,λ)∂x < 0. Consider:
∂h(x,λ)
∂x =
−6
x(2−x) +
2(1−x)2
x3(2−x)4 [(−5x
2 + 6x− 7)x (2− x)− (4− 5x) (1− x) (2− x+ x2)] +
2+4x
x(2−x) +
4(2+x)(1−x)2
x2(2−x)2 =
−4(1−x)
x(2−x) +
2(1−x)2
x2(2−x)2
h
−5x3+x2−4+2x
x(2−x) + 2 (2 + x)
i
− 2(4−5x)(1−x)
3
x(2−x)4 (A1)
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We can show that (A1) is negative. However, the proof is somewhat messy, but
straightforward. It is available on request. Therefore, the proof of observations (i) to (iii)
is now complete. They show that Γ (x;λ, 0) intersects the horizontal axis at most twice.
2 µ > 0.
In step 1 we have shown that Γ (x;λ, 0) = 0 occurs for at most two values of x.
Now we will show that the claim holds for all µ. We prove this by considering partial
derivatives of Γ (·) with respect to µ, for fixed x. The argument, based on the following
three observations, will be discussed below.
(i) Keeping x fixed, ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂µ < 0.
We have that ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂µ = −
x
2µ2 ln
h
1 + (1−λ)µλ(1−x)
i
+ x
2µ
(1−λ)
λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ < 0 if
ln
h
1 + (1−λ)µλ(1−x)
i
> (1−λ)µλ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ .
Note that LHS (µ = 0) = RHS (µ = 0) and that
∂LHS
∂µ =
1−λ
λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ ,
∂RHS
∂µ =
(1−λ)[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]−(1−λ)2µ
[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]2 and thus
∂LHS
∂µ >
∂RHS
∂µ .
Therefore, ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂µ < 0.
(ii) The second derivative ∂
2Γ(x;λ,µ)
∂x∂µ < 0.
We obtained under (i) that ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂µ = −
x
2µ2 ln
h
1 + (1−λ)µλ(1−x)
i
+ x
2µ
1−λ
λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ . Taking
the derivative with respect to x we have
2µ∂
2Γ(x;λ,µ)
∂µ∂x = −
1
µ ln
h
1 + (1−λ)µλ(1−x)
i
− x(1−λ)
λ(1−x)2+(1−λ)(1−x)µ +
1−λ
λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ +
x(1−λ)λ
[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]2 .
Under (i) we have shown that the first and third term together are negative. Therefore
we only consider the second and fourth terms. Rewriting yields
−x(1−λ)
λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ
h
1
1−x +
λ
λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ
i
, which is obviously negative.
(iii) The third derivative, ∂
3Γ(x;λ,µ)
∂x2∂µ < 0.
It is convenient to consider the term of Γ (·) that depends on µ and then take the
second derivative to x. Then we obtain the following: A ≡
h
(1−λ)
(1−x)2λ+(1−λ)(1−x)µ
i
+
x(1−λ)[2λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]
2[(1−x)2λ+(1−λ)(1−x)µ]
2 . The first term is decreasing in µ, therefore it suffices to demon-
strate that the second term is decreasing in µ. The second term can be rewritten as
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x(1−λ)
(1−x)
h
2− (1−λ)µ
(1−x)(λ)+(1−λ)µ
i
and the sign of the derivative with respect to µ is the sign of
−(1−λ)λ(1−x)
[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]2 , which is clearly negative.
We will now describe how the above three facts can be used to complete the argument
for µ > 0. Firstly, on the domain where Γ (x;λ, 0) < 0 we have Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 because of
observation (i). Hence, no intersections arise. Secondly, on the domain where Γ (x;λ, 0)
is decreasing, Γ (x;λ, µ) is decreasing as well because of observation (ii). Therefore on
this domain there can emerge at most one intersection. Thirdly, on the domain where
Γ (x;λ, 0) ≥ 0 and increasing, we have that ∂
2Γ(x;λ,0)
∂x2 < 0. Then because of observation
(iii) given in step 2 above it must be that ∂
2Γ(x;λ,µ)
∂x2 < 0 as well on this domain. This
concavity property implies that at most two intersections arise and if two intersections
arise, there does not arise any intersection on the domain mentioned secondly.
Therefore, Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0 occurs for at most two values of x.
Fact 5: ∂
2Γ(x;λ,µ)
∂x2 |x=0< 0.
Proof of Fact 5: This property is established for µ = 0 in the Proof of Fact 4, step
1, observation (i). Now since we demonstrated in step 2 of that proof that Γ
3(x;λ,µ)
∂x2∂µ < 0
the claim holds for all µ.
Fact 6: ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂λ > 0.
Proof of Fact 6. We can compute that
∂Γ (·)
∂λ
=
x
(1− x)2
·
2λ− xλ2 − x
4λ2
¸
+
x (1− x− µ)
2µ [λ (1− x) + (1− λ)µ] +
µ2λ− x
µ2λ
.
This is larger than zero if
k (x;λ, µ) ≡ 1
(1− x)2
·
2λ− xλ2 − x
4λ2
¸
+
(1− x− µ)
2µ [λ (1− x) + (1− λ)µ] +
1
x
− 1
2µλ
> 0.
We can show that, for fixed x:
∂k(·)
∂µ =
−2µ[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]−(1−x−µ)[2λ(1−x)+4(1−λ)µ]
4µ2[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]2 +
1
2µ2λ =
2(1−λ)µ2
4µ2[λ(1−x)+(1−λ)µ]2 > 0. We
therefore concentrate on µ = 0. In this case, the expression reduces to:
k (x;λ, 0) =
1
(1− x)2
"
2− x
¡
λ+ 1λ
¢
4λ
#
+
1
x
.
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Now we will argue that this expression is positive for all x ≤ x¯. This is certainly the case
if 2− x
¡
λ+ 1λ
¢
> 0. As the latter expression decreases in x, we may evaluate it at x = x¯
to obtain 2
³
1− λ2+1λ+1
´
≥ 0 and conclude ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂λ > 0.
Fact 7: Γ (x; 1/2, µ) < 0.
Proof of Fact 7: We have
Γ (x; 1/2, µ) =
x
(1− x)2
µ
11x− 8
8
+
ln 2−x
2x
2
¶
+
x
2µ
ln
·
1 +
µ
(1− x)
¸
− 1
2
.
We have shown in Fact 4, step 2 that ∂Γ(x;λ,µ)∂µ < 0. Therefore Γ (x; 1/2, 0) < 0 implies
Γ (x; 1/2, µ) < 0. We obtain Γ (x; 1/2, 0) = x
(1−x)2
³
11x−8
8
+
ln 2−x
2x
2
´
+ 2x−1
2(1−x) . We want to
show that this expression is negative for x ≤ 2
3
. This is the case iff 1
(1−x)
³
3x
8
+
ln 2−x
2x
2
´
− 1
2x <
0, or iff 3x
2−4+4x
4x + ln
2−x
2x < 0. Taking the derivative of LHS to x we obtain
∂LHS
∂x =
12x2+16
16x2 −
2
x(2−x) . We show that this derivative is positive. This is true if 12x
2 + 16 > 32x
2−x
and certainly if 12x2 − 32x + 16 > 0. Since this polynomial has a root at x = 2
3
and
at x = 2, it is positive for x ≤ 2
3
. Therefore, the expression is increasing and we may
evaluate at x = 2
3
to conclude that the inequality holds.
Fact 8: For any 0 < µ < 1 and 0 < x < 1, Γ (x; 1, µ) > 0 and Γ (1; 1, µ) = Γ (0; 1, µ) =
0.
Proof of Fact 8: We obtain Γ (x; 1, µ) = −x
(1−x) +
x
2(1−x)2 ln
(2−x)
x . This expression is
positive for all 0 < x < 1 if −1+ 1
2(1−x) ln
2−x
x > 0 or, ln
2−x
x ≥ 2− 2x. To verify the latter
inequality, check that it holds with equality at x = 1 and that ∂LHS∂x =
−2
x(2−x) <
∂RHS
∂x =
−2, since x (2− x) < 1.
The last equality of the statement is easily verified:
Γ (0; 1, µ) = lim
x→0
x
2 (1− x)2
ln
(2− x)
x
= 0.
Fact 9: ∂x∂µ > 0 if α < 1.
Proof of Fact 9: We have that dΓ(·)dµ =
∂Γ(·)
∂µ − α
∂Γ(·)
∂x . Above in Fact 4 (step 2) we
have shown that the first term, that is, the direct effect, is negative. Furthermore, we
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know that in equilibrium ∂Γ(·)∂x > 0, therefore
∂Γ(·)
∂µ < 0. Now by employing the Implicit
Function Theorem we obtain: ∂x∂µ = −
∂Γ(·)
∂µ /
∂Γ(·)
∂x > 0.
Fact 10: ∂E(p)∂λ < 0 if α < 1 and
∂E(p)
∂λ = 0 if α = 1.
Proof of Fact 10: To prove the first statement, it is sufficient to show that F (p) as
specified in (2.5) increases in λ. Recall that ∂x∂λ < 0 if α < 1 and consider first the lower
segment F l (p). We can show that
∂F l(p)
∂x =
1
2(1−x)
h
1
1−x
³
2− x− xvp
´
− 1− vp
i
< 1
2(1−x)
£
1
1−x (2− 2x)− 2
¤
= 0, where the
inequality follows from the fact that vp > 1. Hence,
dF l(p)
dλ > 0. Secondly, consider
now the part of F (·) on the domain [λv, p0]. It can be checked that both terms in
dFm(·)
dλ =
∂Fm(·)
∂λ +
∂Fm(·)
∂x
∂x
∂λ are positive. Finally, consider the upper segment F
u (p). It is
easily checked that ∂F
u(·)
∂x < 0, hence
dFu(p)
dλ > 0.
The second statement, ∂E(p)∂λ = 0 if α = 1, can easily be verified by observing that
(2.3) does not depend on λ.
Proposition 2.2: Equilibrium for the case of no channel substitution.
Proof. The proof is included in the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Lemma 2.3: Prices in the interval
³
λv, (1−x)v
1−x+µλ−µ
´
are set with zero probability.
Proof. Let us denote the upperbound by p0. To see why the lowerbound of this open
interval is λv, suppose first that a slightly higher price is asked with some probability. The
firm will then not sell to the inexperienced consumers on the Internet, so it can improve
by not charging that price and charging λv instead. Suppose now that λv has zero density
in equilibrium and that the lowerbound of the hole is pˆ < λv. We will show that firm i can
improve by charging λv with positive probability, i.e. by shifting mass from pˆ to λv. The
profit of charging pˆ is given by
¡
x
2
+ [1− x] [1− Fj (pˆ)]
¢
pˆ while the profits of charging λv
are given by
¡
x
2
+ [1− x] [1− Fj (λv)]
¢
λv. Now since the rival j has zero probability over
the interval (pˆ, λv], Fj (pˆ) = Fj (λv) and thus i prefers to charge λv in stead of pˆ. Thus,
the gap consists of the interval (λv, p0).
The next step is to find an expression for p0 by using the fact that F (λv) = F (p0).
Since the firm must be indifferent between λv and p0 it must be the case that
³x
2
+ [1− x] [1− F (λv)]
´
λv =
³x
2
+ µ [1− F (p0)]
´
p0.
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From this we can obtain that
1− F (λv) = 1− F (p0) =
³
1− λvp0
´
x
2
[1− x] λvp0 − µ
.
We know that the firm can always attain the profit x
2
v, by charging p = v. We can use
this fact to obtain an expression for p0:
p0 = v
1− x
1− x+ µλ − µ
.
Lemma 2.4: Expressions for expected price and conditional expected minimum price.
Proof. The expected price can be calculated as follows:
E (p) =
Z λv
p
pf l (p) dp+
Z v
p0
pfu (p) dp,
where f l and fu denote the density functions corresponding to the lower and upper parts
of the cumulative distribution function, respectively. The first term can be derived by
noting that
f l =
dF l
dp
=
xv
(2− 2x) p2 .
It then follows that
Z λv
p
f lp dp =
vx
2− 2x ln p
¸λv
p
=
xv
2 (1− x) ln
·
λ (2− x)
x
¸
.
The second term can be derived in a similar way. We have that:
fu =
dF u
dp
=
2µxv
4µ2p2
and Z
fup dp =
xv
2µ
ln p
¸v
p0
=
xv
2µ
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)µ
λ (1− x)
¸
.
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The expected price can therefore be expressed as follows:
E (p) =
xv
2 (1− x) ln
·
λ (2− x)
x
¸
+
xv
2µ
ln
·
1 +
(1− λ)µ
λ (1− x)
¸
.
Now we turn to the minimum price. We have to determine the conditional expected value
of the minimum of the two prices, that is, the expected minimum price given the fact that
it is not greater than λv. First we will derive the cumulative distribution function of the
minimum price. It is defined as follows:
Fmin (p) ≡ Pr
£
min
£
p1, p2
¤
≤ p
¤
= 1− [1− F (p)]2 .
Using F (p) found above:
Fmin (p) =



0 if p <p
1−
³
x
2(1−x)
h
v
p − 1
i´2
if p≤ p ≤ λv
1−
³
x(1−λ)
2(1−x)λ
´2
if max
£
p, λv
¤
≤ p ≤ p0
1−
³
(v−p)x
p2µ
´2
if max
£
p, p0
¤
< p ≤ v
1 if p > v
.
The inclusion of the expression max
£
p, λv
¤
ensures that Fmin (p) is nonnegative. It fur-
thermore leads to a restriction on the domain of x for the usage of the explicit expression
for Fmin (p). Consider the value π ≡ Fmin (λv) and note that p= xv2−x < λv if x < x ≡
2λ
λ+1 .
Therefore we obtain
π =



1−
³
x(1−λ)
2(1−x)λ
´2
if x < x
0 otherwise
.
The conditional expected value can be expressed as follows:
E
¡
min
£
p1, p2
¤ | min £p1, p2¤ ≤ λv¢ = R λvp p dFmin (p)
Fmin (λv)
for x < x.
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For the integral part (the numerator) we have that
Z λv
p
p
dFmin
dp
dp =
Z λv
p
x2v2
2 (1− x)2 p2
− x
2v
2 (1− x)2 p
dp =
= − x
2v2
2 (1− x)2 p
− x
2v ln p
2 (1− x)2
¸λv
p
,
and we obtain:
x2v
2 (1− x)2
·
−1
λ
+
2
x
− 1− ln
·
(2− x)λ
x
¸¸
.
The conditional expected minimum price is thus:
E (min [p] | min [p] ≤ λv) =
x2v
2(1−x)2
h
−1
λ +
2
x − 1− ln
h
(2−x)λ
x
ii
Fmin (λv)
for x < x.
Proposition 2.5: Equilibrium for the case of partial channel substitution.
Proof. The result is established in the text.
Theorem 2.6: Characterization of equilibria.
Proof. It is clear that x can range in the interval [0, 1− µ]. Moreover, when x <
x ≤ 1 − µ it has to be that α = 1. From Fact 4 we know that there are either two,
one or no solutions with x in the required interval to the equation Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0. When
there are two solutions, there is one stable equilibrium with α ∈ (0, 1) and one with
α = 1. When there is one solution, it follows (from Fact 1) that there is a unique stable
equilibrium with α ∈ (0, 1). Finally, when there is no solution, it has to be that there is
a unique equilibrium with α = 1. We will now characterize which equilibrium situation
arises when. To this end, we will fix µ at different levels and then see how the equilibrium
configuration changes when λ takes on different values.
First, consider µ close to 0. From Facts 1 and 2 we know that at x = 0 and x = x,
Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 for all λ < 1. From Facts 6 to 8 we can then infer that there exist a eλ (µ)
such that for all λ < eλ (µ), Γ (x;λ, µ) < 0 and a unique equilibrium with α = 1 exists.
When λ > eλ (µ), Γ (x;λ, µ) = 0 has two solutions in the interval [0, x]. When λ gets close
to 1, however, x approaches 1 and eventually becomes larger than (1− µ). Combining
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this with Fact 8 implies that there must be a eeλ (µ) such that for eλ (µ) < λ < eeλ (µ), there
exist two equilibria and for all λ > eeλ (µ) there is one stable equilibrium with α < 1.
Fix then µ close to 1. As x lies in the interval [0, 1− µ], all permissable values of x lie
close to 0. From Fact 3 and the continuity of Γ (·) and ∂Γ (·) /∂x in a neighborhood of 0 (0
itself excluded) it follows that we can choose µ close enough to 1 such that ∂Γ (·) /∂x > 0
on the whole relevant interval. From Facts 6 to 8 it follows that there exist a eλ (µ) as
defined in (A) of the Theorem.
We next show that for any given µ, 0 < µ < 1, the equilibrium configurations that
arise when λ increases from 0 to 1, are exhausted by the two possibilities considered above.
From Fact 7 it follows that for λ small enough there is only one equilibrium, namely where
α = 1. From Fact 8 it follows that for λ close to 1, there exist a unique stable equilibrium
with α < 1. Finally, from Fact 6 it follows that if for
³bλ, µ´ there exists a unique stable
equilibrium with α < 1, then this is also the case for any (λ, µ) with λ > bλ. Hence, no
other possibilities exist than the two considered above.
We finally show that the existence of µ as defined in the Theorem. To this end we
show that if for a certain bµ the equilibrium configuration for increasing λ shifts from a
unique equilibrium with α = 1, via two stable equilibria to a unique equilibrium with
α < 1, then this pattern has to exist for all µ < bµ. In the proof of Fact 4 we show that
∂Γ (·) /∂µ < 0. Moreover, the smaller µ, the larger the range of values for which Γ (x;λ, µ)
is defined. This implies, together with Facts 1 and 2, that if (λ, bµ) is in the region where
there are two equilibria, then (λ, µ) is also in this region for any µ < bµ . Moreover, Facts
7 and 8 are true for any value of µ so that the existence of eλ (µ) and eeλ (µ) is guaranteed.
The observation that limλ→1µ(λ) = 0 and limλ→1 µ (λ) = 1 in Proposition 2.2 follows
from Fact 8.
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Chapter 3
Internet Retailing as a Marketing
Strategy
3.1 Introduction
The importance of the Internet as a marketplace has substantially grown over the past
decade, even though expectations have been dramatically tempered since early 2000. A
distinctive feature of doing business electronically is that transactions no longer require
the physical coordination of buyers and sellers: market participants find each other at
their screens. There are many aspects of market interaction which are affected by this
online nature of trade. On the supply side, we may think of all kinds of cost reductions,
resulting from new ways of organizing production and sales processes. On the demand
side, the major impact of the Internet is on consumers’ ability to acquire information
about firms and their prices.
While electronic commerce may have considerable potential, it is still of minor impor-
tance compared to other retail channels even for books and CDs.1 To understand the role
of the Internet as a retail channel, we have to explain how its features influence market
behaviour. This paper provides a theoretical framework that analyzes firms’ incentives
to sell online and the extent to which consumers will substitute the Internet for the con-
0This chapter is a version of an article co-authored by Maarten Janssen.
1According to a study by the Boston Consulting Group (2000) in the United States and Europe,
e-commerce accounts for less than 5 percent of total sales in the books and CDs categories.
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ventional retail channel. The interaction between incentives on both market sides sheds
light on the different factors that determine the channel structure of the industry and the
market share of electronic sales. Moreover, the analysis sheds a new light on the empirical
evidence concerning prices on the electronic channel relative to prices in the conventional
retail channel.
For consumers, online shopping makes it easy to find and ‘visit’ firms and compare
their prices, but the online nature of the transaction leads to uncertainties. For example,
in some product categories such as clothing and furniture, it is more difficult to assess how
well a particular product fits a consumer’s needs. Other uncertainties and inconveniences
are related to the payment method, poor product declarations, slow delivery of goods,
and unclear redemption policies.2 A consumer weighs the conveniences of online shopping
with the inconveniences and uncertainties. We explicitly take this trade-off into account
in the consumer’s choice of retail channel.
For firms, the Internet may be used as an alternative retail channel to gain market
share. Moreover, if the online shopping convenience is large enough, firms may try to
exploit the fact that consumers are willing to pay for this convenience by charging higher
prices online. These positive aspects are offset by the fact that online competition is
stronger as it is easier for consumers to compare prices. Moreover, the online infrastructure
and the reorganization of sales processes requires that firms make an investment upfront.
The paper models these different market forces in a consistent way and attempts to answer
which factor is dominant and under what circumstances.
We present a two-stage game in which firms first decide whether to build an online
retail channel before engaging in price competition, using the retail channels at their dis-
posal. This game is analyzed in a variety of settings where initially there are always two
incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms that sell horizontally differentiated products. Differen-
tiation between firms is modelled a la Hotelling (1929) where firms are located at opposite
2A survey by Hummerston (2001) indicates that the most important reason for not purchasing online
is related to payment security and the second most important reason is given by ‘You don’t know what
you get.’ and ‘Easier/more fun to buy goods/services in a store.’ In Andersen (2000) it is added that
many ”E-commerce web sites ... are not good at making the shopping experience easy and trustworthy
for the online users.”
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sides of a line segment.3 That is, incumbent firms have built a reputation that appeals
more to some consumers than to others. Traditionally, differentiation between firms in
Hotelling type of analyses is either with respect to physical location and transportation
cost or with respect to heterogeneous products and tastes. In our model, differentiation
between the two bricks-and-mortar firms is comprised of both factors. On the Internet,
physical location is not important so that only the product differentation dimension re-
mains in that retail channel. Accordingly, there is less differentiation online than in the
conventional stores.
We analyse two settings of strategic interaction. The first setting is one where there is
no threat of entry and consumers may or may not experience any additional convenience
from buying online. The second setting we analyze is one where we allow for a pure
online player to threaten the incumbent firms to enter the market and we investigate
the possibilities for entry deterrence. In each setting equilibrium channel structures and
prices are characterized.
Consumers know which of the two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms they prefer the
most. If these firms start an online retail channel, they bring the reputation that is
built up in the conventional stores with them. A pure online player does not have any
reputation among consumers so that consumers have to form expectations about their
position on the product line.
We arrive at the following insights. First, in the absence of a threat of entry and no
additional online shopping convenience, bricks-and-mortar firms do not become clicks-and-
mortar firms. The reason is that a firm with a lower online price (than on its conventional
channel) attracts two types of consumers: those who would otherwise buy from the ri-
val and those who would otherwise buy form the conventional store of the same firm.
The first effect can be called the business-stealing effect, while the second effect may be
termed the cannibalisation effect. We find that the cannibalization effect dominates the
business-stealing effect, and hence, firms find it optimal not to build an online presence
as alternative retail channel.
3When we model the consumer’s utility of buying from the entrant, it turns out that it is more
convenient to interpret the line as a circle a la Salop (1979). The difference between the circle and the
line segment is of no further importance, however, and therefore, we prefer to speak about differentiation
along the line.
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Second, if we allow for online shopping conveniences, some consumers will buy online
even if the online prices are not lower. The cannibalization effect is in this case weaker
as even at identical prices across retail channels, some consumers prefer to buy online.
Moreover, we find that the business-stealing effect is strengthened in case the other in-
cumbent firm did not open an alternative retail channel. This is because consumers who
are fairly indifferent about the two firms, are more inclined to buy online than those who
have a strong preference for a certain firm. Consequently, if the convenience of online
shopping is high enough, individual firms have an incentive to start-up an online retail
channel. However, if both firms become clicks-and-mortar, profits are lower than if both
had stayed bricks-and-mortar firms. The reason is that even though some consumers are
willing to pay more for a product online than in the conventional store, online compe-
tition for costumers is stronger as there is less differentiation online. Therefore, online
prices will be lower. Depending on the cost of setting up an online retail channel, different
equilibrium configurations are possible. If the cost is relatively low, firms face a Prisoner’s
Dilemma: individually they have an incentive to start an alternative retail channel, but
they are both worse off if they both do so. For intermediate values of this cost, there is
scope for only one click-and-mortar firm and there is a first-mover advantage of starting
an online retail channel. When the cost is relatively high, none of the two firms will start
an online channel. Interestingly, the only case where online equilibrium prices are higher
than in the conventional store is when there is only one firm selling online and when the
inconvenience associated with shopping online is not too large.
We next look into the possibilities for a pure online player to enter the market. As
an entrant does not eat up its installed costumer base, the incentives for an entrant to
go online are stronger than those of the bricks-and-mortar firms. Indeed, we find that
both in the case where the incumbent firms do not have an online retail channel and in
case they do, an entrant may make positive operating profits. Again, online prices can
only be higher than in the conventional retail channel if firms enjoy some "monopoly
power" online. We then analyze the incentives of both incumbents and entrants to make
a strategic decision to be the first to start an online retail channel. For intermediate
values of the cost of starting up an online retail channel, we show that an incumbent firm
may set up an online infrastructure to deter entry and that if these costs are even lower,
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the incumbent firms face a situation of strategic uncertainty in the sense that they want
to take identical strategies: either they want to jointly deter entry (as this is the way to
deter entry) or they both want to remain a bricks-and-mortar firm.
In the case where the entrant considers making a strategic decision to be the first on-
line player, many possible equilibrium reactions by incumbent firms may follow. This by
itself shows the difficult situation online entrants face. Details of the interaction matter
a lot; details that may be difficult to foresee. One important difficulty is that when on-
line shopping convenience becomes larger or when the cost of building an online presence
becomes smaller, it may be more profitable for incumbents to follow an entrant’s deci-
sion to build an online retail channel thereby destroying the profitability of the entrant’s
decision. Another difficulty that may arise is that incumbents may face a coordination
problem such that the entrant’s decision to enter is only profitable if the incumbents solve
the problem by not going online themselves. However, it may well be that the incumbents
work out the other solution to the coordination problem in which case the entrant would
have been better off not to enter in the first place. We see these theoretical possibilities as
ways to explain the difficulties online players have been confronted with in the real world
and as possible reasons why online shopping has not been as successful as it promised to
be at the end of the previous millennium.
The empirical literature on the implications of the Internet for the competitiveness
of markets has compared average prices in electronic marketplaces against those in con-
ventional markets. The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies find that prices in
electronic markets are lower than in conventional markets (see, e.g., Brynjolfsson and
Smith (1999)), while others report that prices in electronic markets are approximately
equal to (Clay et al. (2000)) or even higher than in conventional markets (see, e.g., Lee
(1997) and Bailey (1998)). Finally, Friberg et al. (2001) find that pure online retailers
charge lower prices than the online channel of clicks-and-mortar firms. Our theoretical
model provides an explanation for the latter result in terms of the fact that the online
player does not compete with its own conventional store and therefore has less to loose
from charging lower prices online. Our paper attributes the other mixed empirical ev-
idence concerning conventional and online prices to different degrees of online market
power and differences in online shopping convenience.
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On the theoretical side, there are papers by Bakos (1997) and Janssen, Moraga and
Wildenbeest (2005), among others, studying the implications of a reduction in search
cost due to the emergence of online shopping on the competitiveness of markets. Bakos
presents a model of circular product differentiation where consumers search for prices and
product features. In his model, consumers can get to know all product characteristics if
they engage in costly search. In our model, in contrast, consumers cannot get around
some of the uncertainties associated with buying online. Commenting on Bakos’ paper,
Harrington, Jr. (2001) questions the validity of some of Bakos’ results.
There are a few papers addressing the issue of channel substitution. Zettelmeyer
(2000) focuses on the incentives firms have to increase the ease with which consumers
can evaluate their products. In his paper, consumer search cost is a strategic variable
of firms. He shows that firms may provide selected groups of consumers with different
information (level of search cost), thereby providing monopoly power to the firms and
reducing market competition. The focus of our model is different. The source of market
power in our model lies in the fact that firms sell differentiated products. More recently,
Liu et al. (2003) analyze an issue that is more closely related to the present paper,
namely to what extent can a bricks-and-mortar retailer’s online expansion affect a pure
online player’s entry decision? They find that for some parameter values, a bricks-and-
mortar’s decision to go online may tricker an entrant to go online as well, making it more
profitable for a brick-and-mortar firm not to start an online retail channel in the first
place. To get this result, Liu et al. (2003) assume that firms are restricted to set identical
prices across different retail channels, that there is perfect competition online between
homogeneous goods producing firms and that the pricing game is sequential. As we study
a setting with heterogeneous goods and allow firms to set different prices across channels,
this result cannot occur in our setting.
Lal and Sarvary (1999) pose a different question: When is the Internet likely to decrease
price competition? In their model, the specific inconvenience of online shopping is that
products cannot be evaluated physically to learn about non-digital attributes. Firms are
present on two retail channels. Since digital attributes can be communicated over the
web, the Internet changes the effective search cost structure: consumers do not have to
visit the store to buy their familiar brand, and thus, the cost of trying another brand is
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higher than the cost of buying the familiar brand. In this way, the Internet may increase
the effective cost of search, which decreases price competition.
Finally, Mazón and Pereira (2000) also analyze whether firms have incentives to open
electronic retail channels and the different price equilibria these incentives generate. How-
ever, they focus on different issues such as retail cost reductions and their results depend
crucially on the assumption that some (“old”) consumers do not have Internet access.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
equilibrium properties in the absence of a threat of entry. Section 4 discusses the case
of a pure online player threatening to enter. The issue of which market structures can
obtain in equilibrium is discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and managerial implications
are contained in Section 6 and proofs and calculations can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
There are two types of firms. Two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms have established a
certain brand reputation among consumers, while the possible pure online entrant does
not have such a reputation. In the first stage of the game, firms decide whether or not
to invest in setting up an online retail channel at fixed cost f . For the pure online player
this decision is equivalent to the decision whether or not to enter the market. This first
stage can be analyzed as a simultaneous move or as a sequential move game where one
or two firms may try to pre-empt the other(s).
In the second stage, there are two (or three) vertically integrated firms on the supply
side of the market. Firms produce the good at constant returns to scale and production
cost is normalized w.l.o.g. to zero. Firms are horizontally differentiated, as in Hotelling
(1929)’s linear city model. On the demand side of the market, there is a mass of consumers,
normalised to 1. Incumbent firms 1 and 2 are located at x = 0 and x = 1, respectively.
Every consumer has a location x on the line segment and the preference for a firm is
represented by the disutility of travelling the distance between the consumer’s location
and the firm. This travel cost consists of two components: the physical travel cost related
to travelling to a firm’s physical shop and the "utility cost" of buying a good that differs
from her most preferred taste. For each unit travelled, consumers incur a linear cost t > 0.
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The utility a consumer x gets from buying the product from firm 1 in its physical shop is
given by
v − tx− p1c,
where v is the consumer’s maximal willingness-to-pay4 and p1c is the price firm 1 sets
for its conventional retail channel (i.e., its physical shop). Similarly, the utility consumer
x gets from buying the product at firm 2’s physical shop is given by
v − t(1− x)− p2c.
Firm i charges price pic in its store and piE on its electronic retail channel (if it has one).
Consumers purchase at most one unit and to do so they can either go online, or they
can visit one store.5 The advantages and disadvantages of the different retail channels
are modelled as follows. A first advantage of buying online is that consumers can easily
compare the firms’ prices. Moreover, the conveniences and inconveniences/uncertainties
of buying on the internet such as poor product declarations and slow delivery of goods are
modelled in two steps. First, when buying in a firm’s online shop, the willingness-to-pay
is multiplied by a factor λ. If λ < 1 (λ > 1), then the consumer’s willing-to-pay is lower
(larger) for an online purchase compared to a purchase in a conventional store. Second, a
consumer does not have to travel to a firm’s conventional store in order to buy, i.e., he only
”pays” the mismatch between a firm’s product and his most preferred commodity. This is
modelled by multiplying the cost of ”travelling” to a firm by a factor β, where 0 ≤ β < 1.
The parameter β measures how much of the disutility of buying from firm i is attributed
to product heterogeneity: for example β = 0 implies that products are homogeneous and
differentiation between incumbent firms is entirely due to differences in their locations,
whereas β = 1 implies that differentiation is entirely due to the heterogeneity of products.
Hence, consumer x derives the following utility from buying from one of the incumbent
4It is assumed throughout that v is large enough so that the market is covered.
5Here we recognize that, although often suggested otherwise, searching on the Internet does take
time. The equilibria we characterize are such that given the price and product offerings available, no
consumer regrets the choice it has made and, therefore, allowing consumers to visit the Internet and the
conventional channel would not alter the results.
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firms’ online retail channels:
max[λv − βtx− p1E, λv − βt(1− x)− p2E]
It turns out to be useful to define a parameter α as α = (1 − λ)v/(1 − β)t. The in-
terpretation of α is straightforward whenever it is positive (λ < 1). If firm 1, resp. 2,
sets identical prices in its conventional channel and its online channel, consumer α, resp.
(1 − α), is indifferent between buying in the conventional store and buying online. An-
other interpretation of α is that it measures the size of the online shopping inconvenience
relative to the inconvenience of having to travel to the conventional shop. We will assume
that −1/2 < α < 1/2.
Since the potential third firm in the market is a newcomer and did not build up any
reputation in its conventional channel, we assume that consumers do not know the x
location of this firm. Each consumer therefore has to ”travel” an expected distance of
1/2.6 The expected utility of buying from firm 3, a pure Internet player, is then given by
λv − βt/2− p3E.
An equilibrium of the second stage of the game is a set of prices, one for each retail channel
on which a firm is active, such that each individual firm i maximizes its profits given the
prices set by the other firms. Consumers buy at the firm where utility is maximized. We
will focus on symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game.
3.3 No Threat of Entry
In this section we study incentives to open online channels and the subsequent price
competition between two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms. We study a two stage game
in which firms first decide whether or not to sell online, and then compete in prices. The
two incumbent players have both the possibility to open an additional retail channel,
6Strictly speaking, this is only true along a circle. Along the line, a consumer’s expected travel to
the Internet player depends on his location and is smaller the closer a consumer is located towards the
middle of the line segment. Working with the proper line segment interpretation only complicates the
analysis without bringing additional insights.
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yielding four possible market structures in the second stage. The case in which neither
firm opens an online presence is standard as it confirms the logic of Hotelling’s (1929)
linear city model. It is easy to see that in this case both firms set their prices equal to t
and the two firms share the market equally so that each firm’s profit is equal to t/2. The
case in which only firm 2 sells online is equivalent to the case in which only firm 1 sells
online. This leaves us with two cases to investigate further.
We first concentrate on the case where each duopolist is a multi-channel retailer.
3.3.1 Two Clicks-and-Mortar Players
Whenever λ < 17 and the prices (p1c, p1E, p2c, p2E) are in the relevant range, the picture
of channel substitution is as in Figure 3-1,8 where x1Ec and x2Ec represent the consumer
that is indifferent between buying from a respective firm’s conventional and online channel
and x1E2E represent the consumer that is indifferent between buying from the two online
channels. One can easily calculate that
x1Ec =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t ;x2Ec = 1−
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p2E)
(1− β)t ;x1E2E =
βt− (p1E − p2E)
2βt
.
In this picture, the area to the left of x1Ec forms the demand for firm 1’s conventional
channel, while the area between x1Ec and x1E2E constitutes the consumers who buy via
firm 1’s online channel. Mirror areas represent Firm 2’s demand on its conventional and
online channel, respectively. From Figure 3-1 it is clear that the profit function for firm 1
is given by:
π1 = p1cx1Ec + p1E(xEE − x1Ec)
=
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t (p1c − p1E) + p1E
βt− (p1E − p2E)
2βt
.
7The main reason why we focus in the text mostly on this case is that the expressions that hold true
when λ > 1 are less complicated and easily follow once the case λ < 1 is clearly understood. Also, one
may argue that this is the most natural case to look at as the main advantage of shopping online, the
fact that one does not incur geographical travelling cost, is already captured by the parameter β.
8Here, it is implicitly assumed that equilibrium prices are such that all channels by all firms are visited
by at least some consumers. Below, we will specify the parameters for which this is the case.
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Figure 3-1: Two clicks-and-mortar players
A similar equation holds for firm 2. The equation has a simple interpretation. By means
of its online channel, a firm competes with the other firm to get a larger market share.
The division of a firm’s market share between the conventional and the electronic channel
is entirely determined by a firm’s internal pricing policy: a firm has some monopoly power
over the consumers who buy from them and can set the price difference p1c − p1E so as
to maximize profits. It is easy to see then that whenever all channels are visited by some
consumers, equilibrium prices are given by:
p1E = p2E = βt
p1c = p2c = βt+
(1− λ)v
2
and the equilibrium indifferent consumers are given by
x∗1Ec =
(1− λ)v
2(1− β)t ;x
∗
2Ec = 1−
(1− λ)v
2(1− β)t ;x
∗
EE = 1/2.
As it has to be the case that 0 ≤ x1Ec ≤ 1/2, it follows that this equilibrium holds
whenever 0 < (1−λ)v ≤ (1−β)t, or given the restrictions we have imposed on α, whenever
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α is positive.9 The Proposition below summarizes the above and also considers the case
where α < 0.
Proposition 3.1 When both firms have built the infrastructure to sell online, there are
three cases to consider: (a) if α ≤ 0, all consumers will buy online, p1E = p2E = βt,
and equilibrium profits will be βt/2; (b) if α > 0, all retail channels will be used and
p1E = p2E = βt, p1c = p2c = βt+
(1−λ)v
2
and equilibrium profits will be βt/2 + [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t .
Proposition 3.1 is easily understood by taking the Hotelling result as a reference point
and therefore, a more formal proof is omitted. If Internet purchases are considered to be
relatively inconvenient overall (α > 0), firms use both channels. Competition between
the firms mostly takes the form of competition online as the consumer that is indifferent
between buying from the two firms is a consumer that buys online. The online prices that
result are exactly equal to the equilibrium prices in a Hotelling model where transportation
costs are equal to βt (the online "transportation costs"). When both firms are clicks-and-
mortar firms, online prices are always lower than prices in the conventional channel. More
precisely, conventional prices are set as a monopoly mark-up on the online prices: there
is no effective competition for these inframarginal consumers and firms will use their
monopoly power over these consumers. This also helps to explain the result in case online
purchases are considered to be more convenient (α < 0). In this case, firms have to
set lower conventional prices than online prices to motivate consumers to buy in their
conventional stores. From the discussion provided above for the case α > 0 it follows that
this cannot be profit maximizing. Therefore, we get a situation where the online retail
channel dominates all sales. As online ”transportation costs” are lower, competition is
more severe and prices are lower than when firms compete with their conventional stores.
As competition online is more severe, we can therefore arrive at a preliminary conclu-
sion that it is not in the interest of incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms to make the online
shopping experience very convenient.
9One may observe that many relevant expressions in this paper, like the ones here for the indifferent
consumers (in equilibrium), include a term like (1 − λ)v/(1 − β)t. One of the advantages of defining α
in the way we did is that one does not have to impose each time additional and different restrictions
on β (to have it bounded away from 1). One should note, however, that given the values of the other
parameters, α negatively depends on β and in particular that α is close to 0 whenever β is close to 1.
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Figure 3-2: Clicks-and-mortar vs. bricks-and-mortar
3.3.2 Clicks-and-Mortar vs. Bricks-and-Mortar
When one firm (say firm 1) has opened an electronic retail channel and the other has
decided not to do so, the picture of channel substitution for the relevant range of prices
and parameter values is as in Figure 3-2, where
x1Ec =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t ;x1E2c =
t− (1− λ)v + (p2c − p1E)
(1 + β)t
.10
In this picture, the segment to the left of x1Ec forms the demand for firm 1’s conventional
channel, while the segment between x1Ec and x1E2c constitutes the consumers who buy
via firm 1’s Internet channel.
The remaining segment represents firm 2’s demand on its conventional channel. Using
Figure 3-2 the profit function for firms 1 and 2 are given by:
π1 = p1cx1Ec + p1E(x1E2c − x1Ec)
=
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t (p1c − p1E) + p1E
t− (1− λ)v + (p2c − p1E)
(1 + β)t
;
π2 = p2cx1E2c = p2c
βt+ (1− λ)v − (p2c − p1E)
(1 + β)t
.
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The first-order conditions that yield the subgame perfect equilibrium prices are given in
the Appendix. Solving these equations and substituting them back into the profit function
given above gives the Proposition below.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose one firm has decided to build the infrastructure to sell online,
say firm 1, and firm 2 has not. Then, if λ < 1,11 the unique symmetric subgame equilib-
rium prices are given by
p1c =
(4 + 2β)t+ (1− λ)v
6
;
p2c =
(1 + 2β)t+ (1− λ)v
3
;
p1E =
(2 + β)t− (1− λ)v
3
,
and equilibrium profits equal
π1 =
[(1− λ)v]2
4(1− β)t +
[(2 + β)t− (1− λ)v]2
9(1 + β)t
;
π2 =
[(1 + 2β)t+ (1− λ)v]2
9(1 + β)t
.
There are a few interesting observations to make. First, if only one firm opens an
electronic retail channel, it will set higher prices online than the other firm with its
conventional and it may even set higher prices online than the average conventional price.
The first point follows as (1 − β)t > 2(1 − λ)v whenever α < 1/2 and is explained by
the fact that the clicks-and-mortar firm exploits its monopoly position online. The second
point holds true whenever α < 1/5 and is explained by the fact that in this case the online
inconveniences are considered to be fairly small (or non-existent in case α < 0) so that
the clicks-and-mortar firm can further exploit its online monopoly position. A second
observation is that the operating profits of the clicks-and-mortar firm are always higher
than those of the bricks-and-mortar firm. Finally, both the online and the conventional
prices of the clicks-and-mortar firm are lower than in case both firms had stayed out
of online retailing altogether. The main reason for this is that the bricks-and-mortar
11In case λ > 1, firm 1 will not use its conventional channel, the remaining two equilibrium prices will
not be affected and equilibrium profits are simply given by π1 =
[(2+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9(1+β)t and π2 =
[(1+2β)t+(1−λ)v]2
9(1+β)t .
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firm considers the online channel of its competitor more aggressive than the competitor’s
conventional retail channel. In reaction, it will price lower, which forces the clicks-and-
mortar firm also to lower its price.
3.3.3 Clicks or just Bricks?
In the previous two subsections we have characterized the price equilibria of the second
stage of the game. We now go one step back and analyze the first stage decision whether
or not to build an online retail infrastructure. The above analysis can be summarized in
the payoff matrix below (for the case where λ < 1),12 where because of symmetry only
the pay-offs of firm 1 are mentioned.
2
1
y/n n y
n t
2
[(1−λ)v+(1+2β)t]2
9(1+β)t
y [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t +
[(2+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9(1+β)t − f
βt
2
+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t − f
.
Table 3-1. Pay-offs for firm 1 depending on whether or not itself and its rival in-
cumbent start an online channel and given that a pure online retailer stays out of the
market.
A firm contemplating to attract additional consumers via its online retail channel has
to trade-off two effects. First, it will steal some consumers away from its competitor, but
at the expense of lower overall prices. Moreover, the online channel also steals consumers
from its own conventional store. The calculations in the Appendix and Figure 3-3 below
show that unless α is a relatively large negative number the first, business-stealing, effect
is weaker than the second, cannibalization, effect. In fact, the Appendix and Figure 3-3
show that for many parameter constellations the firms have a dominant strategy not to
open an online channel. This implies that without a threat of entry, incumbent firms will
not find it profitable to start an online retail channel for most parameter values. It is
12It follows from the analysis above that the pay-off matrix in case λ > 1 differs only to the extent that
the term [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t is missing in both cells in the bottom row of the matrix.
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interesting to observe that this result holds true even if f , the cost of starting such a retail
channel, is very small.
If α is a relatively large negative number and f is small enough,13 a firm may be
better off having an online channel and the situation where both firms did not build an
online retail channel cannot arise in equilibrium. Two cases may result. First, for a range
of parameters where α is not close to −1/2 when β takes on middle range values (see
the picture below for an example), there exist asymmetric equilibria where only one firm
opens an online channel. In this case one firm effectively uses only its online retail channel,
while the other firm uses the only channel it has, the conventional one. Online prices in
this case will be higher than offline prices. If α is quite close to −1/2 and β is not close 0
or to 1, firms face a Prisoner’s Dilemma: both firms have a dominant strategy to build on
online channel and to use it as their only effective retailing channel, but as competition
online is more severe than off-line competition, both firms would be better off if they had
not opened an online channel!
The possible equilibrium configurations are summarized in Figure 3-3 below for the
case when f/t = 0.01. The Figure shows for which parameter constellations, which
equilibrium structure arises. The Figure shows that the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation
described above cannot arise when β is close to 0. In this case, locational differences
are the main source of product differentiation, hence online competition is very severe.
In this case, firms want to avoid both having an online presence. When β is close to 1,
differences between firms are due to differences in the products they sell and in this case
firms cannot benefit from an online presence, no matter how large the online shopping
conveniences are! In this case without a threat of entry, geographical differences between
shops and the consumer cost of travelling associated with it are thus important features
explaining whether or not firms will start an online retail channel. Note also that on
average firms are worse off, or not better off, if online shopping conveniences increase (α
decreases). This is easily seen in the two regions where a symmetric equilibrium exists. In
the asymmetric equilibrium case, one can easily show that the average pay-off, relevant if
13Of course, when f is relatively large, it is never optimal to build an online channel.
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Figure 3-3: Equilibrium structures when no threat of entry, f/t = 0.01.
firms do not know which one of them will be the one with an online presence, is declining
in α.
3.4 Threat of Entry by a pure Internet player
We now turn to the role the Internet can play as an alternative marketing and distribution
channel in case a pure online retailer threatens to enter the market. We are interested in
the incentives to enter and in the question whether the two conventional firms have an
incentive to start operating an Internet channel in view of this threat of entry. Assuming
the entrant enters, there are three relevant situations to consider depending on how many
incumbent firms open an online channel: no incumbent firm sells online, one incumbent
sells online or both incumbents sell online. Each of these three cases is analyzed in turn in
the next Subsections. The case where the entrant, firm 3, decides not to enter is analyzed
in the previous section.
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3.4.1 Bricks-and-Mortar vs. Pure Internet Retailer
We first consider the subgame where the two incumbent firms have not built the in-
frastructure to sell online, while the entrant has done so and uses the online channel as
the sole retail channel. In this case, it is easy to see that for the set of relevant prices, the
indifferent consumers are given by the following expressions:
x1c3E =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E) + βt2
t
;x2c3E = 1−
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p2E) + βt2
t
,
where for example x1c3E denotes the consumer who is indifferent between buying from
firm 1’s conventional store and the entrant’s (firm 3’s) online store. Consumers located to
the left of x1c3E buy from firm 1’s conventional store, those located to the right of x2c3E
buy from firm 2’s conventional store and those located between x1c3E and x2c3E buy from
the entrant’s online store. Given these indifferent consumers, one can easily derive the
firms’ profit functions.
Proposition 3.3 When the two incumbent firms have committed not to use the Internet
channel and a pure internet retailer has entered, the subgame equilibrium prices are given
by14
p1c = p2c =
(1 + β)t+ 2(1− λ)v
6
p3E =
(1− 1
2
β)t− (1− λ)v
3
.
Operating profits are given by
π1 = π2 =
[(1− λ)v + (1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9t
π3 =
2[(1− 1
2
β)t− (1− λ)v]2
9t
The Proposition shows that entry by a pure online retailer forces incumbent bricks-
and-mortar firms to lower their prices considerably: straightforward calculations show
that the subgame perfect equilibrium prices are smaller than t
2
implying that they are
more than two times smaller than without the presence of the pure online retailer. In this
14Note that equilibrium prices are nonnegative for −1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1/2.
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Figure 3-4: Clicks-and-mortar vs. pure Internet retailer.
case, the entrant has a monopoly position online and because of this may even enter with
higher prices than the incumbent firms who have an established reputation. Online prices
are larger whenever (2−β)t− 2(1−λ)v > (1+β)t+2(1−λ)v. This can be rewritten as:
α < 1−2β
4(1−β) . This inequality is satisfied whenever α and β are both relatively small, i.e., in
sectors where the online inconvenience is perceived to be fairly small (or online shopping
is considered to be more convenient) and products are close substitutes. This has a clear
economic significance. In case β is small, consumers do not have a clear preference for
one of the incumbents’ brands; they mainly dislike travelling to the conventional shop.
The online retailer benefits in case the online shopping convenience is not too bad. Note
that it is in the interest of the entrant to increase online shopping convenience if possible.
3.4.2 Clicks-and-Mortar vs. Pure Internet Retailer
Let us now consider the case where all firms opened the possibility of selling through the
online channel. In case λ < 1, Figure 3-4 applies for relevant values of the parameters and
prices, where (in addition to the notation used earlier) x1E3E denotes the consumer who
is indifferent between buying from the online channel of firm 1 and the online channel of
firm 3. Consumers located relatively close to 1/2 buy from firm 3.
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As firms 1 and 2 are symmetric with respect to each other, we only concentrate on
firm 1. Using this notation and the figure one can derive that the indifferent consumers
are given by
x1Ec =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t and x1E3E =
1
2
− p1E − p3E
βt
.
Using these equations and the derivations in the Appendix, we can state the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3.4 If λ < 1,15 the unique symmetric subgame equilibrium prices are as
follows in case all three firms have opened an online retail channel :
p1E = p2E =
βt
3
(3.1)
p1c = p2c =
βt
3
+
(1− λ)v
2
, (3.2)
and
p3E =
βt
6
. (3.3)
Some consumers buy via the incumbents Internet channel. Operating profits are given by
π1 = π2 =
βt
9
+
[(1− λ)v]2
4(1− β)t
π3 =
βt
18
.
With three retailers with online presence, online prices are lower than prices in the
conventional retail channel. Moreover, the fact that pure online retailers do not have an
established reputation, forces them to gain market share by setting quite low prices: their
equilibrium prices are just half of the online prices of incumbent firms and these are again
lower than their conventional prices. Also, when β is close to 0, online prices are close to
15In case λ > 1, it easily follows that the conventional channel will not be used by the incumbent firms
and the equilibrium profits of these firms will be simply βt/9. All other expressions remain the same.
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0 as well: in this case, products are almost homogeneous and due to a lack of locational
difference, online competition is very severe.16
3.4.3 Asymmetric Incumbents
The last case to consider in the presence of entry is when one incumbent has set up an
online retail channel, say firm 1, and the other has not. The profit functions in this case
are given by the following equations:
π1 =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t (p1c − p1E) + p1E(
1
2
− p1E − p3E
βt
);
π2 =
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p3E) + βt2
t
p2c;
π3 = [
1
2
−
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p3E) + βt2
t
+
p1E − p3E
βt
]p3E;
Using the derivations in the Appendix, we can state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.5 In the asymmetric case where only incumbent firm 1 and the entrant
have an online retail channel and firm 2 not, the unique symmetric subgame equilibrium
prices are, in case λ < 1,17 given by:
p1E =
β
1 + β
[
(3 + β)t
6
− (1− λ)v
6
]; (3.4)
p1c = p2c =
β
1 + β
(3 + β)t
6
+
3 + 2β
1 + β
(1− λ)v
6
; (3.5)
and
p3E =
β
1 + β
[
(3− β)t
6
− (1− λ)v
3
]. (3.6)
16It is easy to see that x1Ec ≤ 1/3 whenever α ≤ 2/3, which is always satisfied given the assumption
on α we imposed.
17When λ > 1, there are two subcases two consider. In both cases, as before, the incumbent firm
with an online channel decides not to use its conventional retail channel implying equation (5) stops
being relevant. The first subcase arises when the expression for p2c remains positive. This is the case
as long as α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) > 0. Apart from the fact that we have to delete the expression
[(1−λ)v]2
4(1−β)t in the equilibrium profits of the incumbent, all other expressions remain unchanged. When
α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) < 0, firm 2 cannot make positive profits and drops out of the market
altogether. One can easily check that in this case, the equilibrium prices are p1E = p3E = βt/2 and
equilibrium pofits are given by π1 = π3 = βt/4. One may easily verify that given the condition on α
and β, even the consumer located at 1 prefers buying from the entrant at this price (yielding a pay-off of
λv − βt) to getting the good for free from firm 2 (yielding a pay-off of v).
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Operating profits in this case are given by
π1 =
[(1− λ)v]2
4(1− β)t +
β
36(1 + β)2t
[(3 + β)t− (1− λ)v]2;
π2 =
1
36(1 + β)2t
[(3β + β2)t+ (3 + 2β)(1− λ)v]2;
π3 =
β
36(1 + β)t
[(3− β)t− 2(1− λ)v]2.
With asymmetric incumbent firms there are again some interesting results that deserve
some further elaboration. First, in case online shopping is considered to be less convenient
(α > 0) both incumbents charge the same equilibrium offline price. This price is simply
equal to the online price plus the mark-up (1−λ)v
2
we have seen in previous cases. Second,
the entrant’s online price can never be larger than the incumbent’s online price. From
equations (3.4) and (3.6) one can conclude that the entrant’s online price is larger in case
2β + α(1− β) < 0. However, in this case the condition that p2c ≥ 0 is violated, implying
that the equilibrium online prices of both firms equal βt/2 (see footnote 18). We can
therefore conclude already that the entrant’s (online) prices can only be larger than the
incumbents’ prices in case the entrant has a monopoly position online, the case examined
in subsection 3.4.1.
3.5 Equilibrium Market Structures: Only Bricks or
also Clicks?
We now analyze the first stage of the game and ask the question what are the incentives
of firms to develop an infrastructure to sell online at a fixed cost f. In other words, under
what conditions on the exogeneous parameters can which of the above market structures
arise? We consider two different ways the first stage may be played. First, we analyze
the case where the incumbents decide whether or not to start an online channel before
the entrant does. Here, we ask the question whether starting an online channel may be a
way to deter a pure online player to enter. Second, we analyze the case where the entrant
decides whether or not to start an online channel before the incumbents do.
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Before we delve into the implications of these two different decision sequences, we
provide some analysis that is used in both cases. We first summarize the pay-offs in the
different cases where the entrant always enters in the following two matrices, where due
to the symmetry between firm 1 and 2, we have only one matrix for both of them.18
2
1
y/n n y
n [(1−λ)v+(
1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9t
[(3β+β2)t+(3+2β)(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t
y [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t +
β[(3+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t − f
βt
9
+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t − f
,
Table 3-2. Pay-offs for firm 1 in case λ < 1 depending on whether or not itself and its
rival incumbent start an online channel and given that a pure online retailer enters.19
2
1
y/n n y
n 2[(1−
1
2
β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9t − f
β[(3−β)t−2(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)t − f
y β[(3−β)t−2(1−λ)v]
2
36(1+β)t − f
βt
18
− f
,
Table 3-3. Pay-offs for firm 3 in case λ < 1 depending on which of the incumbent
firms starts an online channel and given that itself enters.20
On the basis of Table 3-3, we can easily argue that firm 3’s incentive to enter are
monotone in the number of firms that have an online channel: the more incumbents have
an online retail channel, the less operating profits a pure online retailer can get.21
Looking at the matrices, one can see that the parameters λ and v only enter together
in the combination (1 − λ)v. Using the definition of α we can therefore substitute this
18Note that the cells are defined in terms of the actions taken by firms 1 and 2. Hence, this is not a
proper pay-off matrix.
19In case λ > 1 the term [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t has to be deleted from the two cells in the bottom row. In case
λ > 1 and, in addition, α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) < 0, the bottom left cell will have to be replaced by
βt/4− f (see footnote 17) and the upper right cell becomes zero.
20In case λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) > 0, the expressions remain identical. In case λ > 1
and α(3+2β)(1−β)+β(3+β) < 0, the bottom left cell will have to be replaced by βt/4−f (see footnote
17).
21See the Appendix for the calculations.
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Figure 3-5: Incentives for firm 3 to enter, α = 0.4.
expression without loss of generality for α(1 − β)t, where α is relatively small (large)
when the shopping inconvenience or the willingness-to-pay is relatively small. Once the
substitution is made, one can also see that all operating profits are linear in t so that in
fact we are left with three relevant parameters: α, β and f/t. Figure 3-5 shows for α = 0.4,
the monotonicity of the incentives of firm 3 to enter: for any β, if f/t is relatively large
firm 3 will never enter even, not even if no incumbent has built the facilities to sell online.
If f/t becomes smaller we first enter an area of parameter values in which firm 3 can only
profitably enter when no incumbent firm has an online retail channel. If f/t becomes even
smaller we next enter an area of parameter values in which firm 3 can only profitably enter
if at most one incumbent firm has an online retail channel. Finally, if f/t is very small
firm 3 will always want to enter.
3.5.1 Online Retailing as an Entry Deterrence Strategy
We first consider whether or not incumbent firms have an incentive to make a strategic
move by opening an online retail channel first. We have seen that in the absence of an
entry threat the incentives to open an online channel are limited to the case where the
online shopping conveniences are relatively large. By looking at the case where incumbents
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decide first whether or not to start an online retail channel before a pure online player
decides to enter the market, we therefore inquire whether the possibility to deter entry
gives incumbent firms more incentives to open online retail channels. The analysis of this
section is facilitated by the fact presented above that the entrant’s incentives to enter
are monotonic in the number of incumbent firms having an online retail channel at their
disposal. It turns out that in line with Figure 3-5, there are four possible cases for the
entrant’s reaction to the incumbents’ online presence. To discuss these cases in an easy
way, we denote by πi(a, b, c) the total pay-off (including the cost f of opening an online
channel) of player i when player 1, 2 and 3 take decisions a, b and c respectively, where
a, b and c are either equal to n (not to start an online retail channel) or y (start an online
channel).
First, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel are relatively high, π3(n, n, y)
< 0, the entrant will never enter. In the appendix we show that if the costs are really
that high that an entrant will never enter, then incumbents will also not start an online
channel. In other words, the incentives to start an online retail channel are larger for
a pure online entrant than for an incumbent. This is easily explained by the fact that
an incumbent partially competes with its own conventional store when it sets up its own
online channel.
Second, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel is somewhat smaller,
π3(n, n, y) > 0 > π3(y, n, y), the entrant will enter if, and only if no incumbent firm has
started an electronic channel. In the appendix it is shown that in this case the only
subgame perfect equilibrium has one incumbent incurring the cost of starting an online
retail channel. Depending on the parameters, the incumbent firms then may face a free-
rider problem whenever both of them prefer the other to incur the cost of deterring entry.
Free riding may occur for example when β is close to 1 and α is close to 0 so that product
differentiation is mostly due to product heterogeneity and if there is an online shopping
inconvenience, it is fairly small. As we have seen in Section 3.3, online prices may be
higher in this market structure (when α is small) than average conventional prices due to
the fact that one of the incumbents has some online monopoly power. Unlike in Section
3.3, this market structure may now also arise when α > 0 as incumbent firms have an
incentive to deter entry.
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Third, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel is even smaller, π3(y, n, y)
> 0 > π3(y, y, y), the entrant will enter if and only if, at most one incumbent firm has
started an electronic channel. The appendix shows that in this case two things may
happen. The more interesting possibility occurs when α > 0 and it may also arise when
α is not too small. In this case, the incumbent firms face a situation of severe strategic
uncertainty in the sense that they only would like to start an online retail channel if the
other firm will do likewise so that they together deter entry. This strategic uncertainty is
reflected by the fact that the incumbent firms face a coordination game and there are two
subgame perfect equilibria: either they both start an online retail channel and together
deter entry, or none of them builds an online channel and entry occurs. When entry
occurs, as explained in subsection 3.4.1., online prices may be higher than the prices in
the conventional stores due to the "monopoly power" of the entrant. When there are
large online shopping conveniences, only one online shop owned by the entrant is a very
big threat to the incumbents and it becomes a dominant strategy for the incumbent firms
to start an online channel irrespective of the behavior of the other incumbent. The net
effect in this case is that entry is deterred.
Fourth, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel is very small, f < βt
18
, the
entrant will always enter. If the cost of setting up the online retail channel is really very
low, it may be (as a subcase) that both incumbent firms nevertheless decide to go online,
sometimes even when α > 0. Hence, even if entry does occur it may facilitate incumbents
also to start an online retail channel as without entry they would not do so.
An overview of the different cases presented in this subsection is given in (α, β) space
in Figure 3-6 below. The vertical line in the Figure represents the boundary between a
region where the entrant always enters (to the right) and a region where the entrant’s
decision is conditional on what incumbents do. In the left-hand part of the Figure we
see the different possibilities to deter entry (either by one firm, or jointly as part of a
coordination game or due to dominant strategies) as discussed above. The right-hand
part shows that when α decreases it becomes more attractive for incumbents to start an
online retail channel as well even though this will not affect the entrant’s choice.
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Figure 3-6: Equilibrium structures, f/t = 0.02.
3.5.2 Following the entrant’s lead
Next, we analyze the case where the entrant is considering whether or not to make a
strategic move and invest already early on (i.e., before the incumbents consider doing so)
in building an online retail channel. More formally, the entrant now decides first whether
or not to enter before the incumbents decide whether or not they follow and start their
own retail channel. Of the cases considered in the previous subsection, the first and the
last case (π3(n, n, y) < 0 and π3(y, y, y) > 0) are very similar to the previous analysis
where the incumbents decide first and are therefore omitted. So, we concentrate on the
intermediate cases where π3(n, n, y) > 0 > π3(y, y, y).
Unlike in the previous subsection, now many possibilities arise and we don’t attempt
to give a complete characterization. The most obvious cases arise when the incumbents
have a dominant strategy either to start or not to start an online channel after the entrant
has decided to enter. For quite a few parameter values when α > 0, the incumbents have
a dominant strategy not too follow the entrant and the market outcome is one where the
entrant is the only one having online presence. On the other hand, when α is relatively
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small, there are many parameters values (especially when β is not too close to 0) for
which the incumbents have a dominant strategy also to start an online retail channel
whenever the entrant has done so. In this case, the entrant is better off not to start an
online channel when π3(y, y, y) < 0. Whether or not the incumbents will then set up an
online channel depends on the specific parameter values and this case is already analyzed
in section 3.3.3.
There are, however, also quite a few other more interesting situations that may occur.
First, it may be that the incumbents face a situation of strategic uncertainty, formally
represented by a coordination game, following the entrant’s decision to go online. This is
for example the case in an area around the following parameter constellation: α = 0, β =
0.1 and f/t = 0.007. The incumbent firms would either like to enter both or not at all as
π1(y, y, y) > π1(n, y, y) and π1(n, n, y) > π1(y, n, y). Turning back to the decision of the
entrant makes clear that when the incumbents face a coordination problem, the entrant
also faces a very risky decision: if incumbents will not follow, it can make a profit starting
an online channel as π3(n, n, y) > 0. However, if incumbents follow suit, the entrant
cannot recover its start-up costs and goes bankrupt as π3(y, y, y) < 0. As the entrant
cannot logically predict what the incumbents will do, as both possibilities may occur as
equilibrium responses, the entrant cannot really figure out what to do. We may interpret
this theoretical possibility as one of the possible rational explanations for the shake-out we
have seen in recent years in the online business world: Entrants may have expected that
incumbent brick-and-mortar firms will not follow and they had good reasons to expect so
as not going online is an equilibrium response by incumbent firms. However, there exists
another equilibrium path where incumbents do go online and where entrants make losses.
The model tells that this possibility arises when both α and β are close to 0, i.e., when
the online shopping inconvenience is fairly small and goods are relatively homogeneous.
Interestingly, these are exactly the sectors where one may expect online retailing to be
quite successful!
A second interesting observation is that the number of firms deciding to start an online
retail channel may very well be non-monotonic in the cost of building the infrastructure to
sell online. The following parameter constellation serves as an example. For α = 0, β = 0.3
and f/t = 0.10, it is optimal for the entrant to enter and start a pure online shop as
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π3(n, n, y) > 0, knowing that the incumbents will not follow suit as π1(y, n, y) < π1(n, n, y)
and π1(y, y, y) < π1(n, y, y) . However, when f/t drops to f/t = 0.05, ceteris paribus, one
incumbent will find it optimal also to start an online retail channel following the entrant’s
decision to do so as π1(y, n, y) > π1(n, n, y). This, however, makes it unprofitable for
the entrant to start an online retail channel in the first place as π3(y, n, y) < 0. When
the entrant does in fact abstain from entering (as it is able to accurately predict the
incumbent’s response), the incumbents will find it optimal not to start an online channel
themselves. Thus, when f/t = 0.05, no online retail channel is built: the threat to enter
in this case is, in a sense, incredible in case the incumbents can respond by going online
themselves! When the cost of building an online retail channel falls further to, for example,
f/t = 0.03 the entrant will find it optimal to enter again (π3(n, n, y) > 0) even if it knows
that an incumbent will do likewise.22 Thus, this numerical example shows that it is not
generally true that by subsidizing the building of online retail channels, more online retail
channels will be built.
A similar situation may arise with respect to the online shopping convenience perceived
by the consumers. For α = 0, β = 0.4 and f/t = 0.07, it is optimal for the entrant to
enter and start a pure online shop, knowing that the incumbents will not follow suit.
However, when the online shopping inconvenience drops to α = −0.3, keeping the other
parameter values equal, one incumbent will find it optimal to go online as well, making
the entrant’s decision to do so unprofitable. As above, when the entrant does not enter in
the first place, the incumbents will not go online at all. This makes the point that it is not
generally true that increasing the online shopping convenience as perceived by consumers,
will increase the possibility that firms build an online presence. Hence, increasing online
shopping convenience may actually not be in the interest of consumers!
22The implicit point in the above discussion is that for some parameter configurations the incumbent’s
decision to go online is positively affected by the entrant’s presence online. This can be explained by the
fact that by doing so an incumbent will want to recover some of the business it has lost to the entrant.
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3.6 Conclusions and Managerial Implications
In this paper we have explored the implications of the possibility for firms of building a
retail channel online. The setting we analyze is one where two incumbent firms compete for
costumers in a market with horizontally differentiated products. Firms are differentiated
because they sell differentiated products and because their physical locations are different.
In the online market, only the first type of differentiation plays a role. Consumers know
which of the two incumbent firms sell products closest to their tastes. They can decide
to go either to the conventional store of a firm or they can go online. Consumers find one
aspect of online shopping certainly better than conventional shopping, which is the fact
that they do not have to travel a physical distance. Apart from that, consumers may find
online shopping more or less convenient from going to a conventional shop depending on
whether or not they feel confident about things like payment method, delivery time and
the thrustworthiness of redemption policies.
Firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage they decide whether or not to build
the infrastructure needed to sell online at a fixed cost. The interesting cases arise when
this fixed cost is not prohibitively high so as to make it unprofitable to start an online
retail channel. The main question at this stage is what are the incentives for a bricks-
and-mortar firm to go online and what are the incentives to enter for a pure online player.
In the second stage, firms decide which prices to charge on different retail channels.
The more interesting managerial implications are as follows. First, bricks-and-mortar
firms are worse off if they open an online retail channel as the cannibalization effect
(stealing consumers from its own conventional store at lower prices) is likely to be more
important than the business stealing effect (attracting demand from rival firms). When
online shopping is considered to carry some conveniences, incumbent firms also will not
have an incentive to start an online retail channel. When there are large online shop-
ping conveniences, firms may individually have an incentive to go online, but total profits
decline as online competition is more severe due to the absence of differentiation in loca-
tion. In some cases, firms may in fact face a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
A second managerial implication relates to the question who benefits from online
shopping conveniences. By increasing the online shopping conveniences (or reducing the
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inconveniences), firms are able to direct more of their costumers through the online chan-
nel. If there are no important cost advantages related to this shift and there is no (threat
of) entry, incumbent firms will be worse off as more bricks-and-mortar firms will open an
online retail channel and competitive pressure online is larger. When there is a threat of
entry, however, increasing online shopping convenience may be a way for incumbent firms
to credibly commit to start an online channel if pure only players do so. In such situations,
online players may abstain from entry as entry will be followed by an incumbent going
online, making the entry unprofitable. These are situations where incumbent firms may
benefit from online shopping conveniences at the expense of entrants and consumers.
A third implication relates to the viability of pure online retailers. Our analysis shows
that in most circumstances these retailers have to charge fairly low prices in order to
get a fair market share. The operating profits of online retailers are therefore relatively
low as they do not benefit from a bricks-and-mortar reputation. Moreover, they may
find it difficult to predict the response of incumbent firms to their entering the market.
There are situations when incumbent firms face a coordination problem after entry. This
makes the entry decision a risky decision as the consequences in terms of profitability
are difficult to predict. Moreover, it may be that incumbent firms will face lower cost of
building up an online retail channel as they may learn from the entrant’s experience. We
have seen how sensitive the entrant’s decision problem is to the non-monotonicity in the
cost of building an online retail channel. All these factors question the viability of pure
online retailers, especially in markets where product differentiation is largely due to the
geographical location of bricks-and-mortar firms.
A last managerial implication relates to a firm’s pricing policy. Online prices depend
on the type of firm: a clicks-and-mortar firm charges higher online prices than a pure
online player. Also, online prices depend on the market structure and on the size of
the online shopping convenience. Online prices will only be higher than prices in the
conventional stores if firms have some market power online, which is partly founded by
the size of the online shopping convenience. In future research it would be interesting to
see whether this theoretical prediction can be empirically verified.
The results may explain the fact that online shopping has not become as important
a retail channel as many believed at the end of the previous millennium. The online
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shop may cannibalize a firm’s own costumer base and when it does not, it may increase
competition between firms if everyone builds an online retail channel. Managers should
be aware of these facts and should weigh the importance of them against the possibility
that new costumers are attracted to the market by using an alternative retail channel.
In future theoretical work, it would be interesting to see to what extent the conclusion
drawn here for a more or less saturated market continue to hold when the online retail
channel is able to attract new costumers.
3.7 Appendix
First-order conditions Section 3.3.2.
There are three first-order conditions, one for firm 2 and two for firm 1:
p1c = p1E +
(1− λ)v
2
;
0 = t− (1− λ)v + p2c − 2p1E;
0 = βt− (1− λ)v − 2p2c + p1E;
Solving these three equations for the three unknown prices, yield the subgame equi-
librium prices given in the main text.
Calculations establishing firms have a dominant strategy in Section 3.3.3 when λ < 1
When firm 2 does not start an online channel, it is better for firm 1 to do likewise iff
1
2
≥ α
2(1− β)
4
+
[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2
9(1 + β)
− f/t.
This inequality certainly holds if it holds for f = 0. In this case, the inequality can be
rewritten as
18(1 + β) ≥ 9α2(1− β2) + 4[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2.
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It is easy to verify that this inequality holds true for both β = 1 (with equality) and
β = 0. As the coefficient in front of the β2 term of the RHS is positive for α > 0, the
inequality has therefore to hold for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
When firm 2 starts an online channel, it is better for firm 1 not to do likewise iff
[1 + α+ (2− α)β]2
9(1 + β)
≥ β
2
+
α2(1− β)
4
− f/t.
For f = 0, this reduces to
4[1 + α+ (2− α)β]2 ≥ 18β(1 + β) + 9α2(1− β2).
It is easy to verify that this inequality holds true for both β = 1 (with equality) and
β = 0. If we bring all terms to the LHS the coefficient in front of β2 is negative, implying
that the inequality has to hold for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Calculations establishing the equilibrium structure in Section 3.3.3 when λ > 1
When firm 2 does not start an online channel, it is better for firm 1 to do likewise iff
1
2
≥ [2− α+ (1 + α)β]
2
9(1 + β)
− f/t.
In this case, the inequality can be rewritten as
µ
1 + 2
f
t
¶
9(1 + β) ≥ 2[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2.
The upper curve in Figure 3-2 depicts this relation in case we replace the inequality by
an equality sign and f/t = 0.01.
When firm 2 starts an online channel, it is better for firm 1 not to do likewise iff
[1 + α+ (2− α)β]2
9(1 + β)
≥ β
2
− f/t.
The lower curve in Figure 3-2 depicts this relation when f/t = 0.01 and when replacing
the inequality by an equality sign.
First-order conditions Section 3.4.1.
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There are three first-order conditions, one for each firm. As firms 1 and 2 are in a
symmetric position and we are looking for symmetric equilibria, we only give the first-
order conditions for firm 1 and 3:
(1− λ)v − 2p1c + p3E +
βt
2
= 0;
t− 2(1− λ)v + p1c + p2c − 4p3E − βt = 0;
Imposing symmetry (p1c = p2c) we can solve these two equations and obtain the
subgame equilibrium prices given in Proposition 3.3.
First-order conditions Section 3.4.2.
In case λ < 1, there are five first-order conditions, two for firms 1 and 2 and one for
firm 3. As firms 1 and 2 are in a symmetric position and we are looking for symmetric
equilibria, we only give the first-order conditions for firm 1 and 3, taking p1E and p1c−
p1E as choice variables:
p1c − p1E =
(1− λ)v
2
;
1
2
− 2p1E − p3E
βt
= 0;
p1E + p2E − 4p3E = 0;
Imposing symmetry (p1c = p2c and p1E = p2E) we can solve these three equations and
obtain the subgame equilibrium prices given in the main text.
First-order conditions Section 3.4.3.
In case λ < 1, there are four first-order conditions, two for firm 1, one for firm 2 and
one for firm 3:
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p1c − p1E −
(1− λ)v
2
= 0;
1
2
− 2p1E − p3E
βt
= 0;
(1− λ)v − 2p2c + p3E +
βt
2
= 0;
1
2
−
(1− λ)v − p2c + 2p3E + βt2
t
+
p1E − 2p3E
βt
= 0;
The second and third conditions together imply that p2c = p1E+
(1−λ)v
2
. It is important
to note that this is independent of whether or not the first-order condition holds, i.e., in
case λ > 1 and the first condition does not hold the second firm’s offline price is still the
usual mark-up over the online price. Substituting this equation for p2c into the fourth
first-order condition and using the second yields
1
2
−
(1−λ)v
2
+ 3
2
p3E +
βt
4
t
+
1
2
p3E +
βt
4
− 2p3E
βt
= 0.
This can be solved for the subgame perfect equilibrium value of p3E given in the Propo-
sition. Substituting this value into the second and third condition yields the subgame
perfect equilibrium values of p1E and p2c. The expressions for equilibrium profits, can be
obtained by substituting the equilibrium prices in the expression for profits given in the
text.
Section 3.5: The entrant’s incentive to enter are monotone in the number of incum-
bents with an online channel
On the basis of Table 3-3 we first show for the case when λ < 1 or the case where
λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) > 0 that the operating profits of the entrant are
larger when no incumbent has an online channel than when one of them has one. This is
the case when23
8(1 + β)[1− α+ (α− 1
2
)β]2 > β[3− 2α+ (2α− 1)β]2.
23In case λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) < 0, the inequality takes the form 8(1 + β)[1 − α +
(α− 12)β]
2 > 9β. Straightforward calculations show that whenever this inequality is relevant, it holds.
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As β/(1 + β) < 1/2, it follows that this is certainly the case when
1− α+ (α− 1
2
)β >
3− 2α+ (2α− 1)β
4
.
One can easily verify that this is the case if α < 1/2.
Next, we show that the operating profits of the entrant are larger when one incumbent
has an online channel than when both of them have one.24 This is the case when
[3− 2α+ (2α− 1)β]2 > 2(1 + β).
As the LHS is decreasing in α, this inequality certainly holds if it holds for α = 1/2.
Substituting this into the inequality yields 4 > 2(1 + β), which holds for all β < 1.
Section 3.5.1: If f is to large for the entrant to enter in case the incumbents have no
online retail channel, then incumbent will not start an online retail channel either
We have to show that π3(n, n, y) < 0 implies π1(y, n, n) < π1(n, n, n). This is the case
when 2[(1−
1
2
β)t−α(1−β)]2
9
< f/t implies [(2+β)t−α(1−β)]
2
9(1+β) −f/t <
1
2
. This implication holds true
if
(1 + β){2− 2β + 1
2
β2 − 4α(1− β)(1− 1
2
β) + α2(1− β)2}+ 9
2
(1 + β)
> 4 + 4β + β2 − 4α(1− β)(1 + 1
2
β) + α2(1− β)2.
This inequality can be rewritten as 21
2
+ 1
2
β − 21
2
β2 + 1
2
β3 + 2αβ2 + α2β(1− β)2 > 0.
The terms involving α reach a minimum value of -β3 at α = −β/(1− β). Given this, it is
easily seen that the inequality always holds true.
Section 3.5.1: Entry deterrence when the entrant enters if, and only if, no incumbent
sells online
We have to show that π3(n, n, y) > 0 implies π1(y, n, n) > π1(n, n, y) > 0. In case
λ < 1 (and when λ > 1) this implication certainly holds true if 2[(1−
1
2
β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9t > f
24In this case the relevant expressions for the entrant’s pay-off are independent of whether or not λ < 1.
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implies [(2+β)t−(1−λ)v]
2
9(1+β)t − f >
[(1−λ)v+( 1
2
+1
2
β)t]2
9t . This can be rewritten as
[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2
9(1 + β)
>
[1
2
+ α+ (1
2
− α)β]2
9
+
2[1− α+ (α− 1
2
)β]2
9
The LHS of this inequality is certainly larger than (2−α)2/9, while the RHS is certainly
smaller than (1+ 2(1−α)2/9. It is easily seen that (2−α)2 > 1+ 2(1−α)2 for all values
of α < 1/2.
Coordination issue between incumbents when the entrant enters if, and only if, at most
one incumbent firm has started an electronic channel (Section 3.5.1).
We have to show two things: (i) π3(y, y, y) < 0 and α > 0 implies π1(n, n, y) >
π1(y, n, y) and (ii) π3(y, n, y) > 0 implies π1(n, y, y) < π1(y, y, n)
(i) The first implication says f > βt
18
implies [(1−λ)v+(
1
2
+1
2
β)t]2
9t >
[(1−λ)v]2
4(1−β)t +
β[(3+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t −
f . We think of the LHS and the RHS of this inequality as function of α. We prove
three facts: (a) When α = 0, the implication holds true if the following inequality
holds: (1+β)
2
36
> β(3+β)
2
36(1+β)2 −
β
18
, which can be rewritten as 1 − 3β + 4β2 + 5β3 + β4 > 0,
which holds for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; (b) When α = 1/2, the implication holds true if
the following inequality holds: 1
9
> β(5+3β)
2
144(1+β)2 +
1−β
16
− β
18
, which can be rewritten as
16(1 + β)2 > β(5 + 3β)2 + 9(1 − β) − 8β, or, −β3 − 14β2 + 24β + 7 > 0, which also
holds for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; (c) Further, it is easy to evaluate the derivative of both LHS and
RHS with respect to α. The derivative of the LHS is positive on the relevant domain of
α, whereas the derivative of the RHS is first negative and then positive. These three facts
together imply that the implication always holds.
When λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) > 0, the implication does not need
to hold. To see this note that the implication holds if, and only if, [α(1−β)+(
1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9
>
β[(3+β)t−α(1−β)]2
36(1+β)2 −
β
18
. One may check that for example when α = −1/2 and β = 0.4 the
inequality does not hold.
(ii) In case λ < 1 the second implication certainly holds true if β[(3−β)t−2(1−λ)v]
2
36(1+β)t > f
implies [(3β+β
2)t+(3+2β)(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t <
βt
2
+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t − f. This implication holds true if
β
2
+
α2(1− β)
4
>
[(3β + β2) + α(3 + 2β)(1− β)]2
36(1 + β)2
+
β[3− 2α+ 2(α− 1)β]2
36(1 + β)
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As the last term of the RHS is decreasing in β, this term is smaller than β/4 when α > 0,
and thus, this inequality holds if
β
4
+
α(1− β)
4
µ
α− α(3 + 2β)
2(1− β)
9(1 + β)2
− 2β(3 + 2β)(3 + β)
9(1 + β)2
¶
>
β2(3 + β)2
36(1 + β)2
.
As the term on the LHS in brackets is increasing in α, this is certainly the case when
β
4
− α(1− β)
4
2β(3 + 2β)(3 + β)
9(1 + β)2
>
β2(3 + β)2
36(1 + β)2
.
As α < 1/2, it is a straightforward exercise to show this is the case.
Similar calculations hold when λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) > 0.25 In this
case the implication holds when
β
2
>
[(3β + β2) + α(3 + 2β)(1− β)]2
36(1 + β)2
+
β[3− 2α+ 2(α− 1)β]2
36(1 + β)
.
As the first term of the RHS is increasing in α and as 0 > α > −1/2, this inequality
certainly holds if
1
2
>
β(3 + β)2
36(1 + β)2
+
16β
36(1 + β)
.
It is straightforward to show that this is always the case.
25When λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) < 0 the implication reads as βt/4 − f > 0 implies
βt/2− f > 0,which obviously holds true.
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Chapter 4
Discrimination in Insurance
4.1 Introduction
When purchasing life insurance, insurees are often required to do a medical test, the re-
sult determining at what terms one can be insured, if at all. There is ungoing debate
about insurers’ information use, for example about genetic discrimination and risk selec-
tion (Lemmens 2003). Insurers usually motivate information use by stating that it is a
necessary underwriting strategy, since they suffer from adverse selection: insurees have
private information about their risk profile and base their decision to buy insurance on
this information. Consequently, in a heterogeneous population only the high-risks will
purchase insurance. Even though adverse selection is mitigated by this underwriting, the
loss of insurance coverage for the high-risks forms a welfare loss. We develop a model of
adverse selection in which the two opposing effects are incorporated. Insurers may obtain
information about an applicant’s risk profile by using some screening technology. We
postulate that if the applicant possesses a certain trait (e.g. a gene mutation or virus),
his or her risk profile exceeds some upperbound. The objective is to compare welfare in
an economy where risk profiles above this upperbound are rejected with an economy in
which this is not the case.
We address this question in a setting that has not been studied before. One of the
main novelties of our model is that we use a continuum of risk types. The advantage
of such a realistic setup is that asymmetric information remains after excluding some
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of the highest risks. Furthermore, it provides us with a continuous relation between
the demand for insurance and important market variables, such as risk aversion. The
equilibrium we find has more risk types than contracts. This is not the case in the existing
contributions where individuals come in a discrete number of known risk profiles, usually
two. In a two-type model, exluding one risk type would imply full information about
the remaining pool and the welfare effect of discrimination would be trivial: it would
implement the full-information outcome. Our setting permits the important mechanism
that when the highest risks are excluded, the expected risk in the pool decreases but
individual risks remain unknown. It follows that the actuarially fair premium decreases
as well. This in turn gives rise to the following three effects on aggregate surplus: (i) the
fall in premium paid due to the overall lower risk in the economy, (ii) some low risks will
switch to purchasing insurance (softening adverse selection) and (iii) loss of insurance for
the high risk types. Our analysis fully balances these three effects and thus shows when
total welfare improves due to discrimination and when this is not the case. We thereby
contribute to the debate on the desirability of information usage by insurers.
Since discrimination is a mechanism that potentially softens adverse selection, we want
to look at adverse selection in isolation from other solutions, like offering an incentive com-
patible menu-of-contracts where different types choose different combinations of premium
and deductible. Additionally, we want to portray a market where there are more risk types
than contracts as clearly as possible, and therefore we assume that insurers compete only
on the price dimension.
Our results are as follows. The loss of insurance effect (iii) depends on the treshold,
which in turn is determined by the nature of the peculiarity tested for and the test
technology. For a given treshold, the total effect on welfare depends therefore on the
magnitude of effect (i) and (ii) mentioned above. How large will the premium decrease
be and how many low risks will be persuaded to buy insurance as a result? The answer
depends on the risk attitude in the population. It turns out that when risk aversion is
low, the price elasticity of the demarcating low risk consumer is high and many low-risks
are gained. As a result, total welfare increases in that case. When risk aversion is very
low, a market does not emerge if insurers do not discriminate, while it always emerges
87
in the discrimination regime. On the contrary, when risk aversion is high, even the low
risks already have a relatively high willingness to purchase insurance and not many are
gained by a premium decrease. Hence, the welfare effect of discrimination is negative in
that case.
It is interesting to compare our result with a lemons market model, initiated by Akerlof
(1970). In our model, the volume of transactions decreases as a result of discrimination,
when risk aversion is high. However, in the lemons model an increase in the lowerbound
of the quality distribution always increases the volume of transactions.1
The literature on adverse selection (in insurance) provides the background for the mo-
tivation of this paper.2 There is quite some literature on discrimination and risk selection.
Lemmens (2003) gives an overview of policy and legal issues of genetic discrimination in
Canada. The relevance of risk selection in its many forms is discussed by Eggleston (2000),
it is furthermore suggested that both demand-side cost sharing and risk selection are ways
to discourage over-utilization in health insurance. The optimal combination of the two is
being analyzed.
A concern raised by insurers is the discrepancy between premium paid and expected
costs, while on the contrary others stress the role of solidarity in insurance: low risks
should pay more than their expected costs to subsidize the high risks. According to the
first concern, a better identification of risk type can be seen as a reduction of discrimina-
tion since the discrepancy between premium paid and expected costs decreases. Hoy and
Lambert (2000) analyze this effect for genetic screening and assert that the possibility of
misclassification is a counterforce.
In contrast to the above papers, we focus on the simple question whether risk selection
increases welfare. Our contribution captures the effect that by excluding some risks, the
price for the remaining pool decreases, softening adverse selection. We provide clear-cut
conclusions about aggregate surplus.
1Suppose that quality is distributed uniformly on
£
θ, θ
¤
and that buyers are willing to pay v.E (θ)
and that a seller is willing to trade only if the price exceeds his/her quality. Then it can be shown that
in equilibrium the sellers in
h
θ, v2−vθ
i
trade and the volume of transactions equals 2v−12−v θ and is thus
increasing in the lowerbound of quality θ.
2This literature was initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and is surveyed in Dionne et al. (2000).
For empirical evidence on adverse selection, see Puelz and Snow (1994).
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A related common underwriting strategy is risk classification. The difference with
risk selection is that with classification, all risk categories are being offered a contract,
whereas with selection the highest risks are simply rejected. We use simulations in which
the rejected individuals are offered a risk adjusted alternative. This addition does not
change our results.
Crocker and Snow developed a theory of risk classification and review it in Crocker
and Snow (2000). No sophisticated tests are used but simple data such as age, gender and
domicile. Instead, we allow for insurers to gather information by some costly technology,
that is potentially more informative, e.g. genetics. They allow for screening of individuals
by menus of contracts that have to be made incentive compatible. In contrast, by preclud-
ing screening we isolate the merits of risk classification from such other mechanisms that
partly resolve adverse selection. Related to this, our simple modelling setup relates clear-
cut welfare implications to the degree of risk aversion, as opposed to their conclusions
that are more ambiguous. This is due to the complexity of their separating equilibrium
and maximization problems, furthermore they need to implement complicated transfers
to attain a welfare improvement.
Insurers may also employ some information technology ex-post to investigate the infor-
mation that was provided by the insuree himself in the insurance application. Insurance
law allows for contestability, i.e. when a claim is filed and falsehood is proven, the contract
may become void and the payment of indemnity can be denied. This issue is analyzed in
Dixit and Picard (2002) and in Chapter 5 of this volume.
Finally, an issue quite different from risk selection occurs when symmetric information
is the starting point and an increase of information available to the insuree may create
adverse selection. In Subramanian et al. (1999) consumers may learn more about their
own risk by doing a genetic test. Using mortality rates for a known gene mutation, they
discuss the consequence of this private information for the expected costs of the insurer.
Section 2 presents the model, followed by Sections 3 on equilibrium and 4 on welfare.
Section 5 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
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4.2 The Model
Consider an insurance market, where the demand side consists of a continuum of indi-
viduals who seek to insure the amount of R. Individuals have private information about
their probability of loss ai and are strictly risk averse, with constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA). We assume that v (m) = − exp (−cm) represents the utility of income, where
c > 0 denotes the CARA coefficient. If no damage occurs, wealth equals y1 and in case
of damage it equals y2, where y1 − y2 ≥ R.
The supply side has many insurance firms competing by setting a price P . Insurance
companies are risk-neutral, have no administration costs and know that the distribution
of ai is uniform with support [0, 1]. In our main result we will assume full insurance:
y1 − y2 = R.
Consider the contract P, for individual i the expected utility if this contract is pur-
chased equals:
aiv (y2 +R− P ) + (1− ai) v (y1 − P ) , (4.1)
and if no insurance is purchased, expected utility equals:
aiv (y2) + (1− ai) v (y) . (4.2)
Let:
D1 (P ) = v (y1)− v (y1 − P ) ;
D2 (P ) = v (y2 +R− P )− v (y2) .
Expression D1 denotes the ex-post utility cost of insurance if no accident occurred and
D2 denotes the ex-post utility gain of insurance in case an accident occurred. From (4.1)
and (4.2), we can derive that, for type i, the utility of taking the contract in excess of the
utility of not taking the contract equals:
aiD2 (P )− (1− ai)D1 (P ) .
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This expression is intuitive: if an accident occurs (with probability ai), the utility gain
D2 is enjoyed, otherwise the cost D1 is incurred. We can rewrite the expression as:
F (ai, P ) = (D1 (P ) +D2 (P )) ai −D1 (P ) .
An individual purchases the contract iff F > 0. Since F is increasing in ai, F (0) < 0 and
F (1) > 0 it follows that there exists aˆ such that an individual purchases insurance iff.
ai > aˆ, where
aˆ =
D1 (P )
D1 (P ) +D2 (P,R)
.
We now introduce the information technology that allows insurers to exclude the
highest risks. We assume that a technology is available that allows an insurer to determine
whether an individual has a certain trait that is informative about the risk profile (e.g.
have a disease or gene mutation). Individuals that are found not to possess this trait are
known to have a risk profile that does not exceed a certain treshold, denoted by ah < 1.3
Yet, their precise risk profile remains unknown beyond that knowledge. We assert that
ah depends on the characteristic that is being tested for and on the accuracy of the test.
From the analysis above it follows that the selection of types that demands insurance
is then
£
aˆ, ah
¤
and the expected risk of an insuree equals E (ai) = aˆ+a
h
2
. The benchmark
case of no discrimination corresponds to ah = 1. In what follows, we first characterize
equilibrium and consequently investigate the welfare effects of discrimination, i.e. a regime
in which ah is less than but close to 1. Total welfare is defined as the sum of all actors’
utilities.
3Insurers may have learned this through past experience.
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4.3 Equilibrium
Due to perfect competition on the side of insurers, we require that, in expectation, they
break even on the contract P :
P −E (ai) .R = 0 or
f (P ) ≡ 2P
R
− D1 (P )
D1 (P ) +D2 (P )
= ah. (4.3)
Observe that for a market to exist, we must have that in equilibrium, aˆ < ah. The following
defines an insurance market in equilibrium:
Definition Let the discrimination treshold be ah ∈ (0, 1]. The premium P ∗ character-
izes an insurance market in equilibrium if (i) f (P ∗) = ah and (ii) P ∗ < R. Consumers
in
£
aˆ, ah
¤
purchase insurance. If no such P ∗ exists, no market emerges.
To verify that this is an equilibrium, note that any firm that deviates by setting a lower
premium will make a loss because of (4.3) and that any firm that sets a higher premium
attracts no customers. The optimality of the consumer decision is derived above.
We now provide a claim about f (P ) , that is useful to characterize the equilibrium
and to show it is unique. In the Appendix we show that:
Claim 4.1 f (0) = 0, f (R) = 1; dfdP (0) > 0 and
d2f
dP 2 < 0.
The above claim implies that equilibrium is unique: f is concave and if it has two
intersections with ah then one is in the point where P = R which cannot be an equilibrium.
Note that these claims hold for any concave utility function.
Lemma 4.2 For any concave utility of income, the insurance market equilibrium is unique.
If ah < 1, a market always emerges.
The claim indicates that the premium increases in the upperbound ah. Now since the
lowerbound of participating types aˆ increases in P (which can easily be inferred from the
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proof of Claim 4.1), it follows that lowering ah has two opposing effects on market volume.
The first is simply that individuals on the upper end of the distribution will be excluded.
The second is that more individuals on the lower end of the risk distribution will demand
insurance, because the premium decreases. This effect increases market volume and thus
softens adverse selection. This will show to be of importance when assessing the welfare
effects.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
The following two results will show to be convenient:
Claim 4.3 f (P ) increases in c.
Claim 4.4 We have limc→0 aˆ = P/R and limc→∞ aˆ = 0.
Claim 4.3 implies that P ∗ decreases in c. The more risk averse people are, the more
they are willing to pay for insurance, yet the equilibrium premium decreases. This is
because aˆ decreases in c (more low risks will buy insurance), and the expected risk profile
decreases in c and due to the zero profit condition, this decreases the premium.
We now continue by investigating the welfare that obtains in this market. Since firms
make zero expected profits in equilibrium, we add the utility of all types. Formally:
Z 1
0
[aiv (y2) + (1− ai)v (y1)] dai +
Z ah
aˆ
F (ai, P ) dai.
Note that the density function of ai equals 1 and is omitted. Also, the first integral is
independent of endogeneous variables and since F is lineair in ai it is easy to see that
it equals v(y1)−v(y2)
2
. This part of welfare obtains independent of the market. The second
integral can be attributed to the operation of a market for insurance and we denote it by
W. It can be written as:
W = 1/2((D1 +D2)
¡
ah
¢2
+
(D1)
2
D1 +D2
− 2D1ah).
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When ah = 1 we have W = 1
2
[D2]
2
D1+D2
. Importantly, note that this part of welfare is
only realized when a market emerges. The next proposition characterizes the effect of
discrimination, i.e. decreasing ah marginally, on welfare. The case where R is smaller
than y1 − y2 as well as a wider variation of ah will be provided by numerical simulations
below.
Proposition 4.5 Let y1 − y2 = R. There exists c1 and c2, 0 < c1 ≤ c2, such that the
effect of a marginal decrease of ah is as follows: (i) if c < c1 then welfare (W ) increases
and (ii) if c > c2, then welfare decreases.
The result weighs the three effects that were mentioned in the introduction and can be
explained by looking at market volume. When risk aversion is low (c < c1), the demand
for insurance by low risks is relatively low (high lowerbound aˆ) and their price elasticity
is relatively high. The premium decrease due to a lower ah then induces a large decrease
in aˆ, and hence, a large increase in the market volume.
When risk aversion is high however (c > c2), the low risks are already more inclined
to buy insurance (low lowerbound aˆ) and a premium decrease does not induce a large
decrease of aˆ and thus, the market volume and welfare decrease due to lower ah. The
important mechanism at work is thus the price sensitivity of the pivot aˆ which, in turn,
is determined by the risk attitude c.
Above we assumed that the excluded risks are lost for this economy. It has been shown
that this is plausible in real-world insurance, for example by Eggleston (2000). However,
it is also observed in some markets that the high risks are offered an alternative insurance
policy (known as risk classification). By using numerical simulation, we next analyze if
the above welfare result continues to hold if the excluded risk types are being offered a
competitive alternative, geared to their risk profile. The risk types that get this contract
are in
£
ah, 1
¤
and the premium that breaks even for this contract is P = Ra
h+1
2
.4 The
4It can be shown that there is no adverse selection of the consumers
£
ah, 1
¤
: all types purchase the
contract, formally it must be that F
³
ah, Ra
h+1
2
´
≥ 0.
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:c  =ha 0,8 =ha 0,85 =ha 0,9 =ha 0,95 =ha 1 
0,001 0,00000001 0,00000001 0,00000000 0,00000000 0,00000000 
0,5 0,00354953 0,00226201 0,00114772 0,00033047 0,00000000 
1 0,02013119 0,01479152 0,00903650 0,00337247 0,00000000 
1,5 0,05354369 0,04526396 0,03448210 0,01983445 0,00000000 
2 0,09500343 0,08807487 0,07815561 0,06254627 0,03148265 
2,5 0,13312970 0,12974048 0,12454256 0,11554422 0,09754395 
3 0,16262105 0,16264971 0,16233828 0,16057401 0,15483261 
3,5 0,18300086 0,18551296 0,18891018 0,19271931 0,19580298 
4 0,19571150 0,19974196 0,20556658 0,21315842 0,22217796 
4,5 0,20255250 0,20733971 0,21455982 0,22450944 0,23736602 
5 0,20511071 0,21011745 0,21798604 0,22925902 0,24448385 
5,5 0,20462931 0,20950261 0,21750835 0,22938325 0,24596011 
6 0,20203231 0,20655539 0,21436285 0,22634866 0,24357739 
6,5 0,19798910 0,20204082 0,20944004 0,22120994 0,23860989 
7 0,19297856 0,19650271 0,20337115 0,21471377 0,23195704 
7,5 0,18734128 0,19032454 0,19659956 0,20738414 0,22424970 
8 0,18131897 0,18377544 0,18943484 0,19958666 0,21592868 
 
Figure 4-1: W +W h for y1 = 1.1, y2 = .1, R = 0.8 and different values of c and ah.
welfare generated by this contract is:
W h =
Z 1
ah
F
µ
ai, R
ah + 1
2
¶
dai,
note that since F
¡
ah, ·¢ > 0, the area under F is a square plus a triangle, therefore:
W h =
1
2
¡
1− ah
¢
[(v (y1)− v (y2)) ah + 2v (y1 − P )− v (y2)− v (y1)],
where P = Ra
h+1
2
. We computed W +W h in Figure 4-1.5 The Table shows that the
result continues to hold when high-risks get a contract, there is 20% coinsurance (R is
smaller than y1 − y2) and the decrease in ah is more than marginal. It nicely illustrates
Proposition 4.5: when the CARA coefficient c is 3.5 or higher, excluding some of the
highest risks decreases welfare. However, when risk aversion is lower than 3.5, welfare is
maximized for ah < 1 : the welfare loss for high risks that results from discrimination is
in that case more than offset by the welfare gain of the intermediate risks. When c < 2
5The algorithms are available upon request.
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a market doesn’t emerge at all if insurers do not discriminate, and in that case welfare
is maximized when the 80% lowest and 20% highest risks obtain separate contracts. Of
course, the level of ah that can be set in the market depends on screening technologies
and the underlying risk determinants.
4.5 Concluding remarks
By setting up a model of adverse selection with a continuum of risk types, we assessed
the welfare effects (in terms of aggregate surplus) of risk selection (or discrimination) in
insurance. The use of the continuum made the problem non-trivial: after selecting some
risks out, uncertainty about individuals’ risk remains. It also highlights the role of risk
aversion in explaining the demand for insurance. Insurers compete on the price dimension
only, allowing us to obtain an equilibrium with more risk types than contracts.
Our results contribute to the debate on the desirability of information use by insurers.
Only when risk aversion is low, discrimination can be justified on the basis of aggregate
surplus. In fact, in this case it might prevent the market from not emerging at all.
4.6 Appendix
In the Appendix we denote by L the loss y1 − y2.
Claim 4.1 f (0) = 0, f (R) = 1; dfdP (0) > 0 and
d2f
dP 2< 0 .
Proof. The first two observations are trivially verified. The derivative equals:
df
dP
=
2
R
− D
0
1 (P )D2 −D1D02 (P )
[D1 +D2]
2 ,
and the derivative in 0 is
df
dP
(0) =
2
R
− D
0
1 (P )
D2 (P )
=
2
R
− v
0 (y1)
v (y2 +R)− v (y2)
.
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For the latter to be positive it has to be required that:
2 >
v0 (y1)
v(y2+R)−v(y2)
R
.
Now note that the denominator is simply the slope of the secant line through y2 and
y2 + R and that y2 + R is at most y1. From the concavity of v (·) it then follows that
v0 (y1) <
v(y2+R)−v(y2)
R and this proves the third observation.
Next, note that:
d2f (P )
dP 2
= −
·
D001 (P )D2 −D1D002 (P )
[D1 +D2]
2 −
2 [D01 (P )D2 −D1D02 (P )] [D01 (P ) +D02 (P )]
[D1 +D2]
3
¸
.
Now since D1 > 0, D2 > 0, D01 > 0, D
0
2 < 0, D
00
1 > 0 and D
00
2 < 0 and the fact that
D01 (P ) +D
0
2 (P ) < 0, this derivative is negative.
Claim 4.3 Let v (m) = − exp (−cm) . f (P ) increases in c.
Proof. We have to show that aˆ decreases in c. Recall that
aˆ =
D1 (P )
D1 (P ) +D2 (P )
and let D0ic =
∂Di
∂c for i = 1, 2. Then we can write:
∂aˆ
∂c
=
D01cD2 −D02cD1
[D1 +D2]
2 ,
and for the latter expression to be negative, we require that:
D01c
D1
<
D02c
D2
.
For the specified utility function, this becomes:
− (y1 − P ) exp (−c (y1 − P )) + y1 exp (−cy1)
exp (−c (y1 − P ))− exp (−cy1)
<
−y2 exp (−cy2) + (y2 +R− P ) exp (−c (y2 +R− P ))
exp (−cy2)− exp (−c (y2 +R− P ))
,
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which is equivalent to:
− (y1 − P ) exp (cP ) + y1
exp (cP )− 1 <
(y2 +R− P ) exp (−c [R− P ])− y2
1− exp (−c [R− P ]) ⇔
− P exp (cP )
1− exp (cP ) −
(R− P ) exp (−c [R− P ])
1− exp (−c [R− P ]) < y1 − y2.
Now let x1 = −P, x2 = R−P, and bring the exponential terms to the denominator, then
we can rewrite the above expression as:
x1
exp (cx1)− 1
− x2
exp (cx2)− 1
< L. (4.4)
Now we will show that (i): x
exp(cx)−1 decreases in x and (ii): check inequality (4.4) for
x1 = −L and x2 = R:
(i): The derivative equals exp(cx)(1−cx)−1
[exp(cx)−1]2 and we can demonstrate that e
x (1− x) < 1
for x > 0 : in x = 0, LHS=RHS and dLHSdx = −xex < 0.
(ii) We have −L
exp(−cL)−1−
R
exp(cR)−1 < L, which is equivalent to −
R
exp(cR)−1 < L
exp(−cL)
exp(−cL)−1 ,
which, in turn, is equivalent to R
exp(cR)−1 >
L
exp(cL)−1 .Now since R ≤ L, and
x
exp(cx)−1
decreases in x (shown in (i) above) the inequality holds for all R < L.When R = L, LHS
equals RHS.
Due to step (i), it is enough to find for some x1 < −P and x2 > R − P a weak
inequality of (4.4). This is done in step (ii).
Claim 4.4 We have (a) limc→0 aˆ = P/R and (b) limc→∞ aˆ = 0.
Proof. (a) Write aˆ as 1/y (c) , where y (c) = 1 + D2/D1. By applying the rule of
l’Hopital once we obtain that D2/D1 → (R− P ) /P and hence y (c)→ R/P.
(b) From Claim 4.3 we know that aˆ decreases in c, therefore it converges. Suppose
for sake of contradiction that it converges to a strictly positive number, lim aˆ > 0. This
implies that there exists small  > 0 such that limc→∞ F (, P ) < 0 (a low risk type does
not buy insurance when c→∞). Now since F (0, P ) = −D1 (P ) and D1 (P )→ 0 this is
contradicted and the result follows.
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Proposition 4.5 Let R = L. There exists c1 and c2, 0 < c1 ≤ c2, such that the effect
of a marginal decrease of ah is as follows: (i) if c < c1 then welfare (W ) increases and
(ii) if c > c2, then welfare decreases.
Proof. (i)
We know that when ah = 1, a market emerges iff
2 <
v0 (y2)
v(y1)−v(y1−R)
R
, (4.5)
while a market always emerges when ah < 1. Hence, when the above inequality is violated,
a marginal decrease of ah means that in stead of foreclose, a market emerges, which is
a welfare improvement. We will now show that a violation of (4.5) is equivalent to a
low value of c. When R = L, (4.5) reads as cL
1−exp(−cL) > 2 and LHS increases in cL. To
complete the proof of the statement, note that limc→0 cL1−exp(−cL) = 1.
(ii)
Recall that P is a function of ah via (4.3). When R = L we have that D1+D2 is indepen-
dent of endogeneous variables. We have thatW = 1
2
n
(D1 +D2)
¡
ah
¢2
+ (D1)
2
D1+D2
− 2D1ah
o
and taking the derivative w.r.t. ah we obtain:
∂2W
∂ah
= (D1 +D2) 2ah +
1
(D1 +D2)
2D1
∂D1
∂P
∂P
∂ah
− 2
µ
∂D1
∂P
∂P
∂ah
+D1
¶
,
now substitute ah = 1, the expressions for D1 and D2 and rearrange:
[v (y − L)− v (y − P )]
½
v0 (y − P )
v (y)− v (y − L)
∂P
∂ah
− 1
¾
,
with the specific utility function this becomes:
[exp (−c (y − P ))− exp (−c (y − L))]
µ
c
exp (c (L− P ))− exp (−cP )
∂P
∂ah
− 1
¶
We will now show that the latter equality is positive for c large enough. Observe that
the first multiplicand is negative. Now recall that when c→∞, ba→ 0 and hence ∂P∂ah → R2
in that case. We will next investigate the fraction between brackets c
exp(c(L−P ))−exp(−cP ) .
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We have that the derivative has the sign of [1− c (L− P )] exp (c (L− P ))−(1 + cP ) exp (−cP )
and is therefore negative when:
1− cL
1 + cP
< exp (−cL) .
Now note that the fraction on the LHS increases in c, implying that LHS becomes even-
tually negative. This demonstrates that the derivative is negative for c large enough. We
will now show that
limc→∞
c
exp(c(L−P ))−exp(−cP ) = 0. Applying the rule of l’Hopital once we obtain that the
limit equals limc→∞ 1(L−P ) exp(c(L−P ))+P exp(−cP ) = 0. Therefore, the fraction between brack-
ets decreases in c for c large enough and converges to zero and since ∂P∂ah →
R
2
their product
becomes less than 1 for c large enough. The above demonstrates that ∂W/∂ah > 0 for
such c and completes the proof.
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Chapter 5
Contestability in Insurance
5.1 Introduction
When purchasing life insurance, insurees are required to provide detailed information
about their health and life style on their application. Insurance companies use that
information to determine whether to accept an insuree and at what price. The accuracy
and thruthfullness of this information remains important even after the purchase of the
contract: the insurance contract may became void if irregularities are discovered. The
following quote from www.insurance.com (a resource for consumers) illustrates the point:
The point is, if you lie about your smoking, insurance companies have ways
of uncovering your falsehood and will almost certainly reject your application
if they find out you’ve lied. In addition, if a company sells you a life insurance
policy and then finds out that you lied about your smoking, they may be able
to terminate your life insurance coverage immediately (leaving your beneficia-
ries without protection). The reason: most life insurance policies are subject
to a contestability period (generally, the first two years that the policy is in
force) during which the company has the right to cancel the contract based on
any false statements you made on your application. For example, if you died
from emphysema due to smoking a year after you bought life insurance and
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told the insurance company you don’t smoke, your beneficiaries might not be
entitled to the policy death benefit.1
It is not only smoking behaviour that is the subject of exclusion clauses. Other grounds
for dispute are for example pre-existing medical conditions and the cause of death (whether
it was self-inflicted or an accident). The legal clause in the policy, the disputes in courts
and consumer advice such as the one above all demonstrate that contestability is an
important phenomenon. Since the matters are often ambiguous, this not only holds for
those deliberately lying. Contestability reduces the insuring effect of the insurance policy,
especially with life insurance since one is not able to file the claim oneself. Insurers
usually motivate information use by stating that it is a necessary underwriting strategy
to alleviate adverse selection.
Our objective is to analyze the welfare effect of contestability, weighing opposing
effects. We take smoking behaviour as the leading example. Insurers offer different rates
for non-smokers and smokers, where the first type of contract is contestable and the latter
is not.2 We will therefore compare the aggregate surplus obtained in an economy in which
two contracts are offered with one in which only one, non-contestable contract is for sale.
This issue has so far only been addressed in the two-types, two-contracts setting, as
initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In such a model, it is quite easy to see that
contestability increases welfare, since the possible investigation of a claim discourages a
high-risk to purchase the contract designed for the low type. Dixit (2000) shows that this
implies that the incentive compatibility constraint can be relaxed, compared to the bench-
mark model, and hence the low risks enjoy a better contract and a Pareto improvement
is obtained.
However, since in reality there are far more many risk types than the number of
contracts in the menu, this setting can be questioned. To adhere to this observation, we
construct a model with infinitely many risk types and one contract only in the benchmark
regime of no contestability. Importantly, the conclusion found by Dixit (2000) is being
contradicted completely.
1Source: http://www.insurance.com/FAQs/lifeFAQDetail.aspx/index/17.
2That is, not on smoking behaviour.
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Our setting thus features a continuum of privately informed individuals that demand
insurance on a market with a competitive supply side. They evince constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA). The feature that we use a continuum of risk types is rather unusual
for the asymmetric information literature. The advantage of such a realistic setup is that
asymmetric information remains even if individuals select into two contracts. Further-
more, it provides us with a continuous relation between the demand for insurance and
important market variables, such as risk aversion. This is not the case in e.g. the seminal
paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
To obtain a market with with more risk types than contracts, we assume that insur-
ers only compete on the price dimension. Moreover, since we study a mechanism that
potentially softens adverse selection, an additional motivation for this assumption is that
we want to isolate contestability from other solutions, like offering incentive compatible
menu-of-contracts.3
Finally, the risk of contestation is modeled by ascribing a probability of contest to
every risk profile. We next postulate that this probability of contest is increasing in risk
profile.
The model provides the following insights. When there is only one contract on the
market, only the individuals above some demarcation level will insure (hence, the market
suffers from adverse selection). When two contracts are offered, the highest risks will
still prefer the more expensive non-contestable contract, since it provides more insurance.
Some intermediate risks will switch to the contestable contract, however. Additionally,
some consumers who did not purchase insurance before will now buy the contestable
contract. As a result, the volume of transactions will increase and thus adverse selection
is softened.
The important countereffect on welfare is that the premium for the non-contestable
contract increases substantially, due to the fact that the risk in that pool increased. We
thus quantify the two opposing effects of contestability on welfare: (i) some relatively
low risks are being insured, softening adverse selection, while (ii) the more certain non-
contestable contract is purchased by less individuals and at a higher price.
3Also known as screening or self-selection.
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We computed the welfare effect for risk attitudes that can be considered plausible4
and for a wide range of risk of contestation. A market for the contestable contract does
not always emerge. When it does, welfare in the two contracts world is lower than welfare
in the one contract world. Hence, contestability decreases welfare.
The literature on adverse selection (in insurance) provides the background for the
motivation of this paper.5 Our topic is highly related to risk selection and classification.
With these strategies, insurers use an information technology on all applicants before the
contract is signed. See for an overview Crocker and Snow (2000) and Chapter 4 in this
volume for a recent contribution. With contestability, the clause in the contract has a
discouraging and risky effect because insurers might investigate matters ex-post and no
information technology needs to be actually employed.
As far as I know, there are only three papers that discuss clauses in the insurance
contract. I already mentioned Dixit (2000) and this model is being extended in Dixit
and Picard (2002) by relaxing the assumption that the insured has full knowledge of his
own risk. In sharp contrast to our findings, their equilibrium Pareto improves on the
benchmark model of no contestability. The important difference with our setting is set
out above: because of the continuum, the interaction between the two contracts causes
the high-risks to be worse off. Finally, Garatt and Marshall (2001) analyze exclusions and
the demand for property insurance. They model interaction between exclusions in one
contract and the demand for another.
Section 2 presents the model and shows how the two contracts operate in isolation
from one another. Section 3 provides the equilibrium, Section 4 computes welfare effects
and finally, Section 5 concludes.
4Using a television game show as natural experiment, Beetsma and Schotman (2001) find robust
evidence of substantial risk aversion and show that CARA and CRRA perform equally well.
5This literature was initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and is surveyed in Dionne et al. (2000).
For empirical evidence on adverse selection, see Puelz and Snow (1994).
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5.2 The Model
Consider an insurance market, where the demand side consists of a continuum of indi-
viduals who seek to insure the amount of R. Individuals have private information about
their probability of loss ai and are strictly risk averse, with constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA). We assume that v (m) = − exp (−cm) represents the utility of income, where
c > 0 denotes the CARA coefficient. If no damage occurs, wealth equals y1 and in case
of damage it equals y2, where y1 − y2 ≥ R.
The supply side has many insurance firms competing. Insurance companies are risk-
neutral, have no administration costs and know that the distribution of ai is uniform with
support [0, 1]. They choose a price P k, accept all applicants and pay R in case of damage
(the coverage), where k ∈ {ns, s} denotes a non-smokers contract and a smokers contract,
respectively. The first type of contract may be disputed when a claim is filed. In this
section, we study the two contracts in isolation of one another.
The Non-Contestable (Smokers) Contract
This contract coincides with the benchmark model in Chapter 4 of this volume. We
set out by determining an insuree i’s expected utility, when purchasing the contract P s :
aiv (y2 +R− P s) + (1− ai) v (y1 − P s) . (5.1)
When no insurance is purchased, expected utility equals:
aiv (y2) + (1− ai) v (y1) . (5.2)
Let:
D1 (P s) = v (y1)− v (y1 − P s)
D2 (P s) = v (y2 +R− P s)− v (y2) .
When convenient, we use Dk1 and D
k
2 , for k ∈ {ns, s} . Expression D1 denotes the ex-post
utility cost of insurance if no accident occurred and D2 denotes the ex-post utility gain
of insurance in case an accident occurred. From (5.1) and (5.2), we can derive that, for
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type i, the utility of taking the contract in excess of the utility of not doing so equals:
aiD2 (P s)− (1− ai)D1 (P s) .
This expression is intuitive: if an accident occurs (with probability ai), the utility gain
D2 is enjoyed, otherwise the cost D1 is incurred. We can rewrite the expression as:
F s (ai, P s) = (D1 (P s) +D2 (P s)) ai −D1 (P s) .
An individual purchases the contract iff F > 0. Since F is increasing in ai, F (0) < 0 and
F (1) > 0 it follows that there exists as such that an individual purchases insurance iff.
ai > as :
as =
D1 (P s)
D1 (P s) +D2 (P s)
.
Perfect competition on the side of insurers requires that, in expectation, they break
even on the contract P s. Observe that the expected risk profile equals (as + 1) /2, there-
fore:
P S
R
− 1
2
Ã
D1
¡
P S
¢
D1 (P S) +D2 (P S, R)
+ 1
!
= 0. (5.3)
Proposition 5.1 A unique equilibrium where insurers set P s < R and consumers
purchase insurance if and only if ai ≥ as is defined by (5.3) if such P s exists. A market
does not emerge otherwise.
See Chapter 4 for the proof.
The Contestable (Non-Smokers) Contract
Next, consider a contract that is intended for non-smokers and specifies that the claim
can be denied in case the applicant provided false information about his smoking habits.
Suppose that for an individual with risk profile ai, the perceived probability of a successful
dispute by the insurance company in case of death is g (ai) ∈ [0, 1] . The probability g
depends on many factors, including factual smoking behaviour, other health hazards and
the legal institutions. Below we show how g depends on ai.
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We will first show how such a clause affects the demand for insurance. As before, we
have that utility in case of no insurance equals (1− ai) v (y1) + aiv (y2) . When insurance
is purchased, utility equals:6
(1− ai) v (y1 − P ns) + ai (1− g (ai)) v (y2 +R− P ns) + aig (ai) v (y2 − P ns) .
The first term is the usual utility of income if no accident happens and the premium is
paid. The second term represents the contingency that the damage is undisputed and the
reimbursement of R is being made. Finally, the third term shows the execution of the
exclusion clause: with probability g the damage is successfully disputed and in that case,
the reimbursement is denied. Hence, an individual buys insurance iff
F ns (ai, P ns) = −D3 (P ns) aig (ai) + (D1 (P ns) +D2 (P ns)) ai −D1 (P ns) > 0,
where D3 (P ns) = v (y2 +R− P ns) − v (y2 − P ns) denotes the difference in the gain of
insurance when the damage occurs due to the covered risk, instead of the excluded risk. As
before, it is easily verified that adverse selection is present: Fns (0, Pns) = v (y − P ns)−
v (y) < 0.
It is likely that g0 > 0 : the higher the risk profile, the more smokers there are amongst
this risk profile.7 Many increasing specifications of g are conceivable but for tractability,
we assume that g (ai) = αai, for some 0 < α ≤ 1.
High risks are deterred by the clause when Fns (1, P ns) < 0 or α > D2/D3 : α is large
enough or the individual is risk averse enough. A high-risk individual is quite sure of
incurring damage, but by purchasing a policy that pays only with probability 1 − g, he
or she buys in fact a lottery. The insurance contract is therefore too risky for a high-risk
individual. Henceforth, we assume that either risk aversion or α is sufficiently high so as
to ensure Fns (1, P ns) < 0.
6Here we abstract from the question how the deceased enjoys the money paid to beneficiaries.
7We incorporate the generally believed positive correlation between mortality risk and smoking. In-
deed, smokers pay a higher premium.
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Since F ns is a polynomial in ai it is useful to provide its two roots explicitly (suppress-
ing arguments when this causes no confusion):
b (Pns) =
D1 +D2
2αD3
−
q
(D1 +D2)
2 − 4αD1D3
2αD3
;
b (Pns) =
D1 +D2
2αD3
+
q
(D1 +D2)
2 − 4αD1D3
2αD3
.
Thus, the expected risk profile equals D
ns
1 +D
ns
2
2αDns3
and zero-profitability implies:
P ns
R
− D
ns
1 +D
ns
2
2αDns3
= 0. (5.4)
In summary:
Proposition 5.2 Equilibrium for a contestable contract has firms setting P ns < R
according to (5.4) and consumers with a risk profile ai in
£
b (P ns) , b (P ns)
¤
purchasing
insurance.
This equilibrium exists only if the condition (Dns1 +D
ns
2 )
2− 4αDns1 Dns3 > 0 is met. If this
equilibrium does not exist, a market does not emerge.
5.3 Two-Contracts Equilibrium
Our objective is to compare an economy in which only the smokers contract is for sale
with one in which two contracts are for sale. In the first case, equilibrium is given by
Proposition 5.1.
In the two-contract economy, we distinguish two situations. Firstly, the parameters
of the market are such that the contracts as defined above do not overlap. The two-
contracts equilibrium is then given by Propositions 5.1 and 5.2. Secondly, when the
contracts do overlap (as that follows from Proposition 5.1 is lower than the b that follows
from Proposition 5.2) the market is not in equilibrium. Figure 5-1 illustrates; consumers
in a right neighborhood from as will switch from the smokers contract to the non-smokers
contract, increasing the risk profile in the smokers pool.
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Figure 5-1: Overlapping contracts. Some will switch from the s contract to the ns con-
tract.
In that case, a two contracts equilibrium can be found by a demarcation level d and
prices (P ns, P s) such that:
P ns =
b (P ns) + d
2
R; P s =
d+ 1
2
R and
F s (d, P s) = Fns (d, P ns) > 0. (5.5)
The slopes of Fns and F s are such that when these conditions hold, consumers left
of d prefer the ns contract and consumers to the right of d prefer the s contract. Figure
5-2 shows such an equilibrium, in which d is found at the intersection of Fns and ‘F s two
contracts’.
5.4 Welfare Analysis
Note that when there is no overlap between the two contracts, it must be that welfare
with two contracts is higher than welfare with only one contract. We now illustrate the
other case by using Figure 5-2. The one contract case is depicted by the line ‘F s only s’
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Figure 5-2: Two contracts equilibrium for y1 = 1.1, y2 = .1, R = 1, c = 4 and α = .5.
and hence, aggregate utility generated by the insurance market equals the area under this
line. When the ns contract is introduced, P s increases, as reflected in the downward shift
of ‘F s only s’ to ‘F s two contracts’. The welfare generated by that contract is decreased
by area between the two lines. The positive impact of course is the welfare generated by
the ns contract, the area under Fns between d and b. In the example of the figure, it can
be seen that the latter effect is smaller. Formally welfare in the two regimes equals:
W s =
Z 1
a
F s (ai, P
s) dai;
Wns,s =
Z d
b(Pns)
F ns (ai, P
ns) dai +
Z 1
d
F s (ai, P
s) dai,
where the density functions equal 1 and are omitted. Unfortunately, the determination of
d satisfying (5.5) cannot be done analytically. Therefore we computed it for a wide range
of parameters: the following Table reportsW s−Wns,s for different values of risk aversion
c and contest probability parameter α.8
8The algorithms are available upon request.
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c: =α 0.1 =α 0.15 =α 0.2 =α 0.25 =α 0.3 =α 0.35 
1 # # # # # # 
1.5 # # # # # # 
2 # # # # # # 
2.5 # # # 0.0586 0.0363 0.0289 
3 # # 0.0908 0.0772 0.0661 0.0570 
3.5 # 0.1246 0.1046 0.0895 0.0778 0.0685 
4 # 0.1250 0.1039 0.0887 0.0773 0.0684 
4.5 0.1474 0.1148 0.0941 0.0798 0.0694 0.0615 
5 0.1306 0.0985 0.0795 0.0670 0.0581 0.0515 
5.5 0.1089 0.0798 0.0636 0.0534 0.0462 0.0409 
6 0.0860 0.0617 0.0489 0.0409 0.0354 0.0313 
6.5 0.0650 0.0461 0.0363 0.0303 0.0263 0.0233 
7 0.0475 0.0334 0.0263 0.0220 0.0191 0.0169 
 
Figure 5-3: W s − W ns,s for y1 = 1.1, y2 = .1, R = 1 and different values of CARA
coefficient c and α. The sign # indicates that a ns market does not emerge.
Figure 5-3 indicates how much in aggregate utility can be gained when the market
offers only one, instead of two, contract. Note that in all cases, there was overlap. The
sign # indicates that a ns market does not emerge and in that case W s −Wns,s = 0.
This happens when risk aversion is relatively low; it reduces the demand for insurance
and shifts F ns downwards.
The table shows that for all cases that we computed, whenever a two contracts equi-
librium is viable, it reduces welfare. The negative impact on high-risks’ welfare is larger
than the positive effect of insuring some intermediate risks that where uninsured before,
hence contestability decreases welfare.
5.5 Concluding remarks
We analyzed the welfare effect of having two contracts, instead of one. The two contracts
are intended for different types and insurance law provides that a claim can be disputed
if it is shown that an insuree provided false information about his or her type. Hence, we
analyze the welfare effect of this legal possibility. Our results show that for a wide range
of parameters, the two contracts economy generates less welfare than the one contract
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economy. This is striking in view of the fact that many actual markets are organized as
the two contracts regime of our model.
Smoking in life insurance is our leading example but the insights are not limited to that
type of insurance. The model can also be applied to insurance markets where no explicit
disclosure of information has to be made, but some perils are simply excluded. Examples
are certain kinds of accident and injury, such as self-inflicted injury and not taking care
(e.g. not locking the car), drunkenness and so on and so forth. Of course, these perils are
not type related but depend on behaviour. Yet we think whenever a successful dispute
by the insurer cannot be excluded with full certainty, the insurance policy looses some of
its insuring effect and the mechanisms we studied play a role.
112
Chapter 6
Competition for a Prize
6.1 Introduction
Consider a scientific committee that has the task to organize a contest for a research prize.
Having no knowledge of the qualities of potential applicants, the committee faces the
problem of advertising the prize and designing the application procedure in order to award
the best candidate. With only a limited (time) capacity to read and extract information
from the applications, the committee runs the potential risk of being overloaded with
piles of applications, when too many individuals apply. At the same time, the committee
wishes not to discourage applying too much, since in that case nobody will apply. The
problem is thus to design the contest in such a way that attention will be devoted only to
the better candidates in the population, while ensuring that some people do apply. The
scholars know their own quality but are uncertain about the number of other applicants
and their qualities. To decide whether to apply or not, individuals weigh their chances of
winning and the size of the prize against the trouble of writing the application. To what
extent should entry be troublesome?
It is this interaction that is the subject of this paper: the competition by a number
of privately informed candidates for a single prize, awarded by a committee that has im-
perfect ability to rank applicants. This interaction characterizes a number of markets:
examples include recruitment in the labour market, architectural competition, compe-
tition for licences, conference presentations and publications. I will answer the above
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question by relating the (optimal) cost of applying to the size of the market and the
available selection technology.
Since the pioneering work of Spence (1973), asymmetric information in the above
markets has been studied quite extensively, especially in the literature on signaling and
mechanism design. There are two pillars that virtually all models in the traditional
literature rest on: (i) the uninformed side of the market relies on incentives solely in order
to mitigate informational asymmetry and (ii) these incentive mechanisms, like signaling,
require the informed agents to be heterogeneous in some observable way, being for example
their output or education level. Moreover, in the latter case the individual’s cost of
sending a certain signal must be correlated to the hidden information (e.g. ability), to
enable separation.
In some markets, like prize competition, these two assumptions do not seem adequate.
Turning to the first, it is widely observed that effort is spent on acquiring information
about trading partners simply by investigating the candidates. For example, the assess-
ment of job candidates is a widespread phenomenon. Firms try to discover ability of
applicants by using interviews or assessment centers in their hiring decisions. In trade,
buyers may audit and compare the features of different sellers. A program committee of
a conference tries to select the best papers by reading the papers. 1
Hence, it is plausible that for many types of information asymmetries, the uninformed
uses some kind of information technology to obtain imperfect estimates of the other side
of the market. Using these estimates, different candidates can then be compared. It is
likely that the uninformed side of the market can hereby improve its decisions and this
practice should be allowed for in a formal model of asymmetric information.
I now turn to the secondly mentioned pillar, taking education as an example of a
signaling device, as in Spence (1973). I will argue that such a device may not always work
and may leave the problem of asymmetric information unsolved. In the first place, when
asserted that the cost of education decreases in ability, it is often overlooked that more
1In an overview article on signaling and screening, Riley (2001) asserts on this point that “there is a
strong incentive for the market to seek alternative means of information transmission (for signaling or
screening devices). It is likely that in environments where this is the case, there will be evidence of direct
testing, early monitoring, etc. -all provided to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, asymmetric information.”
(p. 474).
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able people incur higher opportunity costs of education, due to unfulfilled other profitable
activities. When contented with this assertion, two additional objections can be made.
Firstly, the contest may be specialized in such a way that the pool of potential applicants
is de facto homogeneous. Think for example about a research grant for Ph.D. students:
they all have a university degree and some working paper ready to send. Thus, sorting
by education level may be too crude and not go far enough. Secondly, the timeframe
of a contest does not always allow for applicants to adjust their (educational) choices to
the menu of contracts offered by a firm. When the scientific committee announces the
research prize, contestants will typically send existing papers, rather than write new ones.
In conclusion, in real world markets costs may not always serve as a sorting device. 2
I present a strategic model in which both aforementioned pillars are relaxed. In my
framework, incentives and technology are both means of dealing with informational im-
perfections and I do not require applicants to have different costs of applying. The ability
of each agent is modelled as an independent draw from a common pool of abilities. Each
individual applicant knows his own ability, but does not know the abilities of the other
applicants, nor the distribution of these rivals’ abilities.
The committee strives for awarding the best candidate in the population, that is, the
committee cares about the rank of the winner in the original population and is ex ante
uninformed about individuals’ abilities. It is thus implicit in my model that, although
qualities are unknown in the selection stage, they matter later on. The assumption is
natural in situations where the merit of the hired candidate is realized when he or she
‘beats’ the other candidates. The following example clarifies: a university seeks to hire a
PhD for a PostDoc position. Since publishing takes time, the quality of recent graduates
is relatively hard to observe. After some years, however, it will become more clear which
candidates have research potential, since time allowed them to publish. At that stage,
quality is easier to observe and it is likely that the largest research funds and international
standing can be gained only if the best candidate was hired.
2Supporting this assertion, Riley (2001) emphasizes “the need for further discussion of equilibrium in
which screening/signaling costs are not perfectly negatively correlated with quality.” (p. 475).
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In a sequential game, the committee announces a contest to a total of T agents.
Participation in this contest is made troublesome by the committee and I denote the
utility cost of applying by c. To control c, the committee can, for example, require all
kinds of formalities to be fulfilled and numerous documents be sent. Then individuals
decide whether to participate or not and finally, the committee processes N applications
with a selection technology and allocates the award to one candidate.3
The endogenous choice of how many contestants to process must take into account the
imperfect and costly nature of any information processing technology. I capture this fact
by implicitly assuming a constraint on time, budget or attention available for processing
information. More specifically, I model the allocation of scarce limited attention by let-
ting the reliability of the ranking of candidates decrease in the quantity of applications
processed. As a result, a trade-off emerges between including the best candidate in the
investigation and identifying the best candidate. I will call the decreasing reliability of
the ranking technology the overload effect.
My results about equilibrium behaviour in this game are the following. Firstly, to avoid
overload, the contest organizer sometimes chooses to disregard some pieces of information
and thus randomly chooses N applications out of the total number. The overload effect
thus causes the contest organizer to leave unattended some potential trading alternatives.
Secondly, I find an equilibrium of ‘favorable selection’, in the sense that each candidate
participates if and only if the ability is above some demarcation level. Separation emerges
not due to some cost heterogeneity but due to the fact that N > 1: the winner is
determined by comparison of informative estimates of ability.4 Individuals with higher
abilities have higher probabilities of winning and are therefore easier inclined to incur
the cost c, while lower abilities will not find it worthwhile to apply. I will label this the
selection effect. I thus introduce a new mechanism for a separating equilibrium to emerge.
Thirdly, the number of participants is stochastic in equilibrium and there is a risk of
delay or breakdown in the contest. It might occur that in equilibrium, no candidate finds
3We abstract from the question whether ignoring applicants is possible, from an institutional
perspective.
4The accuracy may be quite low.
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it worthwhile to participate as all candidates perceive their ability level as too low, that
is, below the demarcation level.
I finally study two design problems. The first insight is that the selection effect of
c is used to balance the risk of delay and the overload effect. I then analyze how the
demarcation level depends on the market size T and find that it increases in T, for fixed
c. The latter finding implies that the larger the potential market, the smaller the expected
share of the active market. In fact, for some parameters, the expected total number of
applications may actually decrease in the number of potential applicants!
Thus the sheer number effect of market size T is not the only effect to consider when
overload is feared: the competitive effect, due to strategic interaction, works in the oppo-
site direction: it discourages applying. The above suggests that the risk of delay becomes
an issue for larger markets. Indeed, even though the committee incurs overload, I find
that the optimal application costs c decrease in the size of the market T.
Since in some contests not the trouble of applying (c) can be controlled easily, but
committees rather invest in their selection technology, the second design problem I inves-
tigate is whether for fixed c and market size T, it is optimal to invest in a perfect selection
technology. The surprising result I find is that when applying is troublesome enough, it
is not optimal to have a perfect selection technology, even when this technology has zero
costs. The reason is that the risk of delay becomes an issue when c is high and lowering
the accuracy of the selection technology is then a way to dampen this risk.
The issues in this study relate to several strands in the literature. Firstly, it is related to
the traditional signaling literature. I have already discussed the features that differentiate
my analysis from this field. The paper that comes closest is Janssen (2002), who studies
competition for a job and the effect of the number of competitors on signaling activity
and the wage the firm sets.
Secondly, another vast area is that of contests and tournaments. A distinction should
be made between mechanisms that have the purpose to select one candidate out of a group
(e.g. whom to hire) and mechanisms that serve to induce a desired behaviour of all group
members (e.g. work hard). The term ‘contest’ is often understood to include the latter
117
purpose. I should therefore emphasize that I only study the selection role of contests. For
the incentive role I refer to Lazear and Rosen (1981) and subsequent papers.5
Most papers that study contests as selection devices share the feature that contestants
provide effort (or make expenditures) that increases their chances of winning the prize.6
I have argued that a selection procedure does not always allow for contestants to adjust
their efforts. In my setup, contestants merely decide whether to apply or not and it
excludes effort considerations.
Thirdly, there is some literature that discusses imperfect information acquisition. A
study that comes close to my model is Ficco (2004). His emphasis is on the conditions for
information overload to occur in equilibrium, defined as a situation in which the number
of candidates that applies is larger than the number that will be processed. An important
feature that differentiates it from my work, is that the distribution of the rivals’ abilities
is known. Hence, there is no risk that nobody applies, and consequently the effect of costs
to invoke a selection effect is unambiguous and is not an issue in his model. Malueg and
Yongsheng Xu (1997) investigate the optimal acquisition of information in order to assign
a worker to a job. Information acquisition also plays a role for prospective home buyers,
for whom the beliefs of quality also depend on other consumers’ decisions and the time
the house has been on the market. This interaction is analyzed by Taylor (1999).
Finally, there are two ingredients of prize competition that dissociate it from a typical
auction: (i) the (common) value is deterministic and (ii) the committee’s main objective
is not to raise revenue, but to allocate the prize (contract, licence etc.) to the best
candidate.7 It is also worth noting that auctions may have undesirable self-selection
effects in procurement, as shown by Manelli and Vincent (1995).8
5A more recent contribution is Clark and Riis (1998) who study competition over more than one prize.
6Typically some contest success function is assumed that increases in effort or rent-seeking expendi-
tures. Recent contributions are Morgan (2003), who studies sequential expenditures by contestants, and
Hvide and Kristiansen (2003), who study the degree of risk taking as a strategic variable.
7Moreover, auction mechanisms are not always available as prices are sometimes fixed due to regulation
or other reasons, for example house rents in the Netherlands.
8In spite of these two important differences, a connection with the auction literature can be made,
as there are some papers that study the role of participation cost and the potential number of bidders,
see Levin and Smith (1994) and Menezes and Monteiro (2000). Both studies also find that participation
should be costly.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the ranking of candidates
by using some technology. Section 3 analyses the game and is followed by Section 4 on
contest design. Section 5 relates the market size to the competitiveness of the market and
Section 6 concludes and discusses further work. The lengthier proofs are in the Appendix.
6.2 Selection Technology
In this section, I introduce a selection technology, the committee’s corresponding pref-
erence relation and its use of the selection technology. Consider a population S with k
members. Each member i of this population has a certain ability ai, determined by an in-
dependent random draw from a common pool of abilities. Ability ai is private information
held by agent i and the realization of abilities is unknown.
In this section, I abstract from agents’ incentives and I assume all k agents apply. The
committee can make N random draws from this set of applying candidates, denote this
sample by XN , with XN ⊆ S. The committee investigates the ability of all i ∈ XN and
its decision is to choose a single element from XN .9
One can think of various objectives for a committee to strive for. For example, to make
sure that only candidates that exceed a treshold apply, or to maximize the expected ability
of the winner. Instead, I assume that the objective of the committee is to maximize the
probability that the best candidate will win the prize. As mentioned in the Introduction,
good arguments can be given for this assumption. The committee strives for awarding
the best candidate and obtains utility uh in that event and ul if another was awarded,
where uh > ul, w.l.o.g. I normalize ul = 0.10
As mentioned above, an important aspect I want to capture, is that the precision of
the investigation depends on N . I introduce an assessment method that suggests one
candidate from XN as winner. With a certain probability, this candidate is indeed the
best candidate and with the remaining probability this candidate is a random draw from
XN . The following definition is used throughout.
9We assume it is not possible to award a candidate i /∈ XN that was not processed.
10In the model, both the preference relation and the technology treat all candidates but the best in the
same way. It can be seen that in a setting where all ranks are selected and evaluated differently, all the
insights of the paper would obtain. Such a setting would only complicate matters needlessly.
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Definition An imperfect selection technology π : N → [0, 1] suggests a winner. The
probability that the winner is argmaxi∈XN {ai} , that is, the best candidate, is π (N) and
the probability that the winner is a random draw from XN is 1− π (N).
To incorporate the scarce nature of the capacity to process information we assume
that technology π satisfies one of the two following conditions:
(A) π (N + 1) < π (N) for all N and limN→∞ π (N) = 0.
(B) For some capacity constraint bN ∈ N and constant π ∈ [0, 1] ,
π (N) =



π if N ≤ bN
0 if N > bN .
Technology (A) exhibits the trade-off in quantity and quality of information processing
most straightforwardly, whereas technology (B) is a step-wise approach and can be the
result of outsourcing the test to an assessment center, with whom a contract
n
π, bNo is
agreed that specifies a reliability and a capacity of the test.
The above definition implies that, when k candidates apply and N will be processed,
the probability of awarding the best in S equals:
φ (N ; k, π) ≡ π (N) N
k
+ [1− π(N)] 1
k
. (6.1)
This can be understood as follows. With probability π (N) , the best in XN will be chosen
and since the best in S is included in XN with probability Nk the first term follows. With
probability 1 − π (N), the winner was a random draw from XN and in this case the
probability that the best is drawn is 1k .
The trade-off in information processing can now be seen in the first term: (a) as more
candidates are being assessed the more likely it is that a really good candidate is amongst
them (the fraction Nk ) but as (b) the limited attention is divided over more applications,
the more superficial the assessment will be, obscuring the informativeness of every single
candidate’s application (π (N) decreases). Hence, this trade-off is one of processing many
alternatives and the informativeness of the investigation. The problem of choosing how
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many alternatives to process can then be written as follows:
max
1≤N≤k
uhφ (N ; k, π) (6.2)
A few observations about the solution can be made. Firstly, since φ is a probability, it
exists. Secondly, the solution to the unconstrained problem, say N∗, is independent of k
and fully determined by π. Therefore I can write the solution to (6.2) asN = min {k,N∗} :
N∗ tells the committee how many applications to process at most. Thirdly, the variable
uh has no impact of interest and will therefore be normalized to uh = 1. Finally, since
φ (2; k, π) > φ (1; k, π) , I have that N∗ > 1. These results hold for any specification of π.
In summary:
Lemma 6.1 The committee processes at most N∗ applications, ignoring applications
randomly if necessary, where N∗ is the solution to (6.2). N∗ is larger than 1, indepen-
dent of the number of applications actually received and fully determined by the selection
technology π.
The following example illustrates:
Example Suppose π (N) = Ng for some g < 0. Then the following are graphs of
π (N) and φ (N ; k, π) , respectively.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
N
π (N) = N−1.07.
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0150
0.0155
0.0160
0.0165
0.0170
0.0175
N
φ (N ; 100, π (N)) for π (N) = N−1.07.
In the above example, N∗ = 15. I thus conclude that imperfect decision making may
require to process a finite amount of information, implying that some sources are left
unattended.
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6.3 The Game
Above we studied the problem of the committee in isolation from applicants’ incentives.
In this section I introduce the entire game and its equilibrium. There is a population of T
agents. The committee announces to all T agents a contest C
­
c
V , π;T
®
for prize V that
costs c to participate in. The timing of events is as follows:
0. The committee determines and announces the contest C.
Nature draws abilities {a1, a2, ..., aT} from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1] .
1. Each agent i privately learns ai and decides whether to participate (i.e. to apply)
or not. By participating in the contest he incurs cost c.
2. The committee observes the number of applications and decides how many to in-
vestigate, N .
3. The investigation of the committee yields a winner and the prize is awarded.
We will postpone the determination of c/V and π in stage 0 to the next section. Before
analyzing stages 1 and 2 in detail, I introduce a first result:
Lemma 6.2 Let π (N) > 0. If in an equilibrium of the game a candidate with ability
a0 applies then all candidates with ability ai > a0 apply as well.
Proof. First note that all candidates have the same costs and benefits of applying
and that they only differ in their chances to win. Hence, I prove the claim by arguing
that the probability to be chosen by the committee increases in true ability ai on [a0, 1] .
The probability to be chosen is equal to the probability to be suggested as winner by π.
The winner, in turn, is either determined correctly or by chance. Thus, the higher the
ability, the higher the probability to win. Furthermore, note that π (N) is independent of
ai and then the result follows.
This result implies that there exists a demarcation level α such that a candidate
i applies if and only if ai ≥ α. I will now analyze Stages 2 and 1 subsequently. Let
us denote by S ⊆ T the subset of candidates that send an application to the contest
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organizer in Stage 1, with | S |= k. The contest organizer has to decide in Stage 2 on
N, the number of applications to consider. S consists of the k best candidates in T and
Lemma 6.1 applies.
I now turn to stage 1, the incentive to apply. Due to Lemma 6.2 we can restrict
the quest for equilibrium strategies to those of the form “apply if and only if ai ≥ α”
and I will now investigate how the demarcation level α is determined.11 We have that k
denotes the unknown total number of applications. In determining the expected payoff
of applying, the expectation about the number of rivals applying (k − 1) will turn out to
play a major role. A potential contestant i with ability ai ∈ [0, α] has to conjecture two
uncertain events to decide whether or not to apply: i ∈ XN (being processed) and the
event of being selected (being labeled as winner). I now proceed by investigating how the
probability to win for such a type is determined.
First, given that i ∈ S, Pr (i ∈ XN | i ∈ S) = Nk . Second, given that i applies (i ∈ S)
and that i will be investigated (i ∈ XN), i wins if the test with technology π suggests him
as best candidate.
Consider first the case 1 < k ≤ N∗. All k candidates will be processed and thus agent
i will be considered surely. If the winner is determined correctly, he looses for sure since
at least one other candidate applied and this other candidate has a higher ability. If the
winner is determined by chance, he wins with probability 1k . Thus, the probability to win
for given k − 1 in case all will be processed equals
[1− π (k)] 1
k
for 1 < k ≤ N∗,
and when k > N∗, then i will be considered with probability N
∗
k and only N
∗ candidates
will be processed, hence the probability to win is then:
N∗
k
[1− π (N∗)] 1
N∗
for k > N∗.
11Note that we have in fact two kinds of contestant-strategy that are part of an equilibrium: ”apply iff
ai > a” and ”apply iff ai ≥ a”. The distinction is unimportant.
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Now since, if k = 1, agent i is the only one and wins for sure, we can write the probability
to win for all types ai ∈ [0, α] as:
Γ (α, π,N∗, T ) ≡
TX
k=1
P (k − 1)F (k − 1) , where F (k − 1) =



1 if k = 1
1−π(N)
k if k > 1
,
(6.3)
N = min {k,N∗} and P (k − 1) ≡ ¡T−1k−1¢αT−k (1− α)k−1 denotes the density function of
k − 1.
To relate the demarcation α that arises in equilibrium to the other variables of the
model, it is important how Γ (α, ·) depends on α. When α increases, the probability that
a given rival candidate applies decreases and thus, probability mass shifts to lower k. How
this effects Γ (α, ·) depends on the shape of F (k) , as can been seen in expression (6.3).
For k > 1 and N∗ > T, we have that F (k − 1) = (1− π (k)) /k and two counterforces are
at work: when k decreases, the easier it is to be selected when the selection is random,
but the lower the probability that the selection will be random since the technology is
more accurate for lower k. Thus, both numerator and denominator of F increase in k. To
characterize equilibrium I want Γ to be monotone, however. The following assumption
resolves this:
Assumption 1 Let kˆ = (T − 1) (1− α) + 1. Technology π is such that
F (k − 1) ≥ F
³
kˆ − 1
´
∀ k ≤ kˆ,
F (k − 1) < F
³
kˆ − 1
´
∀ k > kˆ.
It is immediate that a constant technology (type B) always satisfies this assumption
(since π does not vary). For type (A), we have that bk − 1 is the expected number of
competitors so this condition requires that, for a non-applying agent, the chance to win if
k−1 is below (above) average is higher (lower) than the chance to win if k−1 is average.12
The assumption allows us to show:
12Technologies characterized by a very steep decrease of π (the ability to select the best deteriorates
very fast in the number processed) might not satisfy this assumption. What Γ (α, ·) might look like in
that case is left as an exercise.
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Lemma 6.3 The probability Γ (α, π,N∗, T ) increases in α.
The following Theorem characterizes the equilibrium for the game.
Theorem 6.4 (i) Suppose (1− π (N∗)) /T < c/V < 1, then in every subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game, only agents with ability ai ≥ α apply, where α > 0 is the unique
solution to
Γ (α, π,N∗, T ) = c/V. (6.4)
(ii) Suppose that c/V ≤ (1− π (N∗)) /T. Then an equilibrium in which all agents apply
exists.
In both cases the committee processes at most a finite number of applications, which is
fully determined by π.
Proof. In Lemma 6.2 I have demonstrated the existence of a demarcation level α as
stated. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the solution Γ (α, π,N∗, T ) = c/V follows from
Lemma 6.3.
(i) I proceed by showing that in every equilibrium: (a) α > 0 and (b) the determination
of demarcation level α as in (6.4).
(a) When every candidate applies (α = 0), the probability distribution P (m) collapses
such that all probability mass shifts tom = T−1, hence Γ (0, π,N∗, T ) = (1− π (N∗)) /T <
c/V, from which it follows that a sender with ai = ε, for small ε > 0, is strictly better off
by not applying, yielding a contradiction.
(b) Denote the demarcation level by ea. We will rule out the situations
Γ (ea, π,N∗, T ) < c/V and Γ (ea, π,N∗, T ) > c/V. The first implies that ea is strictly better
off by not applying and the second point implies that all in [0,ea] apply. Both points
contradict the fact that ea is a demarcation level.
(ii) That an equilibrium with all T candidates applying exists easily follows.
I note that non-applying agents have the same incentive to apply as the candidate with
ability level α. The reason for this is the following. Incentives to apply are constant in ai
for ai < α as low-ability people can only be chosen if the winner is determined by chance
or if k = 1, and hence, their winning is independent of their true ability. I therefore assign
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a strategy to low-ability people not to apply, although they do not have a strict incentive
to do so, namely they are indifferent, as agent α would be. I have shown that this profile
of strategies is the only subgame perfect equilibrium profile.
The equilibrium proposed above shows how information asymmetry can be overcome,
when the market does not allow for signaling. Because the uninformed compares 2 or
more candidates (with a precision that may be quite low), the higher types have a higher
probability of winning. As a result, only the higher types are willing to incur the partici-
pation costs and separation is induced. I will label this the selection effect of participation
costs c.
In what follows I characterize the contest design. Since variations in c and π will have
no effect on the incentive to apply as long as c/V ≤ (1− π (N∗)) /T, I will focus on the
properties of the equilibrium described under (i) of the Theorem, rather than (ii).
6.4 Contest Design
In this section I consider two design problems: (i) for given market size and selection
technology, how troublesome should applying be made and (ii) for given market size and
cost of applying, is it optimal to have a perfect selection technology ?
Since what matters in equilibrium condition (6.4) is the ratio c/V , all my results on
c can be applied to V as well.13 For simplicity, we normalize V = 1. The committee’s
objective function is given by:
U (c, π;T ) ≡
N∗X
k=1
P (k;α)φ (k; k, π) +
TX
k=N∗+1
P (k;α)φ (N∗; k, π) ,
where, with a slight change in notation from (6.3), P (k; ·) denotes the probability that k
out-of T apply. There is a probability that no one applies (k = 0) and when that happens,
the contest is delayed. I will label this the risk of delay and the payoff in that event is
normalized to 0.14
13This is the case to the extent that V is not a transfer.
14The dynamic process of delay and the resulting updating of information is left out of the model.
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For k ≥ 1 the above expression can be understood by recalling that when k agents
apply, the probability to award the winner is φ (·) , as was elucidated in (6.1). Note that
when k > N∗, the test capacity is overloaded and then the best candidate might not be
considered, and I will label this the overload effect.
In the remainder of the paper I will study the interaction between the selection effect,
the overload effect and the risk of delay to characterize the optimal design of the contest.
First observe that Lemma 6.3 and equilibrium equation (6.4) imply that ∂α∂c > 0. This
leaves us with investigating one other variable, market size T.
For an individual candidate, the number of potential competitors affects the chance of
winning. First, recall that a type ai ∈ [0, α] can only win if the test picks up a candidate
randomly. Then, as T increases, for given demarcation α more candidates apply, and
the discussion that proceeds assumption 1 is again relevant: the increase in k makes it
more difficult to be selected if selection is random, but increases the probability that the
selection is in fact random. The latter effect stimulates low-ability types to apply. By
assumption 1 the first effect dominates and consequently I can show:
Lemma 6.5 The demarcation level α increases in T.
We now use this result to characterize the two design problems.
Designing c
For a given technology π, I relate the optimal cost c to the market size T. If the
demarcation level α would be independent of T, one might conclude that, since for given
α, k increases in T, optimal cost increase in T. The intuition would be that the larger the
market, the more troublesome applying should be, in order to avoid overload. However,
since Lemma 6.5 shows that α does depend on T, this reasoning lacks the strategic effect
of the market size. To accurately incorporate the fact that U (c, π;T ) depends on T via α
as well as directly via P (k; ·) , I resort to a type (B) technology.15 Doing so, I find that:
Proposition 6.6 Suppose that the selection technology is of type (B). There existeπ ≤ 1 such that if π < eπ, then c (T + 1) < c (T ) for all T.
15The difficulty with a type (A) technology is that Γ contains a sum.
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The above Proposition demonstrates that the strategic effect of T inverts the logic
that in larger markets it should be more troublesome to apply: even though overload
constitutes a problem, application cost should decrease in market size!
Designing π
It can easily be verified that whenN∗ > T and π = 1 (perfect information acquisition),
c (T ) = 0 for all T. In many prize competitions however, the utility cost of applying cannot
be controlled to that extent. Therefore, I now look at the design of π : this variable can
be controlled by investing time and budget in the selection technology. When c is given,
I investigate whether it is optimal to have perfect information acquisition:
Proposition 6.7 There exists ec < 1, such that if c > ec, the committee prefers an
imperfect selection technology over a perfect one with π = 1 and N∗ > T .
To give an idea about what the level of ecmight be, I computed it for a market with T =
50 potential applicants: when the utility cost of applying for the prize amounts to more
than 20% of the value of winning it, the committee prefers having an imperfect selection
technology to a perfect one! The reason is that a very accurate selection technology works
discouraging and by lowering it, the risk of delay is dampened. Note that the result does
not require the technology to be costly.
6.5 Market Size
The analysis above shows how a committee best balances the risk of receiving too many
applications with the risk of receiving no applications. Surprisingly, when the market size
increases and the information technology is poor (low π), the selection effect of c should
not be used to discourage applications, but to encourage them. Indeed, when information
acquisition is perfect, participation cost c should be zero. Conversely, when c cannot be
that low, information acquisition should not be perfect. This points out that the risk of
market break down might increase with market size and invalidates the commonly held
belief that the more players there are, the more competitive the outcome will be.
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Since additionally, perfect information acquisition is believed to enable lush competi-
tion, I will in this section use the model to investigate the hypothesis that having perfect
information and a large number of competitors will lead to a competitive outcome. We
denote by E (k | c, T ) the expected number of applications:
Proposition 6.8 Let π (·) be of type (B) with π = 1.
(i) The risk of break down P (0; ·) increases in T ;
(ii) For all finite T, there exist bc (T ) < 1 such that E (k | c, T ) > limT→∞E (k | c, T ) for
c ∈ (bc (T ) , 1].
The proposition shows that having a larger market does not imply having a more
competitive outcome (understood as the expected number of participants), even when
processing capacity is unbounded. This is a relevant insight for those designing markets.
Applied to the labour market, the above implies that in times of high unemployment,
people could actually apply less in the aggregate, due to the low expectations they have
about their chances of being accepted!
My result corresponds to findings in the consumer search literature in which the ex-
pected price is related to the number of firms in the market. Janssen andMoraga-Gonzalez
(2004) show for example that an increase in the number of firms may lead to an increase
in the expected price. In their study, some consumers engage in costly search for prices,
others are fully-informed and firms randomize their price. Now when the number of ri-
val firms increases, it becomes less likely to be the lowest-priced firm (i.e. to win the
competition for selling to the informed consumers) and in that case a firm can be better
off by targeting the consumers that search for one price only, instead of targeting the
fully-informed consumers. Hence, the expected price increases.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
A model of prize competition was presented. My model intends to describe markets
where the contest is specialized in such a way that the applicants cannot be sorted on
the basis of heterogenous variables. I show that in this case, the uninformed market side
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finds an alternative means of information acquisition: directly comparing candidates by
some technology. As a result, better candidates are more likely to win and separation
is induced. A novel feature for the traditional asymmetric information literature is that
both technology and incentives reduce informational asymmetry. My model thus fills the
gap in markets where the traditionally studied mechanisms are not applicable.
The technology is imperfect and as a result, resources will not be spend on every ap-
plication received. This resembles the practice in selection procedures in which numerous
applications are first ranked on rather trivial, uninformative attributes and consequently,
costly interviews are given to a select few.
The nature of information asymmetry I use deserves some discussion. In my setup,
besides not knowing which candidate has which ability (as in most models), it is also
unknown whether there is an applicant out there with ability above some given level.16
For an applicant, knowing her own ability, this implies that she does not know whether a
better candidate considers applying. Especially in those situations where the population
of potential applicants is not too small (in that case people may know each other too well)
one cannot be sure that one of the applicants possesses any pre-specified ability.
The finding that there is a positive probability that nobody applies, is driven by the
fact that realizations of ability are unknown. As argued above, for many markets, not
requiring players to know the distribution is appropriate, and hence, the contingency that
no one applies is an important one. A contest designer must simply take into account that
it might happen that nobody finds it worthwhile to apply: all agents perceive their chance
of winning too low compared to the prize. If no one applies, information about abilities
in the population is revealed and lower quality candidates are encouraged to apply. This
dynamic process, which is left out of the theoretical model, delays the contest.
The variables c and V of the model are not treated as transfers but instead incurred,
resp. enjoyed, only by the agents. They lend themselves therefore for various, non-
monetary interpretations. The cost parameter c for example, can be seen as the trouble
of collecting the application documents and the value of the prize V can be seen as
16Again, as exception, I have this feature in common with Janssen (2002).
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prestige. In case of journal submissions, the cost c can be seen as the waiting time for an
editorial decision.
The above mentioned selection and overload effects and risk of delay were analyzed and
showed that the actual level of competition may vary with market size in an unanticipated
way. Insights about optimal contest design that we obtained are firstly, that the larger
the market, the easier applying should be, in order to mitigate the discouraging effect of
competition. This effect of market size dominates the potential overload of applications.
Secondly, when the utility cost of applying is fixed and high enough, an accurate selection
technology also discourages applicants. In that case, it is in the interest of the committee
to have a less than perfect technology.
Besides the typical contests for prizes and contracts, these insights can be applied to
the allocation of public assets, such as frequencies and licences for example, when they
are procured via a beauty contest rather than via an auction. In this light, I should
emphasize that the committee’s sole objective in this model is to allocate the prize to
the best possible candidate, rather than revenue maximization. A comparison of the two
mechanisms constitutes an avenue for future research.
6.7 Appendix
We investigate the impact on Γ (·) of marginal changes in α and T :
Lemma 6.3 The probability Γ (α, π,N∗, T ) increases in α.
Proof. For convenience, we denote m ≡ k − 1. First note that:
∂P (m,α)
∂α



> 0 for m < bm
= 0 for m = bm
< 0 for m > bm, where bm = (T − 1) (1− α) .
(6.5)
This easily follows from the fact that:
∂P (m,α)
∂α
=
µ
T − 1
m
¶
αT−m−1 (1− α)m
µ
(T − 1) (1− α)−m
α (1− α)
¶
.
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Let P 0 = ∂P (m,α)∂α , the claim can then be stated as
∂Γ (·)
∂α
=
emX
m=1
P 0F (m) +
T−1X
m=em+1
P 0F (m) +
∂P (0, α)
∂α
> 0.
By Assumption 1 and (6.5) this is surely the case if F (bm)PT−1m=1 P 0 + ∂P (0,α)∂α > 0 which
implies
F (bm) T−1X
m=0
P 0 + (1− F (bm)) ∂P (0, α)
∂α
= (1− F (bm)) ∂P (0, α)
∂α
> 0,
now since F (bm) < 1 this inequality holds. This completes the proof.
Lemma 6.5 The demarcation level α increases in T.
Proof. A change in T changes only the probability distribution and the possible
values m can take. Therefore, let us denote the distribution of m when there are T + 1
senders in total by eP (m) , (omitting the argument α for convenience):
P (m) =
µ
T − 1
m
¶
αT−1−m (1− α)m ,
eP (m) = µT
m
¶
αT−m (1− α)m = αT
T −mP (m) ,
hence
Γ (α, π,N∗, T + 1) =
N∗−1X
m=1
eP (m)½(1− π (m+ 1))
m+ 1
¾
+
+
T−1X
m=N∗
eP (m)½(1− π (N∗))
m+ 1
¾
+ eP (T ) 1− π (N∗)
T + 1
+ αP (0) ,
and thus we need to show that
Γ (α, π,N∗, T + 1)− Γ (α, π,N∗, T ) =
N∗−1X
m=1
h eP (m)− P (m)i½(1− π (m+ 1))
m+ 1
¾
+
T−1X
m=N∗
h eP (m)− P (m)i½(1− π (N∗))
m+ 1
¾
+ eP (T ) 1− π (N∗)
T + 1
− (1− α)P (0) < 0
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Now note that eP (m) − P (m) = m−(1−α)TT−m P (m) such that the coefficients on F (m) are
negative for small m and positive for large m. Indeed, we can use the same method as in
Lemma 6.3, employing again (6.5) and Assumption 1.
A sufficient condition for the inequality above is then:
emX
m=1
h eP (m)− P (m)iF (bm) + T−1X
m=em+1
h eP (m)− P (m)iF (bm)+
+ eP (T ) 1− π (N∗)
T + 1
− (1− α)P (0) < 0
Repeatedly rewriting of LHS we get:
F (bm) T−1X
m=1
h eP (m)− P (m)i+ eP (T ) 1− π (N∗)
T + 1
− (1− α)P (0)
= F (bm)(T−1X
m=1
eP (m)− T−1X
m=0
P (m)
)
+ eP (T ) 1− π (N∗)
T + 1
− (1− α− F (bm))P (0)
= eP (T )½1− π (N∗)
T + 1
− F (bm)¾− (1− α) (1− F (bm))P (0) < 0,
and since 1−π(N
∗)
T+1 = F (T ) < F (bm) this inequality is satisfied.
The next two statements are on contest design. For easy reference, we state the
objective function for a type (B) technology:
U (c, π;T ) = π
£
1− αT
¤
+ (1− π)
(
TX
k=1
µ
T
k
¶
1
k
(1− α)k αT−k
)
+
+π
(
TX
N∗+1
µ
T
k
¶
(1− α)k αT−k
·
N∗
k
− 1
¸)
.
Proposition 6.6 Suppose that the selection technology is of type (B). There existseπ ≤ 1 such that if π < eπ, then c (T + 1) < c (T ) for all T.
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Proof. Take the first-order condition w.r.t. α for a maximum of U :
−TπαT−1 + (1− π) T
α
(
TX
k=1
µ
T
k
¶
1
k
(1− α)k αT−k − 1− α
T
T (1− α)
)
+
+π
TX
N+1
µ
T
k
¶
αT−k (1− α)k T (1− α)− k
α (1− α)
·
N
k
− 1
¸
= 0, (6.6)
The proof consists of three steps.
Step (1).
Denote by G (T ) =
PT
k=1
¡T
k
¢
1
k (1− α)
k αT−k and by
H (T ) =
PT
N∗+1
¡T
k
¢
(1− α)k αT−k
£
N∗
k − 1
¤
. We then obtain that (6.6) implies:
c (T ) = (1− π)G (T ) + π
¡
αT−1 − αT
¢
+ π
α
T
H (T ) .
Step (2).
Rewrite G (T ):PT
k=1
¡T
k
¢
1
k (1− α)
k αT−k = αT
PT
k=1
¡T
k
¢
1
k
¡
1−α
α
¢k
. Now let
z = 1−αα , then we get: G (T ) = α
T
P¡T
k
¢
1
kz
k. Now since 1kz
k =
R z
0
xk−1dx, we get
αT
P¡T
k
¢ R z
0
xk−1dx = αT
R z
0
³PT
0
¡T
k
¢
xk−1 − 1x
´
dx =
αT
R z
0
³
1
x
PT
0
¡T
k
¢
xk − 1
´
dx =
αT
Z z
0
1
x
³
(1 + x)T − 1
´
dx = αT
Z 1−α
α
0
(1 + x)T − 1
x
dx.
It is convenient to eliminate α from the bounds of integration. Let y = α
1−αx and
dx = 1−αα dy, then the above can be rewritten as α
T
R 1
0
(1+ 1−αα y)
T−1
1−α
α y
1−α
α dy or:
G (T ) =
Z 1
0
h
(α+ (1− α) y)T − αT
i dy
y
.
Using this expression, take the first-order condition w.r.t. α :
∂U
∂α
= −TπαT−1 + (1− π) dG
dα
+ πH (T ) = 0 or
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−TπαT−1 + (1− π)
½Z 1
0
dy
y
³
T [α+ (1− α) y]T−1 (1− y)− TαT−1
´¾
+ πH (T ) = 0⇒
− παT−1 + π
T
H (T ) + (1− π)
Z 1
0
dy
y
[α+ (1− α) y]T−1 − αT−1 =
(1− π)
Z 1
0
dy [α+ (1− α) y]T−1 =⇒
(1− π)G (T − 1)− παT−1 + π
T
H (T ) = (1− π) 1− α
T
T (1− α)
Hence, f.o.c. (6.6) when the market size equals T implies that:
c (T ) = (1− π)G (T − 1) + π
T
H (T ) .
Step (3).
Now, when convenient, denote by α (T ) the level of α that satisfies the f.o.c. when the
market volume is T. From Steps (1) and (2) we know:
c (T ) = (1− π)G (T, α (T )) + π
¡
αT−1 − αT
¢
+ π
α
T
H (T )
c (T + 1) = (1− π)G (T, α (T + 1)) + π
T + 1
H (T + 1) .
Thus, to prove the result we will show that:
(1− π)G (T, α (T )) + π
¡
αT−1 − αT
¢
+ π
α
T
H (T ) >
(1− π)G (T, α (T + 1)) + π
T + 1
H (T + 1) or
G (T, α (T ))−G (T, α (T + 1)) > π
1− π
µ
H (T + 1)
T + 1
−
¡
αT−1 − αT
¢
− α
T
H (T )
¶
.
Note that, for α (T ) we have ∂G∂α =
π
1−π
¡
TαT−1 −H
¢
due to (6.6). Since π
1−π increases, we
have that ∂G∂α goes to zero when π goes to zero. This, in turn, implies that when π goes
to zero, G (T, α (T )) goes to the maximum of G w.r.t. α. Now since α (T + 1) is different
from α (T ) in a discrete way, we can conclude that there exists a πˆ such that LHS of the
latter inequality is positive for all 0 ≤ π ≤ πˆ. Finally, since the RHS equals zero for π = 0,
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we can conclude that there exists eπ > 0 such that the inequality holds for all π ∈ [0, eπ] .
This completes the proof.
Proposition 6.7 There exists ec < 1, such that if c > ec, the committee prefers an
imperfect selection technology over a perfect one with π = 1 and N∗ > T .
Proof. We will investigate ∂U/∂π in the point π = 1 and N∗ > T, and use the same
notation as in the previous proof. We need to show that:
∂U
∂π
= 1− α (π)T − Tα (π)T−1 ∂α
∂π
π −G+ ∂G
∂π
(1− π) +H + ∂H
∂π
π < 0
Since N∗ > T, the last two terms vanish and then substituting π = 1 we get
1− α (π)T − Tα (π)T−1 ∂α
∂π
−G < 0. (6.7)
First, we investigate ∂α∂π . The demarcation α depends on π via, (6.4) and we thus use the
Implicit Function Theorem to obtain that, in π = 1:
∂α
∂π
= −
αT−1 − 1−αTT (1−α)
(T − 1)αT−2 ,
thus TαT−1 ∂α∂π =
1
T−1
µ
α(1−αT )
1−α − TαT
¶
. Inequality (6.7) thus becomes
1− αT −G < 1
T − 1
Ã
α
¡
1− αT
¢
1− α − Tα
T
!
or
1−G < 1
T − 1
α− αT
1− α . (6.8)
Now from the proof of Proposition 6.6 we know that
G =
R 1
0
h
(α+ (1− α) y)T − αT
i
dy
y and
dG
dα =
R 1
0
dy
y
³
T [α+ (1− α) y]T−1 (1− y)− TαT−1
´
. Label LHS and RHS of (6.8) by
LHS (α) and RHS (α) , respectively. We will now show that (i) LHS(1) = RHS(1)
and (ii) dLHSdα (1) >
dRHS
dα (1) .
(i) It is easily shown that G (α = 1) = 0 and RHS can be written as 1T−1α
1−αT−1
1−α . By ap-
plying l’Hopital’s rule once we get that limα→1 1−α
T−1
1−α = T−1, showing that RHS (1) = 1.
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(ii) We have dGdα (1) =
R 1
0
dy
y (T (1− y)− T ) = −T and thus dLHS/dα = T. Now,
dRHS
dα (1) =
1
T−1 limα→1
1−TαT−1
1−α and by applying l’Hopital’s rule twice we obtain that
the limit equals dRHSdα (1) = T/2.
Due to points (i) and (ii) there exists α0 < 1 such that (6.8) holds for all α > α0 and
the fact that α monotonically increases in c implies the existence of ec as stated.
Proposition 6.8 Let π (·) be of type (B) with π = 1.
(i) The risk of break down P (0; ·) increases in T ;
(ii) For all finite T, there exist bc (T ) < 1 such that E (k | c, T ) > limT→∞E (k | c, T ) for
c ∈ (bc (T ) , 1].
Proof. (i) In equilibrium, α (T )T−1 = c and hence P (0; ·) = α (T )T = α (T ) c. Now
since RHS increases in T, LHS must increase in T as well.
(ii)We first show thatE (k | c, T ) converges to− ln (c) .We haveE (k | c, T ) = T
h
1− (c)1/(T−1)
i
.
Write this as T
1/[1−(c)1/(T−1)]
and note that both numerator and denumerator converge to
infinity. The limit can then be obtained by repeatedly applying l’Hôpital’s rule.
Next, we show
T
¡
1− c1/(T−1)
¢
> − ln (c) .
First observe that both sides are decreasing in c. Then we will prove by showing that
LHS > RHS for c high enough. We have that ∂LHS∂c =
−T
T−1c
−T/(T−1) and dRHSdc = −
1
c and
LHS (1) = RHS (1) and thus the inequality is satisfied in a left neighbourhood of c = 1.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
Several important economic consequences of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) were discussed in this thesis. While incorporating the promising features of these
ICTs, each essay also addressed the important drawbacks that are naturally associated to
them. In this way, we attempted to provide a balanced analysis of an ICTs significance for
society. Indeed, our analysis might shed some light on the question why these technologies
have not invaded the economic sphere totally. This holds especially for Part I. The essays
in Part II are to a lesser extent focused on the emergence of the Internet, but discuss
information acquisition and the advances in technology that allow risk selection (Chapters
4 and 5) and how best to use the possibilities of information acquisition (Chapter 6). In
this final Chapter I summarize each individual Chapter and attempt to provide some
implications for further research and policy.
In Chapter 2 we analyze a market where firms compete in a conventional and an
electronic retail channel. Consumers easily compare prices online, but some incur purchase
uncertainties on the online channel. We investigate the market shares of the two retail
channels and the prices that are charged. We find that the share of the electronic channel
is decreasing in the size of the uncertainty. Furthermore, searching consumers do not
always buy. They drop out when the uncertainty associated with buying online is not
compensated by a low price. Finally, the model exhibits price dispersion and surprisingly,
the expected price is increasing in the magnitude of the online purchase uncertainty and in
the number of confident online shoppers. Most of the findings are in line with observations
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on e-commerce. Our model thus provides a sound explanation of the low share of Internet
sales, emphasizing the need of trust in the online environment and the need for intangible
product information. The importance of these issues has been confirmed by OECD (2004).
Additionally, the equilibrium attributes price dispersion to the fact that firms’ operate
their different retail channels jointly.
Chapter 3 analyzes the incentives for incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms and new en-
trants to start an online retail channel in a differentiated goods market. To this end we set
up a two-stage model where firms first decide whether or not to build the infrastructure
necessary to start an online retail channel and then compete in prices using the channels
they have opened up. Consumers trade-off the convenience of online shopping and the
ease to compare prices, with online uncertainties. Without a threat of entry by a third
pure online player we find that for most parameter constellations firms’ dominant strategy
is not to open an online retail channel as this cannibalizes too much on their conventional
sales. As the cannibalization effect is not present for a pure Internet player, we show
that these firms will start online retail channels under a much wider range of parameter
constellations. The threat of entry may force incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms to deter
entry by starting up an Internet retail channel themselves. We also show that a low cost
of building up an online retail channel or online shopping conveniences may not be to the
benefit of online shopping as the strategic interaction between firms may be such that no
online retail channel is built when the circumstances seem to be more favourable. Finally,
we provide arguments for the low viability of pure online retailers that was observed in
the last decade. This essay thus explains the rather low share of e-commerce in retailing
by investigating the profitability for firms to enter online. An interesting issue for future
research is whether the theoretical predictions can be verified empirically. In future the-
oretical work, it would be interesting to see to what extent the conclusion drawn here for
a more or less saturated market continues to hold when the online retail channel is able
to attract new costumers.
Chapter 4 studies an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types,
private information and a competitive supply side. We use the model to investigate the
welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate that a test
is available that determines whether an applicant’s risk exceeds a treshold. Excluding the
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highest risks softens adverse selection, but constitutes a welfare loss for the high risks. In
contrast to a lemons market intuition, we find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk
aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination increases aggregate
surplus and may even prevent a market from being eradicated by adverse selection. The
important mechanism that drives this finding is the price elasticity of the demand for
insurance. The result contributes to the lively policy debate on the desirability of insurers’
use of medical and genetic information: the effect of discrimination on aggregate welfare
depends on the risk preferences of the insurees. Our theoretical work thus reemphasizes
the need for understanding and measuring the empirical attitudes towards risk, and how
they vary between markets.
A model that largely coincides with the one above is employed in Chapter 5 to investi-
gate the contestability clause in the policy: when a claim is filed, the insurer may dispute
it on grounds of the information provided by the insuree. Smoking in life insurance is
our leading example: there are different rates for smokers and non-smokers. We compare
the aggregate utility in a two contracts economy with a one, non-contestable contract
economy. Having two contracts alleviates adverse selection, but increases the risk in the
smokers pool. The negative effect dominates: contestability decreases welfare. This result
strongly opposes earlier studies and is striking in view of the fact that the two-contracts
situation is in fact the way the market is organized in the U.S. and many other countries.
Whether the theoretical controversy will find its counterpart in the policy debate remains
to be seen.
The final essay presents a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choos-
ing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best
candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice
of application cost, size of the prize and use of information technology are being char-
acterized. In equilibrium, the number of applicants is stochastic and may overload the
committee. I show that in spite of overload, the optimal cost (size of the prize) is decreas-
ing (increasing) in market size. Furthermore I show that in case the control of application
cost is limited and this cost therefore cannot be set low enough, the committee prefers an
imperfect information technology over a perfect one.
140
From a conceptual perspective, it is surprising that a model built to study overload
and spam (resulting from a limited cognitive capacity) finds that the more potential
applicants there are, the less their applying should be discouraged by cost. The mechanism
of discouragement behind this may even render perfect information processing inferior!
This trade-off between preventing overload and avoiding desired information being missed
is a policy challenge recognized by OECD (2004).
The applications of this model are versatile. Typical examples are the competitions
for prizes, grants and awards that are common in the academic world. Interestingly, my
result indicates that the increased reach of competitions due to Internet should go hand
in hand with easy application, which is natural for an e-mail or Internet environment.
The overload effect of the high reach is offset by the discouragement of this reach for each
individual applicant, making it undesirable to discourage by costs. This is however not
all to it; an increased reach due to Internet does not necessarily imply that the number
of potential competitors is large since it is limited by the number of individuals that is
eligible for application. The paper shows that the optimal design of the competition varies
with this number.
Another example that comes very naturally is architectural competition. Since in this
market the costs of preparing an application are always substantial, my results indicate
that here it may pay for a committee to have a not-so-perfect selection technology in
order to avoid the possibility that applicants feel too uncertain to apply.
To conclude, the essays in this book cover several topics in the large field of infor-
mation economics. We showed how phenomena such as bounded human information
processing capacities, the importance of non-digital information, the indirect nature of
e-commerce and discrimination due to disclosure of personal information can be incorpo-
rated in theoretical models. The endeavours may contribute to understanding the impact
of information and communication technologies.
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Chapter 8
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In het laatste decennium heeft veel vooruitgang in informatie- en communicatietechnolo-
gieën (ICT) plaatsgevonden. Deze technologieën spelen een grote rol in de wereldeconomie
(OECD 2004): de opkomst van het Internet heeft de verspreiding van informatie verge-
makkelijkt en technologische ontwikkeling heeft de verwerving van informatie verbeterd,
bijvoorbeeld in de gezondheidszorg. Desondanks is de verwerking van informatie nog
steeds begrensd door de menselijke natuur en het gemak waarmee individuen en bedrijven
elkaar informatie toezenden werkt overlading (‘overload’) in de hand. Andere grenzen aan
de mogelijkheden van informatiestromen zijn dat niet alles van waarde in digitale vorm
gegoten kan worden, dat transacties via Internet indirect zijn en dat informatie discrimi-
natie in de hand kan werken. De gevolgen van ICTs op de maatschappij zijn daarom niet
zondermeer duidelijk. Zo vraagt OECD (2004) aandacht voor de volgende beleidsonder-
werpen: veiligheid en vertrouwen in de online omgeving, waarborgen van privacy en de
bestrijding van spam.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf essays dat elk een van de bovenstaande thema’s be-
handelt en de impact van een ICT op het economische verkeer onderzoekt. De eerste twee
hoofdstukken analyseren op welke wijze en in welke mate het Internet gebruikt kan worden
voor (detail)handel. De voor- en nadelen van Internet voor zowel consumenten als bedri-
jven worden gemodelleerd om het functioneren van de markt in kaart te brengen, waardoor
zicht ontstaat op het belang van e-commerce. Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 gaan over de infor-
matieachterstand die verzekeraars ondervinden ten opzichte van kandidaat-verzekerden
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en welke technologieën zij in de praktijk gebruiken om deze achterstand te overbruggen.
Zoals gebleken is in beleidsdiscussies, over bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van genetische infor-
matie, kan deze informatieverwerving leiden tot discriminatie en schending van privacy.
De twee essays onderzoeken elk het effect van een vorm van informatiegebruik op de totale
maatschappelijke welvaart en dragen zo bij aan het debat over de wenselijkheid ervan.
Het laatste hoofdstuk behandelt het thema overlading, wanneer een selectiecommissie
een kandidaat uit velen moet kiezen, bijvoorbeeld bij de werving van een werknemer.
Een van de vragen die aan bod komen is: als de omvang van de kandidatenmarkt groeit,
moeten zij dan ontmoedigd worden om te solliciteren? Ik zal nu elk hoofdstuk afzonderlijk
samenvatten en enige aanbevelingen geven.
In Hoofdstuk 2 introduceren we een model waarin twee bedrijven elk de beschikking
hebben over twee verkoopkanalen: het Internet (e-commerce) en een conventionele winkel.
Consumenten dienen te kiezen of en waar ze een aankoop willen doen: bij een van de
conventionele winkels of online. Daarbij ondervinden sommige ‘onervaren’ consumenten
de volgende voor- en nadelen. Online kunnen ze gemakkelijk prijzen vergelijken, zodat
ze zeker weten dat ze de aankoop tegen de laagste prijs doen. Het nadeel van de online
omgeving bestaat uit twee factoren. Ten eerste kunnen niet alle producteigenschappen
onderzocht worden omdat het product niet fysiek bekeken en betast kan worden. Ten
tweede is de uitvoering van de transactie niet direct: betaling en levering vinden niet
direct plaats. Dit betekent dat men niet zeker weet of er niet te veel via bijvoorbeeld
credit card wordt afgeschreven en of het product wel geleverd wordt. Deze nadelen noemen
we hieronder de ‘online onzekerheid’ en deze vormen de voordelen van de conventionele
winkel: producten kunnen uitgebreid ‘besnuffeld’ worden en goede afloop van betaling en
levering zijn direct vast te stellen.
Het marktaandeel van e-commerce draait daarom op twee grootheden: de zekerheid de
laagste prijs te betalen (online) en de online onzekerheid. De resultaten zijn als volgt. Hoe
groter de online onzekerheid, hoe kleiner het marktaandeel van e-commerce. Consumenten
die voor het Internet kiezen, doen niet altijd een aankoop: de online onzekerheid wordt
voor hen niet voldoende gecompenseerd door een lage prijs. Verder is het zo dat in
sommige marktomstandigheden er geen enkele combinatie van prijzen bestaat die tot
evenwicht leidt en de prijzen zijn in zo’n markt daarom zeer moeilijk te voorspellen.
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Alhoewel beide bedrijven hetzelfde product verkopen en op Internet aanbieden, kan het
dus voorkomen dat hun prijzen ver uit elkaar liggen! Het meest verrassende resultaat
tenslotte is dat de verwachte prijs toeneemt in de omvang van de online onzekerheid en
in het aantal consumenten dat deze onzekerheid niet ervaart.
De meeste bevindingen komen overeen met empirische waarnemingen over het mark-
taandeel van e-commerce. Ons model geeft dus een theoretische verklaring voor het lage
marktaandeel van e-commerce, met nadruk op vertrouwen in de online omgeving en het
belang van product eigenschappen die niet digitaal te communiceren zijn.
Hoofdstuk 3 kijkt daarnaast ook naar de winstgevendheid voor bedrijven om een online
verkoopkanaal op te zetten, zowel voor bedrijven die al een conventionele winkel geves-
tigd hebben als voor bedrijven die alleen online zullen opereren. Wanneer de dreiging van
toetreding door een zuivere Internet speler afwezig is, loont het onder de meeste mark-
tomstandigheden niet om te investeren in een online verkoopkanaal, omdat de afzet in dat
kanaal vooral ten koste zou gaan aan afzet die anders in de eigen winkel behaald zou wor-
den, tegen een hogere prijs. Zuivere online spelers ondervinden dit kannibalisatie effect
niet en zullen daarom eerder toetreden en die mogelijkheid beweegt de al aanwezige bedri-
jven dan toch actief te worden op het Internet, om zo de toetreding te voorkomen. Op
die wijze verklaren wij de lage winsten die zuivere online bedrijven het laatste decennium
hebben behaald. Dit essay schrijft het geringe aandeel van e-commerce dus toe aan de lage
winstgevendheid voor bedrijven, die resulteert uit de strategische toetredingsbeslissingen
en de kannibalisatie van de omzet in het conventionele kanaal.
De resterende hoofdstukken gaan over informatieverwerving: in veel markten heeft
de ene partij een informatieachterstand op de andere. Een voorbeeld: de werkgever die
potentiële werknemers vergelijkt weet minder van de kwaliteiten van die kandidaat dan
de kandidaat zelf. Sinds Nobelprijswinnaar George Akerlof in 1970 hierover publiceerde
hebben veel auteurs laten zien hoe een vaststaande informatieasymmetrie kan leiden tot
drastische gevolgen, zoals het totaal uitblijven van handel. Mijn essays volgen een an-
dere aanpak: hoe kan de achtergestelde partij zijn informatiegebrek overbruggen middels
een informatietechnologie? Dit zien we overal: een werkgever interviewt een sollicitant,
een koper van een tweedehands auto maakt een testrit en een verzekeraar onderzoekt
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een kandidaat-verzekerde. Ik onderscheid deze technologische aanpak nadrukkelijk van
oplossingen die gebaseerd zijn op evenwichtsconstructies zoals signalling en screening.
In de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 is anti-selectie (adverse selection) bij verzekering het vertrekpunt.
De belangrijke aanname hier is dat de kandidaat-verzekerde zijn eigen risico beter kan in-
schatten dan de verzekeraar. Die informatieachterstand van de verzekeraar op kandidaat-
verzekerden zorgt ervoor dat de verzekeraar de premie moet baseren op het verwachte
risico van zijn klantenbestand. Omdat bij deze premie de individuen met de allerlaagste
risico’s de verzekering te duur zullen vinden, zullen zij geen klant worden. Dit drijft het
verwachte risico en daarmee de premie omhoog, waardoor weer meer lage risico’s zullen
afhaken. Dit mechanisme (anti-selectie) kan ertoe leiden dat er in het evenwicht geen
enkele verzekering afgesloten zal worden.
Verzekeraars proberen deze informatieachterstand zo goed mogelijk te overbruggen
en dit leidt tot maatschappelijke onrust omdat betere informatie automatisch leidt tot
differentiatie en daarmee kan afdoen aan het solidariteitsbeginsel in verzekering en wellicht
ook tot schending van privacy. Een voorbeeld van een debat is de toegang tot verzekering
voor HIV/Aids patiënten. De onthulling van genetische persoonlijke informatie reikt nog
verder en werpt allerlei ethische dilemma’s op.
In hoofdstuk 4 is een verzekeringsmarkt met anti-selectie het vertrekpunt. Ik bestudeer
de praktijk waarin verzekeraars middels een test bepalen of een kandidaat-verzekerde tot
een hoge risico groep behoort. Te denken valt bijvoorbeeld aan medische (waaronder
genetische) tests in geval van het ziektekosten- of arbeidsongeschiktheidsrisico. Met de
uitslag kan de verzekeraar de hoge risico-groep een aangepast contract aanbieden of uit-
sluiten. Anti-selectie wordt hierdoor verzacht, maar het nadeel is dat de hoge risico’s geen
of een ongunstiger verzekering zullen hebben. Er zijn dus twee tegenstrijdige effecten op
de totale maatschappelijke welvaart: een nadelig effect voor de hoge risico’s en een vo-
ordelig effect voor de andere individuen. Het model stelt ons in staat de optelsom van
deze effecten analytisch vast te stellen. Deze blijkt af te hangen van de gevoeligheid voor
onzekerheid (ofwel risicoaversie) van de verzekerden. In geval verzekerden erg gevoelig zijn
voor onzekerheid, zullen relatief veel lage risico’s een verzekering afsluiten. Het probleem
van adverse selection is dan gering. Als in die situatie de test wordt ingevoerd, zal de
verzachting van adverse selection weinig extra verzekerden opleveren. Het totale welvaart-
145
seffect van discriminatie is dan negatief. Wanneer deze risicoaversie echter laag is, lijdt
men weinig onder onzekerheid en is de prijs zeer belangrijk voor het bepalen van de om-
vang van de markt. Adverse selection is daarom een groot probleem en kan zelfs de markt
geheel vernietigen. Als vanuit deze situatie de discriminerende test wordt ingevoerd, zal
de totale maatschappelijke welvaart stijgen. Het verlies voor de hoge risico’s wordt in dat
geval gecompenseerd door de winst van de relatief lage risico’s. Mijn analyse laat dus zien
dat de wenselijkheid van discriminatie afhangt van de risicoaversie onder verzekerden. Dit
resultaat noopt tot meer kennis over de empirische risicoaversie in verschillende markten.
Hoofdstuk 5 bestudeert het gebruik van informatie door verzekeraars nadat het con-
tract is gesloten. Voorafgaand aan het tekenen van het contract vullen kandidaten een
vragenlijst in over hun medische situatie. Het contract bevat een clausule die de verzek-
eraar de mogelijkheid geeft schadeuitkering te weigeren indien zij deze informatie kan
bestrijden. In de Verenigde Staten gebeurt dit bijvoorbeeld met roken bij levensverzeker-
ing: verzekerden verklaren zelf of zij roken of niet. Niet-rokers betalen een lagere premie
maar lopen het risico dat de verzekering aangevochten wordt wanneer er aanspraak op
wordt gemaakt. Weer zijn er tegenovergestelde effecten: de clausule zorgt ervoor dat niet-
rokers een beter contract aangeboden krijgen waar meer individuen gebruik van zullen
maken, terwijl rokers erop achteruit gaan. Daarnaast neemt de zekerheid voor niet-rokers
af omdat het contract na schade aangevochten kan worden. In dit hoofdstuk vergelijk ik
de maatschappelijke welvaart in een wereld waarin dit is toegestaan met die in een wereld
waar dat niet is toegestaan. Het negatieve effect domineert: de clausule verlaagt de
maatschappelijke welvaart. Dit weerlegt resultaten uit eerdere studies en zet vraagtekens
bij deze in de praktijk veelvoorkomende clausule.
Hoofdstuk 6 is het laatste essay en gaat over het probleem van een selectiecommissie
wanneer zij een kandidaat uit velen moet kiezen en over de keuze van een kandidaat om te
solliciteren of niet. De keuze van de commissie is enerzijds hoe de competitie georganiseerd
moet worden en anderzijds hoe met een teveel aan sollicitaties omgegaan moet worden als
tijd en middelen voor selectie beperkt zijn. Een sollicitant moet zijn kans om te winnen
inschatten en daarmee afwegen of het loont zich de moeite van sollicitatie te getroosten.
De interactie wordt speltheoretisch geanalyseerd en is niet alleen van toepassing op de
arbeidsmarkt maar op al die situaties waar een partij moet kiezen uit velen om een
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contract mee te sluiten. Voorbeelden zijn competities voor architectuuropdrachten, de
keuze van een huurder door een verhuurder en het toewijzen van subsidies aan kunstenaars
en wetenschappers. De cruciale informatieachterstand is dat de kandidaten beter weten
in welke mate ze aan de doelstelling van de commissie zullen voldoen dan de commissie
zelf.
De volgende vragen komen aan bod. Hoe moet met een eventueel teveel aan sollici-
taties worden omgegaan? Is het in het belang van de commissie om sollicitaties middels
een drempel te ontmoedigen en hoe verhoudt de optimale drempel zich tot de omvang van
de kandidatenmarkt? Onder welke omstandigheden loont het te investeren in een betere
selectietechnologie of commissie? Analyse van de drijfveren van zowel kandidaat als com-
missie levert de volgende aanbevelingen voor een commissie op. Een commissie doet er
goed aan willekeurig sollicitanten te negeren als het totale aantal boven een vaststaande
bovengrens uitkomt. Wanneer tijd en middelen inderdaad beperkt zijn, is het altijd op-
timaal een drempel op te werpen, financieel of anderszins. Wanneer de accuratesse van
de selectietechnologie laag genoeg is, moet deze drempel dalen in de omvang van de kan-
didatenmarkt: hoe meer (potentiële) kandidaten er zijn, hoe makkelijker het solliciteren
moet zijn. Merk op dat juist wanneer deze accuratesse laag is, overlading eerder optreedt
wat het resultaat extra verrassend maakt.
Tenslotte, in die markten waar de drempel relatief hoog is en niet gemakkelijk is te
verlagen (bijvoorbeeld bij architectuur competities), is het optimaal voor de commissie om
een imperfecte selectietechnologie te hebben, omdat kandidaten anders zozeer ontmoedigd
worden dat het risico dat niemand reageert te groot zou zijn.
Ik heb een aantal thema’s in informatie-economie besproken. Ik heb laten zien hoe
fenomenen zoals begrensde informatieverwerking, het belang van niet-digitale informatie,
de indirecte aard van uitwisseling op het Internet en discriminatie als gevolg van infor-
matieverwerving verwerkt kunnen worden in theoretische modellen. Hopelijk dragen ze bij
aan het inzicht in de gevolgen van informatie en communicatietechnologieën op economie
en maatschappij.
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